

294. Sino regularly communicated with the public investors and financial analysts via established market communication mechanisms, including through regular disseminations of their disclosure documents, including press releases on newswire services in Canada, the United States and elsewhere. Each time Sino communicated that new material information about Sino financial results to the public the price of Sino securities was directly affected.

295. Sino was the subject of analysts' reports that incorporated certain of the material information contained in the Impugned Documents, with the effect that any recommendations to purchase Sino securities in such reports during the Class Period were based, in whole or in part, upon that information.

296. Sino's securities were and are traded, among other places, on the TSX, which is an efficient and automated market. The price at which Sino's securities traded promptly incorporated material information from Sino's disclosure documents about Sino's business and affairs, including the Representation, which was disseminated to the public through the documents referred to above and distributed by Sino, as well as by other means.

### **XIII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY**

#### **A. *Sino and the Individual Defendants***

297. Sino is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of the Individual Defendants particularized in this Claim.

298. The acts or omissions particularized and alleged in this Claim to have been done by Sino were authorized, ordered and done by the Individual Defendants and other agents, employees and representatives of Sino, while engaged in the management, direction, control and transaction of the business and affairs of Sino. Such acts and omissions are, therefore, not only the acts and omissions of the Individual Defendants, but are also the acts and omissions of Sino.

950

120

299. At all material times, the Individual Defendants were officers and/or directors of Sino. As their acts and omissions are independently tortious, they are personally liable for same to the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members.

**B. E&Y**

300. E&Y is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of each of its officers, directors, partners, agents and employees as set out above.

301. The acts or omissions particularized and alleged in this Claim to have been done by E&Y were authorized, ordered and done by its officers, directors, partners, agents and employees, while engaged in the management, direction, control and transaction of the business and affairs of E&Y. Such acts and omissions are, therefore, not only the acts and omissions of those persons, but are also the acts and omissions of E&Y.

**C. BDO**

302. BDO is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of each of its officers, directors, partners, agents and employees as set out above.

303. The acts or omissions particularized and alleged in this Claim to have been done by BDO were authorized, ordered and done by its officers, directors, partners, agents and employees, while engaged in the management, direction, control and transaction of the business and affairs of BDO. Such acts and omissions are, therefore, not only the acts and omissions of those persons, but are also the acts and omissions of BDO.

**D. Pöyry**

304. Pöyry is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of each of its officers, directors, partners, agents and employees as set out above.

305. The acts or omissions particularized and alleged in this Claim to have been done by Pöyry were authorized, ordered and done by its officers, directors, partners, agents and employees, while engaged in the management, direction, control and transaction of the business and affairs of Pöyry. Such acts and omissions are, therefore, not only the acts and omissions of those persons, but are also the acts and omissions of Pöyry.

**E. *The Underwriters***

306. The Underwriters are vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of each of their respective officers, directors, partners, agents and employees as set out above.

307. The acts or omissions particularized and alleged in this Claim to have been done by the Underwriters were authorized, ordered and done by each of their respective officers, directors, partners, agents and employees, while engaged in the management, direction, control and transaction of the business and affairs such Underwriters. Such acts and omissions are, therefore, not only the acts and omissions of those persons, but are also the acts and omissions of the respective Underwriters.

**XIV. REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION WITH ONTARIO**

308. The Plaintiffs plead that this action has a real and substantial connection with Ontario because, among other thing:

- (a) Sino is a reporting issuer in Ontario;
- (b) Sino's shares trade on the TSX which is located in Toronto, Ontario;
- (c) Sino's registered office and principal business office is in Mississauga, Ontario;
- (d) the Sino disclosure documents referred to herein were disseminated in and from Ontario;
- (e) a substantial proportion of the Class Members reside in Ontario;

- (f) Sino carries on business in Ontario; and
- (g) a substantial portion of the damages sustained by the Class were sustained by persons and entities domiciled in Ontario.

#### **XV. SERVICE OUTSIDE OF ONTARIO**

309. The Plaintiffs may serve the Notice of Action and Statement of Claim outside of Ontario without leave in accordance with rule 17.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, because this claim is:

- (a) a claim in respect of personal property in Ontario (para 17.02(a));
- (b) a claim in respect of damage sustained in Ontario (para 17.02(h));
- (c) a claim authorized by statute to be made against a person outside of Ontario by a proceeding in Ontario (para 17.02(n)); and
- (d) a claim against a person outside of Ontario who is a necessary or proper party to a proceeding properly brought against another person served in Ontario (para 17.02(o)); and
- (e) a claim against a person ordinarily resident or carrying on business in Ontario (para 17.02(p)).

#### **XVI. RELEVANT LEGISLATION, PLACE OF TRIAL, JURY TRIAL AND HEADINGS**

310. The Plaintiffs plead and rely on the *CJA*, the *CPA*, the Securities Legislation and *CBCA*, all as amended.

311. The Plaintiffs propose that this action be tried in the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, as a proceeding under the *CPA*.

312. The Plaintiffs will serve a jury notice.

313. The headings contained in this Statement of Claim are for convenience only. This Statement of Claim is intended to be read as an integrated whole, and not as a series of unrelated components.

January 26, 2012

**Siskinds LLP**

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Lawyers for the Plaintiffs

Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada,  
*et al.* and Sino-Forest Corporation,  
*et al.*

Plaintiffs

Defendants

**ONTARIO**

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

**FRESH AS AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM**

**(NOTICE OF ACTION ISSUED JULY 20, 2011)**

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
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Lawyers for the Plaintiffs

**TAB C**

This is Exhibit "C" mentioned and referred to in the Affidavit of Daniel E. H. Bach, sworn before me at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 11th day of April, 2012.



---

A Commissioner, etc.  
Serge Kalloghlian  
(LSUC #55557F)





## Sino-Forest Announces Resignation of Director

**TORONTO, CANADA – November 4, 2011** - Sino-Forest Corporation (the "Company") (TSX:TRE) today announced James Bowland has resigned as a director. Mr. Bowland joined the Board in February, 2011 and was a member of the Independent Committee, the Audit Committee and the Compensation and Nominating Committee. The Company would like to thank Mr. Bowland for his contributions to the Company.

### **About Sino-Forest Corporation**

Sino-Forest Corporation is a leading commercial forest plantation operator in China. Its principal businesses include the ownership and management of tree plantations, the sale of standing timber and wood logs, and the complementary manufacturing of downstream engineered-wood products. Sino-Forest also holds a majority interest in Greenheart Group Limited (HKSE:00094), a Hong-Kong listed investment holding company with assets in Suriname (South America) and New Zealand and involved in sustainable harvesting, processing and sales of its logs and lumber to China and other markets around the world. Sino-Forest's common shares have been listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol TRE since 1995. Learn more at [www.sinoforest.com](http://www.sinoforest.com).

Cautionary note: No stock exchange or regulatory authority has approved or disapproved of information contained herein.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT:

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Cindy Leggett-Flynn

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Hong Kong

Tim Payne

Joseph Lo

Tel: +852 3512 5000

# TAB D

This is Exhibit "D" mentioned and referred to in the Affidavit of Daniel E. H. Bach, sworn before me at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 11th day of April, 2012.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Serge Kalloghlian', is written over a horizontal line.

A Commissioner, etc.  
Serge Kalloghlian  
(LSUC #55557F)

**CITATION:** Smith v Sino-Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC24  
**COURT FILE NO.:** 11-CV-428238CP  
**COURT FILE NO.:** 11-CV-431153CP  
**COURT FILE NO.:** 11-CV-435826CP  
**DATE:** January 6, 2012

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

**BETWEEN:**

**Douglas Smith and Zhongjun Goa**

Plaintiffs

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation, Allen T.Y. Chan, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, W. Judson Martin, Simon Murray, Peter D.H. Wang, David J. Horsley, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., and Maison Placements Canada Inc.**

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

**AND BETWEEN:**

**The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada and the Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario**

Plaintiffs

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation, Ernst & Young LLP, Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley, William E. Ardell, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley, James P Bowland, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, Simon Murray, Peter Wang, Garry J. West, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc. Canaccord Financial Ltd., and Maison Placements Canada Inc.**

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

**AND BETWEEN:**

**Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P., Comité Syndical National de Retraite  
Bâtirente Inc.**

Plaintiffs

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation, Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon,  
David J. Horsley, Hua Chen, Wei Mao Zhao, Alfred C.T. Hung, Albert Ip, George  
Ho, Thomas M. Maradin, William E. Ardell, James M.E. Hyde, Simon Murray,  
Garry J. West, James P. Bowland, Edmund Mak, Peter Wang, Kee Y. Wong, The  
Estate of John Lawrence, Simon Yeung, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited,  
Pöyry Forest Industry PTE Limited, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company  
Limited, JP Management Consulting (Asia-Pacific) PTE Ltd., Dundee Securities  
Corporation, UBS Securities Canada Inc., Haywood Securities Inc., Credit Suisse  
Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia  
Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc. Canaccord  
Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co.  
Incorporated, Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner  
& Smith, Inc.**

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

**COUNSEL:**

- J.P. Rochon, J. Archibald, and S. Tambakos for the Plaintiffs in 11-CV-428238CP
- K.M. Baert, J. Bida, and C.M. Wright for the Plaintiffs in 11-CV-431153CP
- J.C. Orr, V. Paris, N. Mizobuchi, and A. Erfan for the Plaintiffs in 11-CV-435826CP
- M. Eizenga for the defendant Sino-Forest Corporation
- P. Osborne and S. Roy for the defendant Ernst & Young LLP
- E. Cole for the defendant Allen T.Y. Chan
- J. Fabello for the defendant underwriters

**HEARING DATES:** December 20 and 21, 2011

**PERELL, J.**

**REASONS FOR DECISION****A. INTRODUCTION**

[1] This is a carriage motion under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, S.O. 1992, c. 6. In this particular carriage motion, four law firms are rivals for the carriage of a class action against Sino-Forest Corporation. There are currently four proposed Ontario class

actions against Sino-Forest to recover losses alleged to be in the billions of dollars arising from the spectacular crash in value of its shares and notes.

[2] Practically speaking, carriage motions involve two steps. First, the rival law firms that are seeking carriage of a class action extoll their own merits as class counsel and the merits of their client as the representative plaintiff. During this step, the law firms explain their tactical and strategic plans for the class action, and, thus, a carriage motion has aspects of being a casting call or rehearsal for the certification motion.

[3] Second, the rival law firms submit that with their talent and their litigation plan, their class action is the better way to serve the best interests of the class members, and, thus, the court should choose their action as the one to go forward. No doubt to the delight of the defendants and the defendants' lawyers, which have a watching brief, the second step also involves the rivals hardheartedly and toughly reviewing and criticizing each other's work and pointing out flaws, disadvantages, and weaknesses in their rivals' plans for suing the defendants.

[4] The law firms seeking carriage are: Rochon Genova LLP; Koskie Minsky LLP; Siskinds LLP; and Kim Orr Barristers P.C., all competent, experienced, and veteran class action law firms.

[5] For the purposes of deciding the carriage motions, I will assume that all of the rivals have delivered their Statements of Claim as they propose to amend them.

[6] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds propose to act as co-counsel and to consolidate two of the actions. Thus, the competition for carriage is between three proposed class actions; namely:

- *Smith v. Sino-Forest Corp.* (11-CV-428238CP) ("*Smith v. Sino-Forest*") with Rochon Genova as Class Counsel
- *The Trustees of Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corp.* (11-CV-431153CP) ("*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*") with Koskie Minsky and Siskinds as Class Counsel (This action would be consolidated with "*Grant v. Sino-Forest*" (CV-11-439400-00CP))
- *Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P. v. Sino-Forest Corp.* (11-CV-435826CP) ("*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*") with Kim Orr as Class Counsel.

[7] It has been a very difficult decision to reach, but for the reasons that follow, I stay *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, and I grant carriage to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[8] I also grant leave to the plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, which may include the joinder of the plaintiffs and the causes of action set out in *Grant v. Sino-Forest*, *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, as the plaintiffs may be advised.

[9] This order is without prejudice to the rights of the Defendants to challenge the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim as they may be advised. In any event, nothing in

these reasons is intended to make findings of fact or law binding on the Defendants or to be a pre-determination of the certification motion.

## **B. METHODOLOGY**

[10] To explain my reasons, first, I will describe the jurisprudence about carriage motions. Second, I will describe the evidentiary record for the carriage motions. Third, I will describe the factual background to the claims against Sino-Forest, which is the principal but not the only target of the various class actions. Fourth, deferring my ultimate conclusions, I will analyze the rival actions that are competing for carriage under twelve headings and describe the positions and competing arguments of the law firms competing for carriage. Fifth, I will culminate the analysis of the competing actions by explaining the carriage order decision. Sixth and finally, I will finish with a concluding section.

[11] Thus, the organization of these Reasons for Decision is as follows:

- Introduction
- Methodology
- Carriage Orders Jurisprudence
- Evidentiary Background
- Factual Background to the Claims against Sino-Forest
- Analysis of the Competing Class Actions
  - The Attributes of Class Counsel
  - Retainer, Legal and Forensic Resources, and Investigations
  - Proposed Representative Plaintiffs
  - Funding
  - Conflicts of Interest
  - Definition of Class Membership
  - Definition of Class Period
  - Theory of the Case against the Defendants
  - Joinder of Defendants
  - Causes of Action
  - The Plaintiff and the Defendant Correlation
  - Prospects of Certification
- Carriage Order
  - Introduction
  - Neutral or Non-Determinative Factors
  - Determinative Factors
- Conclusion

## **C. CARRIAGE ORDERS JURISPRUDENCE**

[12] There should not be two or more class actions that proceed in respect of the same putative class asserting the same cause(s) of action, and one action must be selected: *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4594

(S.C.J.) at para. 14. See also *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3682 (S.C.J.), aff'd [2002] O.J. No. 2010 (C.A.). When counsel have not agreed to consolidate and coordinate their actions, the court will usually select one and stay all other actions: *Lau v. Bayview Landmark*, [2004] O.J. No. 2788 (S.C.J.) at para. 19.

[13] Where two or more class proceedings are brought with respect to the same subject matter, a proposed representative plaintiff in one action may bring a carriage motion to stay all other present or future class proceedings relating to the same subject matter: *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, [2006] O.J. No. 376 (S.C.J.) at paras. 9-11; *Ricardo v. Air Transat A.T. Inc.*, [2002] O.J. No. 1090 (S.C.J.), leave to appeal dismissed [2002] O.J. No. 2122 (S.C.J.).

[14] The *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, confers upon the court a broad discretion to manage the proceedings. Section 13 of the Act authorizes the court to “stay any proceeding related to the class proceeding,” and s. 12 authorizes the court to “make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination.” Section 138 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43 directs that “as far as possible, multiplicity of legal proceedings shall be avoided.” See: *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at paras. 9-11.

[15] The court also has its normal jurisdiction under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. Section 35 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, provides that the rules of court apply to class proceedings. Among the rules that are available is Rule 6, the rule that empowers the court to consolidate two or more proceedings or to order that they be heard together.

[16] In determining carriage of a class proceeding, the court’s objective is to make the selection that is in the best interests of class members, while at the same time being fair to the defendants and being consistent with the objectives of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*: *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4594 (S.C.J.) at para. 48; *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 13 (S.C.J.); *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.* (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 260 (S.C.J.) at para. 14. The objectives of a class proceeding are access to justice, behaviour modification, and judicial economy for the parties and for the administration of justice.

[17] Courts generally consider seven non-exhaustive factors in determining which action should proceed: (1) the nature and scope of the causes of action advanced; (2) the theories advanced by counsel as being supportive of the claims advanced; (3) the state of each class action, including preparation; (4) the number, size and extent of involvement of the proposed representative plaintiffs; (5) the relative priority of the commencement of the class actions; (6) the resources and experience of counsel; and (7) the presence of any conflicts of interest: *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.*, *supra* at para. 17.

[18] In these reasons, I will examine the above factors under somewhat differently-named headings and in a different order and combination. And, I will add several more factors that the parties made relevant to the circumstances of the competing actions in the cases at bar, including: (a) funding; (b) definition of class membership; (c) definition of class period; (d) joinder of defendants; (e) the plaintiff and defendant correlation; and, (f) prospects of certification.



[19] In addition to identifying relevant factors, the carriage motion jurisprudence provides guidance about how the court should determine carriage. Although the determination of a carriage motion will decide which counsel will represent the plaintiff, the task of the court is not to choose between different counsel according to their relative resources and expertise; rather, it is to determine which of the competing actions is more, or most, likely to advance the interests of the class: *Tiboni v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, [2008] O.J. No. 2996 (S.C.J.), sub. nom *Mignacca v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, leave to appeal granted [2008] O.J. No. 4731 (S.C.J.), aff'd [2009] O.J. No. 821 (Div. Ct.), application for leave to appeal to C.A. ref'd May 15, 2009, application for leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref'd [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 261.

[20] On a carriage motion, it is inappropriate for the court to embark upon an analysis as to which claim is most likely to succeed unless one is "fanciful or frivolous": *Settington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 19.

[21] In analysing whether the prohibition against a multiplicity of proceedings would be offended, it is not necessary that the multiple proceedings be identical or mirror each other in every respect; rather, the court will look at the essence of the proceedings and their similarities: *Settington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 11.

[22] Where there is a competition for carriage of a class proceeding, the circumstance that one competitor joins more defendants is not determinative; rather, what is important is the rationale for the joinder and whether or not it is advantageous for the class to join the additional defendants: *Joel v Menu Foods Gen-Par Limited*, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2159 (B.C.S.C.); *Genier v. CCI Capital Canada Ltd.*, [2005] O.J. No. 1135 (S.C.J.); *Settington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*.

[23] In determining which firm should be granted carriage of a class action, the court may consider whether there is any potential conflict of interest if carriage is given to one counsel as opposed to others: *Joel v. Menu Foods Gen-Par Limited*, *supra* at para. 16; *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4594 (S.C.J.) and [2001] O.J. No. 3673 (S.C.J.).

#### **D. EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND**

##### *Smith v. Sino-Forest*

[24] In support of its carriage motion in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, Rochon Genova delivered affidavits from:

- Ken Froese, who is Senior Managing Director of Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., a forensic accounting firm
- Vincent Genova, who is the managing partner of Rochon Genova
- Douglas Smith, the proposed representative plaintiff

##### *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*

[25] In support of their carriage motion in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds delivered affidavits from:

- Dimitri Lascaris, who is a partner at Siskinds and the leader of its class action team
- Michael Gallagher, who is the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario (“Operating Engineers Fund”), a proposed representative plaintiff
- David Grant, a proposed representative plaintiff
- Richard Grottheim, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Sjunde AP-Fonden, a proposed representative plaintiff
- Joseph Mancinelli, who is the Chair of the Board of Trustees of The Trustees of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada (“Labourers’ Fund”), a proposed representative plaintiff. He also holds senior positions with the Labourers International Union of North America, which has more than 80,000 members in Canada
- Ronald Queck, who is Director of Investments of the Healthcare Employee Benefits Plans of Manitoba (“Healthcare Manitoba”), which would be a prominent class member in the proposed class action
- Frank Torchio, who is a chartered financial analyst and an expert in finance and economics who was retained to opine, among other things, about the damages suffered under various proposed class periods by Sino-Forest shareholders and noteholders under s. 138.5 of the *Ontario Securities Act*
- Robert Wong, who is a proposed representative plaintiff
- Mark Zigler, who is the managing partner of Koskie Minsky

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[26] In support of its carriage motion in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, Kim Orr delivered affidavits from:

- Megan B. McPhee, a principal of the firm
- John Mountain, who is the Senior Vice President, Legal and Human Resources, the Chief Compliance Officer and Corporate Secretary of Northwest Ethical Investments L.P. (“Northwest”), a proposed representative plaintiff
- Zachary Nye, a financial economist who was retained to respond to Mr. Torchio’s opinion
- Daniel Simard, who is General Co-Ordinator and a non-voting ex-officio member of the Board of Directors and Committees of Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. (“Bâtirente”), a proposed representative plaintiff
- Michael C. Spencer, a lawyer qualified to practice in New York, California, and Ontario, who is counsel to Kim Orr and a partner and member of the executive committee at the American law firm of Milberg LLP

- Brian Thomson, who is Vice-President, Equity Investments for British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (“BC Investment”), a proposed representative plaintiff

**E. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE CLAIMS AGAINST SINO-FOREST**

[27] The following factual background is largely an amalgam made from the unproven allegations in the Statements of Claim in the three proposed class actions and unproven allegations in the motion material delivered by the parties.

[28] The Defendant, Sino-Forest is a Canadian public company incorporated under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 with its registered office in Mississauga, Ontario, and its head office in Hong Kong. Its shares have traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) since 1995. It is a forestry plantation company with operations centered in the People’s Republic of China. Its trading of securities is subject to the regulation of the *Ontario Securities Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, under which it is a “reporting issuer” subject to the continuous disclosure provisions of Part XVIII of the Act and a “responsible issuer” subject to civil liability for secondary market misrepresentation under Part XXIII.1 of the Act.

[29] The Defendant, Ernst & Young LLP (“E&Y”) has been Sino-Forest’s auditor from 1994 to date, except for 1999, when the now-defunct Arthur Andersen LLP did the audit, and 2005 and 2006, when the predecessor of what is now the Defendant, BDO Limited (“BDO”) was Sino-Forest’s auditor. BDO is the Hong Kong member of BDO International Ltd., a global accounting and audit firm.

[30] E&Y and BDO are “experts” within the meaning of s. 138.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[31] From 1996 to 2010, in its financial statements, Sino-Forest reported only profits, and it appeared to be an enormously successful enterprise that substantially outperformed its competitors in the forestry industry. Sino-Forest’s 2010 Annual Report issued in May 2011 reported that Sino-Forest had net income of \$395 million and assets of \$5.7 billion. Its year-end market capitalization was \$5.7 billion with approximately 246 million common shares outstanding.

[32] It is alleged that Sino-Forest and its auditors E&Y and BDO repeatedly misrepresented that Sino-Forest’s financial statements complied with GAAP (“generally accepted accounting principles”).

[33] It is alleged that Sino-Forest and its officers and directors made other misrepresentations about the assets, liabilities, and performance of Sino-Forest in various filings required under the *Ontario Securities Act*. It is alleged that these misrepresentations appeared in the documents used for the offerings of shares and bonds in the primary market and again in what are known as Core Documents under securities legislation, which documents are available to provide information to purchasers of shares and bonds in the secondary market. It is also alleged that misrepresentations were made in oral statements and in Non-Core Documents.

[34] The Defendant, Allen T.Y. Chan was Sino-Forest's co-founder, its CEO, and a director until August 2011. He resides in Hong Kong.

[35] The Defendant, Kai Kit Poon, was Sino-Forest's co-founder, a director from 1994 until 2009, and Sino-Forest's President. He resides in Hong Kong.

[36] The Defendant, David J. Horsley was a Sino-Forest director (from 2004 to 2006) and was its CFO. He resides in Ontario.

[37] The Defendants, William E. Ardell (resident of Ontario, director since 2010), James P. Bowland (resident of Ontario, director since 2011), James M.E. Hyde (resident of Ontario, director since 2004), John Lawrence (resident of Ontario, deceased, director 1997 to 2006), Edmund Mak (resident of British Columbia, director since 1994), W. Judson Martin (resident of Hong Kong, director since 2006, CEO since August 2011), Simon Murray (resident of Hong Kong, director since 1999), Peter Wang (resident of Hong Kong, director since 2007) and Garry J. West (resident of Ontario, director since 2011) were members of Sino-Forest's Board of Directors.

[38] The Defendants, Hua Chen (resident of Ontario), George Ho (resident of China), Alfred C.T. Hung (resident of China), Alfred Ip (resident of China), Thomas M. Maradin (resident of Ontario), Simon Yeung (resident of China) and Wei Mao Zhao (resident of Ontario) are vice presidents of Sino-Forest. The defendant Kee Y. Wong was CFO from 1999 to 2005.

[39] Sino-Forest's forestry assets were valued by the Defendant, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, ("Pöyry"), a consulting firm based in Shanghai, China. Associated with Pöyry are the Defendants, Pöyry Forest Industry PTE Limited ("Pöyry-Forest") and JP Management Consulting (Asia-Pacific) PTE Ltd. ("JP Management"). Each Pöyry Defendant is an expert as defined by s. 138.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[40] Pöyry prepared technical reports dated March 8, 2006, March 15, 2007, March 14, 2008, April 1, 2009, and April 23, 2010 that were filed with SEDAR (the System of Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval) and made available on Sino-Forest's website. The reports contained a disclaimer and a limited liability exculpatory provision purporting to protect Pöyry from liability.

[41] In China, the state owns the forests, but the Chinese government grants forestry rights to local farmers, who may sell their lumber rights to forestry companies, like Sino-Forest. Under Chinese law, Sino-Forest was obliged to maintain a 1:1 ratio between lands for forest harvesting and lands for forest replantation.

[42] Sino-Forest's business model involved numerous subsidiaries and the use of authorized intermediaries or "AIs" to assemble forestry rights from local farmers. Sino-Forest also used authorized intermediaries to purchase forestry products. There were numerous AIs, and by 2010, Sino-Forest had over 150 subsidiaries, 58 of which were formed in the British Virgin Islands and at least 40 of which were incorporated in China.

[43] It is alleged that from at least March 2003, Sino-Forest used its business model and non-arm's length AIs to falsify revenues and to facilitate the misappropriation of Sino-Forest's assets.

[44] It is alleged that from at least March 2004, Sino-Forest made false statements about the nature of its business, assets, revenue, profitability, future prospects, and compliance with the laws of Canada and China. It is alleged that Sino-Forest and other Defendants misrepresented that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAPP ("generally accepted accounting principles"). It is alleged that Sino-Forest misrepresented that it was an honest and reputable corporate citizen. It is alleged that Sino-Forest misrepresented and greatly exaggerated the nature and extent of its forestry rights and its compliance with Chinese forestry regulations. It is alleged that Sino-Forest inflated its revenue, had questionable accounting practices, and failed to pay a substantial VAT liability. It is alleged that Sino-Forest and other Defendants misrepresented the role of the AIs and greatly understated the risks of Sino-Forest utilizing them. It is alleged that Sino-Forest materially understated the tax-related risks from the use of AIs in China, where tax evasion penalties are severe and potentially devastating.

[45] Starting in 2004, Sino-Forest began a program of debt and equity financing. It amassed over \$2.1 billion from note offerings and over \$906 million from share issues.

[46] On May 17, 2004, Sino-Forest filed its Annual Information Form for the 2003 year. It is alleged in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* that the 2003 AIF contains the first misrepresentation in respect of the nature and role of the authorized intermediaries, which allegedly played a foundational role in the misappropriation of Sino-Forest's assets.

[47] In August 2004, Sino-Forest issued an offering memorandum for the distribution of 9.125% guaranteed senior notes (\$300 million (U.S.)). The Defendant, Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated ("Morgan") was a note distributor that managed the note offering in 2004 and purchased and resold notes.

[48] Under the Sino-Forest note instruments, in the event of default, the trustee may sue to collect payment of the notes. A noteholder, however, may not pursue any remedy with respect to the notes unless, among other things, written notice is given to the trustee by holders of 25% of the outstanding principal asking the trustee to pursue the remedy and the trustee does not comply with the request. The notes provide that no noteholder shall obtain a preference or priority over another noteholder. The notes contain a waiver and release of Sino-Forest's directors, officers, and shareholders from all liability "for the payment of the principal of, or interest on, or other amounts in respect of the notes or for any claim based thereon or otherwise in respect thereof." The notes are all governed by New York law and include non-exclusive attornment clauses to the jurisdiction of New York State and United States federal courts.

[49] On March 19, 2007, Sino-Forest announced its 2006 financial results. The appearance of positive results caused a substantial increase in its share price which moved from \$10.10 per share to \$13.42 per share ten days later, a 33% increase.

[50] In May 2007, Sino-Forest filed a Management Information Circular that represented that it maintained a high standard of corporate governance. It indicated that its Board of Directors made compliance with high governance standards a top priority.

[51] In June 2007, Sino-Forest made a share prospectus offering of 15.9 million common shares at \$12.65 per share (\$201 million offering). Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Hyde signed the prospectus. The underwriters (as defined by s. 1. (1) of the *Ontario Securities Act*) were the Defendants, CIBC World Markets Inc. ("CIBC"), Credit Suisse Securities Canada (Inc.) ("Credit Suisse"), Dundee Securities Corporation ("Dundee"), Haywood Securities Inc. ("Haywood"), Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc. ("Merrill") and UBS Securities Canada Inc. ("UBS").

[52] In July 2008, Sino-Forest issued a final offering memorandum for the distribution of 5% convertible notes (\$345 million (U.S)) due 2013. The Defendants, Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC ("Credit Suisse (USA)"), and Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith Inc. ("Merrill-Fenner") were note distributors.

[53] In June 2009, Sino-Forest made a share prospectus offering of 34.5 million common shares at \$11.00 per share (\$380 million offering). Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Hyde signed the prospectus. The underwriters (as defined by s. 1. (1) of the *Ontario Securities Act*) were Credit Suisse, Dundee, Merrill, the Defendant, Scotia Capital Inc. ("Scotia"), and the Defendant, TD Securities Inc. ("TD").

[54] In June 2009, Sino-Forest issued a final offering memorandum for the exchange of senior notes for new guaranteed senior 10.25% notes (\$212 million (U.S.) offering) due 2014. Credit Suisse (USA) was the note distributor.

[55] In December 2009, Sino-Forest made a share prospectus offering of 22 million common shares at \$16.80 per share (\$367 million offering). Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Hyde signed the prospectus. The underwriters (as defined by s. 1. (1) of the *Ontario Securities Act*) were Credit Suisse, the Defendant, Canaccord Financial Ltd. ("Canaccord"), CIBC, Dundee, the Defendant, Maison Placements Canada Inc. ("Maison"), Merrill, the Defendant, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. ("RBC"), Scotia, and TD.

[56] In December 2009, Sino-Forest issued an offering memorandum for 4.25% convertible senior notes (\$460 million (U.S.) offering) due 2016. The note distributors were Credit Suisse (USA), Merrill-Fenner, and TD.

[57] In October 2010, Sino-Forest issued an offering memorandum for 6.25% guaranteed senior notes (\$600 million (U.S.) offering) due 2017. The note distributors were Banc of America Securities LLC ("Banc of America") and Credit Suisse USA.

[58] Sino-Forest's per-share market price reached a high of \$25.30 on March 31, 2011.

[59] It is alleged that all the financial statements, prospectuses, offering memoranda, MD&As (Management Discussion and Analysis), AIFs (Annual Information Forms) contained misrepresentations and failures to fully, fairly, and plainly disclose all

material facts relating to the securities of Sino-Forest, including misrepresentations about Sino-Forest's assets, its revenues, its business activities, and its liabilities.

[60] On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters Research, a Hong Kong investment firm that researches Chinese businesses, released a research report about Sino-Forest. Muddy Waters is operated by Carson Block, its sole full-time employee. Mr. Block was a short-seller of Sino-Forest stock. His Report alleged that Sino-Forest massively exaggerates its assets and that it had engaged in extensive related-party transactions since the company's TSX listing in 1995. The Report asserted, among other allegations, that a company-reported sale of \$231 million in timber in Yunnan Province was largely fabricated. It asserted that Sino-Forest had overstated its standing timber purchases in Yunnan Province by over \$800 million.

[61] The revelations in the Muddy Waters Report had a catastrophic effect on Sino-Forest's share price. Within two days, \$3 billion of market capitalization was gone and the market value of Sino-Forest's notes plummeted.

[62] Following the release of the Muddy Waters Report, Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors released documents and press releases and made public oral statements in an effort to refute the allegations in the Report. Sino-Forest promised to produce documentation to counter the allegations of misrepresentations. It appointed an Independent Committee of Messrs. Ardell, Bowland and Hyde to investigate the allegations contained in the Muddy Waters Report. After these assurances, Sino-Forest's share price rebounded, trading as high as 60% of its previous day's close, eventually closing on June 6, 2011 at \$6.16, approximately 18% higher from its previous close.

[63] On June 7, the Independent Committee announced that it had appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PWC") to assist with the investigation. Several law firms were also hired to assist in the investigation.

[64] However, bad news followed. Reporters from the *Globe and Mail* travelled to China, and on June 18 and 20, 2011, the newspaper published articles that reported that Yunnan Province forestry officials had stated that their records contradicted Sino-Forest's claim that it controlled almost 200,000 hectares in Yunnan Province.

[65] On August 26, 2011, the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC") issued an order suspending trading in Sino-Forest's securities and stated that: (a) Sino-Forest appears to have engaged in significant non-arm's length transactions that may have been contrary to Ontario securities laws and the public interest; (b) Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors appear to have misrepresented in a material respect, some of its revenue and/or exaggerated some of its timber holdings in public filings under the securities laws; and (c) Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors, including its CEO, appear to be engaging or participating in acts, practices or a course of conduct related to its securities which it and/or they know or reasonably ought to know perpetuate a fraud.

[66] The OSC named Chan, Ho, Hung, Ip, and Yeung as respondents in the proceedings before the Commission. Sino-Forest placed Messrs. Hung, Ho and Yeung on administrative leave. Mr. Ip may only act on the instructions of the CEO.

[67] Having already downgraded its credit rating for Sino-Forest's securities, Standard & Poor withdrew its rating entirely, and Moody's reduced its rating to "junk" indicating a very high credit risk.

[68] On September 8, 2011, after a hearing, the OSC continued its cease-trading order until January 25, 2012, and the OSC noted the presence of evidence of conduct that may be harmful to investors and the public interest.

[69] On November 10, 2011, articles in the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* reported that the RCMP had commenced a criminal investigation into whether executives of Sino-Forest had defrauded Canadian investors.

[70] On November 13, 2011, at a cost of \$35 million, Sino-Forest's Independent Committee released its Second Interim Report, which included the work of the committee members, PWC, and three law firms. The Report refuted some of the allegations made in the Muddy Waters Report but indicated that evidence could not be obtained to refute other allegations. The Committee reported that it did not detect widespread fraud, and noted that due to challenges it faced, including resistance from some company insiders, it was not able to reach firm conclusions on many issues.

[71] On December 12, 2011, Sino-Forest announced that it would not file its third-quarter earnings' figures and would default on an upcoming interest payment on outstanding notes. This default may lead to the bankruptcy of Sino-Forest.

[72] The chart attached as Schedule "A" to this judgment shows Sino-Forest's stock price on the TSX from January 1, 2004, to the date that its shares were cease-traded on August 26, 2011.

## **F. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS**

### **1. The Attributes of Class Counsel**

#### **Smith v. Sino-Forest**

[73] Rochon Genova is a boutique litigation firm in Toronto focusing primarily on class action litigation, including securities class actions. It is currently class counsel in the CIDC subprime litigation, which seeks billions in damages on behalf of CIBC shareholders for the bank's alleged non-disclosure of its exposure to the U.S. subprime residential mortgage market. It is currently the lawyer of record in *Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd* and *Frank v. Farlie Turner*, both securities cases, and it is acting for aggrieved investors in litigation involving two multi-million dollar Ponzi schemes. It acted on behalf of Canadian shareholders in relation to the Nortel securities litigation, as well as, large scale products liability class actions involving Baycol, Prepulsid, and Maple Leaf Foods, among many other cases.

[74] Rochon Genova has a working arrangement with Lieff Cabrasser Heimann & Bernstein, one of the United States' leading class action firms.



[75] Lead lawyers for *Smith v. Sino-Forest* are Joel Rochon and Peter Jervis, both senior lawyers with considerable experience and proficiency in class actions and securities litigation.

*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*

[76] Koskie Minsky is a Toronto law firm of 43 lawyers with a diverse practice including bankruptcy and insolvency, commercial litigation, corporate and securities, taxation, employment, labour, pension and benefits, professional negligence and insurance litigation.

[77] Koskie Minsky has a well-established and prominent class actions practice, having been counsel in every sort of class proceeding, several of them being landmark cases, including *Hollick v Toronto (City)*, *Cloud v The Attorney General of Canada*, and *Caputo v Imperial Tobacco*. It is currently representative counsel on behalf of all former Canadian employees in the multi-billion dollar Nortel insolvency.

[78] Siskinds is a London and Toronto law firm of 70 lawyers with a diverse practice including bankruptcy and insolvency, business law, and commercial litigation. It has an association with the Québec law firm Siskinds, Desmeules, avocats.

[79] At its London office, Siskinds has a team of 14 lawyers that focus their practice on class actions, in some instances exclusively. The firm has a long and distinguished history at the class actions bar, being class counsel in the first action certified as a class action, *Bendall v. McGhan Medical Corp.* (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 734, and it has almost a monopoly on securities class actions, having filed approximately 40 of this species of class actions, including 24 that advance claims under Part XXX.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[80] As mentioned again later, for the purposes of *Labourers' Fund v. Sino-Forest*, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds have a co-operative arrangement with the U.S. law firm, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP ("Kessler Topaz"), which is a 113-lawyer law firm specializing in complex litigation with a very high profile and excellent reputation as counsel in securities class action lawsuits in the United States.

[81] Lead lawyers for *Labourers' v. Sino-Forest* are Kirk M. Baert, Jonathan Ptak, Mark Ziegler, and Michael Mazzuca of Koskie Minsky and A. Dimitri Lascaris of Siskinds, all senior lawyers with considerable experience and proficiency in class actions and securities litigation.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[82] Kim Orr is a boutique litigation firm in Toronto focusing primarily on class action litigation, including securities class actions. It also has considerable experience on the defence side of defending securities cases.

[83] As I described in *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.*, *supra*, where I choose Kim Orr in a carriage competition with Siskinds in a securities class action, Kim Orr has a fine pedigree as a class action firm and its senior lawyers have considerable experience and proficiency in all types of class actions. It was comparatively modest in its self-promotional material for the carriage motion, but I am aware that it is currently class

counsel in substantial class actions involving claims of a similar nature to those in the case at bar.

[84] Kim Orr has an association with Milberg, LLP, a prominent class action law firm in the United States. It has 75 attorneys, most of whom devote their practice to representing plaintiffs in complex litigations, including class and derivative actions. It has a large support staff, including investigators, a forensic accountant, financial analysts, legal assistants, litigation support analysts, shareholder services personnel, and information technology specialists.

[85] Michael Spencer, who is a partner at Milberg and called to the bar in Ontario, offers counsel to Kim Orr.

[86] Lead lawyers for *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* are James Orr, Won Kim, and Mr. Spencer.

## 2. Retainer, Legal and Forensic Resources, and Investigations

### Smith v. Sino-Forest

[87] Following the release of the Muddy Waters Report, on June 6, 2011, Mr. Smith contacted Rochon Genova. Mr. Smith, who lost much of his investment fortune, was one of the victims of the wrongs allegedly committed by Sino-Forest. Rochon Genova accepted the retainer, and two days later, a notice of action was issued. The Statement of Claim in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* followed on July 8, 2011.

[88] Following their retainer by Mr. Smith, Rochon Genova hired Mr. X (his name was not disclosed), as a consultant. Mr. X, who has an accounting background, can fluently read, write, and speak English, Cantonese, and Mandarin. He travelled to China from June 19 to July 3, 2011 and again from October 31 to November 18, 2011. The purpose of the trips was to gather information about Sino-Forest's subsidiaries, its customers, and its suppliers. While in China, Mr. X secured approximately 20,000 pages of filings by Sino-Forest with the provincial branches of China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce (the "SAIC Files").

[89] In August 2011, Rochon Genova retained Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., a Toronto-based forensic accounting firm, to analyze the SAIC files.

[90] Rochon Genova also retained HAIBU Attorneys at Law, a full service law firm based in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, China, to provide a preliminary opinion about Sino-Forest's alleged violations of Chinese accounting and taxation laws.

[91] Exclusive of the carriage motion, Rochon Genova has already incurred approximately \$350,000 in time and disbursements for the proposed class action.

### Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[92] On June 3, 2011, the day after the release of the Muddy Waters Report, Siskinds retained the Dacheng Law Firm in China to begin an investigation of the allegations contained in the report. Dacheng is the largest law firm in China with offices throughout China and Hong Kong and also offices in Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Singapore, and Taiwan.

[93] On June 9, 2011, Guining Liu, a Sino-Forest shareholder, commenced an action in the Québec Superior Court on behalf of persons or entities domiciled in Québec who purchased shares and notes. Siskinds' Québec affiliate office, Siskinds, Desmeules, avocats, is acting as class counsel in that action.

[94] On June 20, 2011, Koskie Minsky, which had a long standing lawyer-client relationship with the Labourers' Fund, was retained by it to recover its losses associated with the plummet in value of its holdings in Sino-Forest shares. Koskie Minsky issued a notice of action in a proposed class action with Labourers' Fund as the proposed representative plaintiffs.

[95] The June action, however, is not being pursued, and in July 2011, Labourers' Fund was advised that Operating Engineers Fund, another pension fund, also had very significant losses, and the two funds decided to retain Koskie Minsky and Siskinds to commence a new action, which followed on July 20, 2011, by notice of action. The Statement of Claim in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* was served in August, 2011.

[96] Before commencing the new action, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds retained private investigators in Southeast Asia and received reports from them, along with information received from the Dacheng Law Firm. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds also received information from an unnamed expert in Suriname about the operations of Sino-Forest in Suriname and the role of Greenheart Group Ltd., which is a significant aspect of its Statement of Claim in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[97] On November 4, 2011, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds served the Defendants in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* with the notice of motion for an order granting leave to assert the causes of action under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[98] On October 26, 2011, Robert Wong, who had lost a very large personal investment in Sino-Forest shares, retained Koskie Minsky and Siskinds to sue Sino-Forest for his losses, and the firms decided that he would become another representative plaintiff.

[99] On November 14, 2011, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds commenced *Grant v. Sino-Forest Corp.*, which, as already noted above, they intend to consolidate with *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[100] *Grant v. Sino-Forest* names the same defendants as in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, except for the additional joinder of Messrs. Bowland, Poon, and West, and it also joins as defendants, BDO, and two additional underwriters, Banc of America and Credit Suisse Securities (USA).

[101] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds state that *Grant v. Sino-Forest* was commenced out of an abundance of caution to ensure that certain prospectus and offering memorandum claims under the *Ontario Securities Act*, and under the equivalent legislation of the other Provinces, will not expire as being statute-barred.

[102] Exclusive of the carriage motion, Koskie Minsky has already incurred approximately \$350,000 in time and disbursements for the proposed class action, and

exclusive of the carriage motion, Siskinds has already incurred approximately \$440,000 in time and disbursements for the proposed class action.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[103] Immediately following the release of the Muddy Waters Report, Kim Orr and Milberg together began an investigation to determine whether an investor class action would be warranted. A joint press release on June 7, 2011, announced the investigation.

[104] For the purposes of the carriage motion, apart from saying that their investigation included reviewing all the documents on SEDAR and the System for Electronic Disclosure for Insiders (SEDI), communicating with contacts in the financial industry, and looking into Sino-Forest's officers, directors, auditors, underwriters and valuation experts, Kim Orr did not disclose the details of its investigation. It did indicate that it had hired a Chinese forensic investigator and financial analyst, a market and damage consulting firm, Canadian forensic accountants, and an investment and market analyst and that its investigations discovered valuable information.

[105] Meanwhile, lawyers at Milberg contacted Bâtirente, which was one of its clients and also a Sino-Forest shareholder, and Won Kim of Kim Orr contacted Northwest, another Sino-Forest shareholder. Bâtirente already had a retainer with Milberg to monitor its investment portfolio on an ongoing basis to detect losses due to possible securities violations.

[106] Northwest and Bâtirente agreed to retain Kim Orr to commence a class action, and on September 26, 2011, Kim Orr commenced *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[107] In October 2011, BC Investments contacted Kim Orr about the possibility of it becoming a plaintiff in the class proceeding commenced by Northwest and Bâtirente, and BC Investments decided to retain the firm and the plan is that BC Investments is to become another representative plaintiff.

[108] Exclusive of the carriage motion, Kim Orr and Milberg have already incurred approximately \$1,070,000 in time and disbursement for the proposed class action.

### **3. Proposed Representative Plaintiffs**

*Smith v. Sino-Forest*

[109] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed representative plaintiffs are Douglas Smith and Frederick Collins.

[110] Douglas Smith is a resident of Ontario, who acquired approximately 9,000 shares of Sino-Forest during the proposed class period. He is married, 48 years of age, and employed as a director of sales. He describes himself as a moderately sophisticated investor that invested in Sino-Forest based on his review of the publicly available information, including public reports and filings, press releases, and statements released by or on behalf of Sino-Forest. He lost \$75,345, which was half of his investment fortune.

[111] Frederick Collins is a resident of Nanaimo, British Columbia. He purchased shares in the primary market. His willingness to act as a representative plaintiff was

announced during the reply argument of the second day of the carriage motion, and nothing was discussed about his background other than he is similar to Mr. Smith in being an individual investor. He was introduced to address a possible *Ragoonanan* problem in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*; namely, the absence of a plaintiff who purchased in the primary market, of which alleged problem I will have more to say about below.

*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*

[112] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed representative plaintiffs are: David Grant, Robert Wong, The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada ("Labourers' Fund"), the Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario ("Operating Engineers Fund"), and Sjunde AP-Fonden.

[113] David Grant is a resident of Alberta. On October 21, 2010, he purchased 100 Guaranteed Senior Notes of Sino-Forest at a price of \$101.50 (\$U.S.), which he continues to hold.

[114] Robert Wong, a resident of Ontario, is an electrical engineer. He was born in China, and in addition to speaking English, he speaks fluent Cantonese. He was a substantial shareholder of Sino-Forest from July 2002 to June 2011. Before making his investment, he reviewed Sino-Forest's Core Documents, and he also made his own investigations, including visiting Sino-Forest's plantations in China in 2005, where he met a Sino-Forest vice-president.

[115] Mr. Wong's investment in Sino-Forest comprised much of his net worth. In September 2008, he owned 1.4 million Sino-Forest shares with a value of approximately \$26.1 million. He purchased more shares in the December 2009 prospectus offering. Around the end of May 2011, he owned 518,700 shares, which, after the publication of the Muddy Waters Report, he sold on June 3, 2011 and June 10, 2011, for \$2.8 million.

[116] The Labourers' Fund is a multi-employer pension fund for employees in the construction industry. It is registered with the Financial Services Commission in Ontario and has 52,100 members in Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador. It is a long-time client of Koskie Minsky.

[117] Labourers' Fund manages more than \$2.5 billion in assets. It has a fiduciary and statutory responsibility to invest pension monies on behalf of thousands of employees and pensioners in Ontario and in other provinces.

[118] Labourer's Fund acted as representative plaintiff in a U.S. class actions against Fortis, Pitney Bowes Inc., Synovus Financial Corp., and Medea Health Solutions, Inc. Those actions involved allegations of misrepresentation in the statements and filings of public issuers.

[119] The Labourers' Fund purchased Sino-Forest shares on the TSX during the class period, including 32,300 shares in a trade placed by Credit Suisse under a prospectus. Most of its purchases of Sino-Forest shares were made in the secondary market.

[120] On June 1, 2011, the Labourers' Fund held a total of 128,700 Sino-Forest shares with a market value of \$2.3 million, and it also had an interest in pooled funds that had \$1.4 million invested in Sino-Forest shares. On June 2 and 3, 2011, the Labourers' Fund sold its holdings in Sino-Forest for a net recovery of \$695,993.96. By June 30, 2011, the value of the Sino-Forest shares in the pooled funds was \$291,811.

[121] The Operating Engineers Fund is a multi-employer pension fund for employed operating engineers and apprentices in the construction industry. It is registered with the Financial Services Commission in Ontario, and it has 20,867 members. It is a long-time client of Koskie Minsky.

[122] The Operating Engineers Fund manages \$1.5 billion in assets. It has a fiduciary and statutory responsibility to invest pension monies on behalf of thousands of employees and pensions in Ontario and in other provinces.

[123] The Operating Engineers Fund acquired shares of Sino-Forest on the TSX during the class period. The Operating Engineers Fund invested in Sino-Forest shares through four asset managers of a segregated fund. One of the managers purchased 42,000 Sino-Forest shares between February 1, 2011, and May 24, 2011, which had a market value of \$764,820 at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. These shares were sold on June 21, 2011 for net \$77,170.80. Another manager purchased 181,700 Sino-Forest shares between January 20, 2011 and June 1, 2011, which had a market value of \$3.3 million at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. These shares were sold and the Operating Engineers Fund recovered \$1.5 million. Another asset manager purchased 100,400 Sino-Forest shares between July 5, 2007 and May 26, 2011, which had a market value of \$1.8 million at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. Many of these shares were sold in July and August, 2011, but the Operating Engineers Fund continues to hold approximately 37,350 shares. Between June 15, 2007 and June 9, 2011, the Operating Engineers Fund also purchased units of a pooled fund managed by TD that held Sino-Forest shares, and it continues to hold these units. The Operating Engineers Fund has incurred losses in excess of \$5 million with respect to its investment in Sino-Forest shares.

[124] Sjunde AP-Fonden is the Swedish Nation Pension Fund, and part of Sweden's national pension system. It manages \$15.3 billion in assets. It has acted as lead plaintiff in a large securities class action and a large stockholder class action in the United States.

[125] In addition to retaining Koskie Minsky and Siskinds, Sjunde AP-Fonden also retained the American law firm Kessler Topaz to provide assistance, if necessary, to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds.

[126] Sjunde AP-Fonden purchased Sino-Forest shares on the TSX from outside Canada between April 2010 and January 2011. It was holding 139,398 shares with a value of \$2.5 million at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. It sold 43,095 shares for \$188,829.36 in August 2011 and holds 93,303 shares.

[127] Sjunde AP-Fonden is prepared to be representative plaintiff for a sub-class of non-Canadian purchasers of Sino-Forest shares who purchased shares in Canada from outside of Canada.

[128] Messrs. Mancinelli, Gallagher, and Grottheim each deposed that Labourers' Fund, the Operating Engineers Fund, and Sjunde AP-Fonden respectively sued because of their losses and because of their concerns that public markets remain healthy and transparent.

[129] Although it does not seek to be a representative plaintiff, the Healthcare Employee Benefits Plans of Manitoba ("Healthcare Manitoba") is a major class member that supports carriage being granted to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds, and its presence should also be mentioned here because it actively supports the appointment of the proposed representative plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[130] Healthcare Manitoba provides pensions and other benefits to eligible healthcare employees and their families throughout Manitoba. It has 65,000 members. It is a long-time client of Koskie Minsky. It manages more than \$3.9 billion in assets.

[131] Healthcare Manitoba, invested in Sino-Forest shares that were purchased by one of its asset managers in the TSX secondary market. Between February and May, 2011, it purchased 305,200 shares with a book value of \$6.7 million. On June 24, 2011, the shares were sold for net proceeds of \$560,775.48.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[132] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed representative plaintiffs are: British Columbia Investment Management Corporation ("BC Investment"); Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. ("Bâtirente") and Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P. ("Northwest").

[133] BC Investment, which is incorporated under the British Columbia *Public Sector Pension Plans Act*, is owned by and is an agent of the Government of British Columbia. It manages \$86.9 billion in assets. Its investment activities help to finance the retirement benefits of more than 475,000 residents of British Columbia, including public service employees, healthcare workers, university teachers, and staff. Its investment activities also help to finance the WorkSafeBC insurance fund that covers approximately 2.3 million workers and over 200,000 employers in B.C., as well as, insurance funds for public service long term disability and credit union deposits.

[134] BC Investment, through the funds it managed, owned 334,900 shares of Sino-Forest at the start of the Class Period, purchased 6.6 million shares during the Class Period, including 50,200 shares in the June 2009 offering and 54,800 shares in the December 2009 offering; sold 5 million shares during the Class Period; disposed of 371,628 shares after the end of the Class Period; and presently holds 1.5 million shares.

[135] Bâtirente is a non-profit financial services firm initiated by the Confederation of National Trade Unions to establish and promote a workplace retirement system for affiliated unions and other organizations. It is registered as a financial services firm regulated in Quebec by the Autorité des marchés financiers under *the Act Respecting the Distribution of Financial Products and Services*, R.S.Q., chapter D-9.2. It has assets of about \$850 million.

[136] Bâtirente, through the funds it managed, did not own any shares of Sino-Forest before the class period, purchased 69,500 shares during the class period, sold 57,625 shares during the class period, and disposed of the rest of its shares after the end of the class period.

[137] Northwest is an Ontario limited partnership, owned 50% by the Provincial Credit Unions Central and 50% by Federation des caisses Desjardin du Québec. It is registered with the British Columbia Securities Commission as a portfolio manager, and it is registered with the OSC as a portfolio manager and as an investment funds manager. It manages about \$5 billion in assets.

[138] Northwest, through the funds it managed, did not own any shares of Sino-Forest before the class period, purchased 714,075 shares during the class period, including 245,400 shares in the December 2009 offering, sold 207,600 shares during the class period, and disposed of the rest of its shares after the end of the class period.

[139] Kim Orr touts BC Investment, Bâtirente, and Northwest as candidates for representative plaintiff because they are sophisticated “activist shareholders” that are committed to ethical investing. There is evidence that they have all raised governance issues with Sino-Forest as well as other companies. Mr. Mountain of Northwest and Mr. Simard of Bâtirente are eager to be actively involved in the litigation against Sino-Forest.

#### **4. Funding**

[140] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds have approached Claims Funding International, and subject to court approval, Claims Funding International has agreed to indemnify the plaintiffs for an adverse costs award in return for a percentage of any recovery from the class action.

[141] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds state that if the funding arrangement with Claims Funding International is refused, they will, in any event, proceed with the litigation and will indemnify the plaintiffs for any adverse costs award.

[142] Similarly, Kim Orr has approached Bridgepoint Financial Services, which subject to court approval, has agreed to indemnify the plaintiffs for an adverse costs award in return for a percentage of any recovery in the class action. If this arrangement is not approved, Kim Orr intends to apply to the Class Proceedings Fund, which would be a more expensive approach to financing the class action.

[143] Kim Orr states that if these funding arrangements are refused, it will, in any event, proceed with the litigation and it will indemnify the plaintiffs for any adverse costs award.

[144] Rochon Genova did not mention in its factum whether it intends to apply to the Class Proceedings Fund on behalf of Messrs. Smith and Collins, but for the purposes of the discussion later about the carriage order, I will assume that this may be the case. I will also assume that Rochon Genova has agreed to indemnify Messrs. Smith and Collins for any adverse costs award should funding not be granted by the Fund.



## 5. Conflicts of Interest

[145] One of the qualifications for being a representative plaintiff is that the candidate does not have a conflict of interest in representing the class members and in bringing an action on their behalf. All of the candidates for representative plaintiff in the competing class actions depose that they have no conflicts of interest. Their opponents disagree.

[146] Rochon Genova submits that there are inherent conflicts of interests in both *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* because the representative plaintiffs bring actions on behalf of both shareholders and noteholders. Rochon Genova submits that these conflicts are exacerbated by the prospect of a Sino-Forest bankruptcy.

[147] Relying on *Casurina Ltd. Partnership v. Rio Algom Ltd.* [2004] O.J. No. 177 (C.A.) at paras. 35-36, aff'g [2002] O.J. No. 3229 (S.C.J.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. denied, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 105 and *Amaranth LLC v. Counsel Corp.*, [2003] O.J. No. 4674 (S.C.J.), Rochon Genova submits that a class action by the bondholders is precluded by the pre-conditions in the bond instruments, but if it were to proceed, it might not be in the best interests of the bondholders, who might prefer to have Sino-Forest capable of carrying on business. Further still, Rochon Genova submits that, in any event, an action by the bondholders' trustee may be the preferable way for the noteholders to sue on their notes. Further, Rochon Genova submits that if there is a bankruptcy, the bondholders may prefer to settle their claims in the context of the bankruptcy rather than being connected in a class action to the shareholder's claims over which they would have priority in a bankruptcy.

[148] Further still, Rochon Genova submits that a bankruptcy would bring another conflict of interest between bondholders and shareholders because under s. 50(14) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3, and 5.1(2) of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36 the claims of creditors against directors that are based on misrepresentation or oppression may not be compromised through a plan or proposal. In contrast, *Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 5017 (S.C.J.) at paras. 48-52 is authority that shareholders are not similarly protected, and, therefore, Rochon Genova submits that the noteholders would have a great deal more leverage in resolving claims against directors than would the shareholder members of the class in a class action.

[149] Kim Orr denies that there is a conflict in the representative plaintiffs acting on behalf of both shareholders and bondholders. It submits that while bondholders may have an additional claim in contract against Sino-Forest for repayment of the debt outside of the class action, both shareholders and bondholders share a misrepresentation claim against Sino-Forest and there is no conflict in advancing the misrepresentation claim independent of the debt repayment claim.

[150] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds also deny that there is any conflict in advancing claims by both bondholders and shareholders. They say that the class members are on common ground in advancing misrepresentation, tort, and the various statutory causes of action. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds add that if there was a conflict, then it is manageable because they have a representative plaintiff who was a bondholder, which is not the case for the representative plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*. It submits

that, if necessary, subclasses can be established to manage any conflicts of interest among class members.

[151] Leaving the submitted shareholder and bondholder conflicts of interest, Rochon Genova submits that Labourers' Fund has a conflict of interest because BDO Canada is its auditor. Rochon Genova submits that Koskie Minsky also has a conflict of interest because it and BDO Canada have worked together on a committee providing liaison between multi-employer pension plans and the Financial Services Commission of Ontario and have respectively provided services as auditor and legal counsel to the Union Benefits Alliance of Construction Trade Unions. Rochon Genova submits that it is telling that these conflicts were not disclosed and that BDO, which is an entity that is an international associate with BDO Canada was a late arrival as a defendant in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, although this can be explained by changes in the duration of the class period.

[152] For their part, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds raise a different set of conflicts of interest. They submit that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments have a conflict of interest with the other class members who purchased Sino-Forest securities because of their role as investment managers.

[153] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' argument is that as third party financial service providers, BC Investment, Bâtirente, and Northwest did not suffer losses themselves but rather passed the losses on to their clients. Further, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that, in contrast to BC Investment, Bâtirente, and Northwest, their clients, Labourers' Fund and Operating Engineers Fund, are acting as fiduciaries to recover losses that will affect their members' retirements. This arguably makes Koskie Minsky and Siskinds better representative plaintiffs.

[154] Further still, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that the class members in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* may question whether Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments failed to properly evaluate the risks of investing in Sino-Forest. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds point out that the Superior Court of Québec in *Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. c. Société financière Manuvie*, 2011 QCCS 3446 at paras. 111-119 disqualified Bâtirente as a representative plaintiff because there might be an issue about Bâtirente's investment decisions. Thus, Koskie, Minsky and Siskinds attempt to change Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments' involvement in encouraging good corporate governance at Sino-Forest from a positive attribute into the failure to be aware of ongoing wrongdoing at Sino-Forest and a negative attribute for a proposed representative plaintiff.

## 6. Definition of Class Membership

### *Smith v. Sino-Forest*

[155] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed class action is: (a) on behalf of all persons who purchased shares of Sino-Forest from May 17, 2004 to August 26, 2011 on the TSX or other secondary market; and (b) on behalf of all persons who acquired shares of Sino-Forest during the offering distribution period relating to Sino-Forest's share prospectus offerings on June 1, 2009 and December 10, 2009 excluding the Defendants,

members of the immediate families of the Individual Defendants, or the directors, officers, subsidiaries and affiliates of the corporate Defendants.

[156] Both Koskie Minsky and Siskinds and Kim Orr challenge this class membership as inadequate for failing to include the bondholders who were allegedly harmed by the same misconduct that harmed the shareholders.

*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*

[157] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed class action is on behalf of all persons and entities wherever they may reside who acquired securities of Sino-Forest during the period from and including March 19, 2007 to and including June 2, 2011 either by primary distribution in Canada or an acquisition on the TSX or other secondary markets in Canada, other than the defendants, their past and present subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, senior employees, partners, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors and assigns, and any individual who is an immediate member of the family of an individual defendant.

[158] The class membership definition in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* includes non-Canadians who purchased shares or notes in Canada but excludes non-Canadians who purchased in a foreign marketplace.

[159] Challenging this definition, Kim Orr submits that it is wrong in principle to exclude persons whose claims will involve the same facts as other class members and for whom it is arguable that Canadian courts may exercise jurisdiction and provide access to justice.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[160] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed class action is on behalf of purchasers of shares or notes of Sino-Forest during the period from August 17, 2004 through June 2, 2011, except: Sino-Forest's past and present subsidiaries and affiliates; the past and present officers and directors of Sino-Forest and its subsidiaries and affiliates; members of the immediate family of any excluded person; the legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns of any excluded person or entity; and any entity in which any excluded person or entity has or had a controlling interest.

[161] Challenging this definition, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that the proposed class in *Northwest* has no geographical limits and, therefore, will face jurisdictional and choice of law challenges that do not withstand a cost benefit analysis. It submits that Sino-Forest predominantly raised capital in Canadian capital markets and the vast majority of its securities were either acquired in Canada or on a Canadian market, and, in this context, including in the class non-residents who purchased securities outside of Canada risks undermining and delaying the claims of the great majority of proposed class members whose claims do not face such jurisdictional obstacles.

## 7. Definition of Class Period

### Smith v. Sino-Forest

[162] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the class period is May 17, 2004 to August 26, 2011. This class period starts with the release of Sino-Forest's release of its 2003 Annual Information Form, which indicated the use of authorized intermediaries, and it ends on the day of the OSC's cease-trade order.

[163] For comparison purposes, it should be noted that this class period has the earliest start date and the latest finish date. *Labourers v. Sino-Smith* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* both use the end date of the release of the Muddy Waters Report.

[164] In making comparisons, it is helpful to look at the chart found at Schedule A of this judgment.

[165] Rochon Genova justifies its extended end date based on the argument that the Muddy Waters Report was a revelation of Sino-Forest's misrepresentation but not a corrective statement that would end the causation of injuries because Sino-Forest and its officers denied the truth of the Muddy Waters Report.

[166] Kim Orr's criticizes the class definition in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and submits that purchasers of shares or notes after the Muddy Waters Report was published do not have viable claims and ought not be included as class members.

[167] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' submission is similar, and they regard the extended end date as problematic in raising the issues of whether there were corrective disclosures and of how Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* should be interpreted.

### Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[168] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the class period is March 19, 2007 to June 2, 2011.

[169] This class period starts with the date Sino-Forest's 2006 financial results were announced, and it ends on the date of the publication of the Muddy Waters Report.

[170] The March 19, 2007, commencement date was determined using a complex mathematical formula known as the "multi-trader trading model." Using this model, Mr. Torchio estimates that 99.5% of Sino-Forest's shares retained after June 2, 2011, had been purchased after the March 19, 2007 commencement date. Thus, practically speaking, there is almost nothing to be gained by an earlier start date for the class period.

[171] The proposed class period covers two share offerings (June 2009 and December 2009). This class period does not include time before the coming into force of Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* (December 31, 2005), and, thus, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that this aspect of their definition avoids problems about the retroactive application, if any, of Part XXIII.1 of the Act.

[172] For comparison purposes, the *Labourers* class period has the latest start date and shares the finish date used in the *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* action, which is sooner than the later date used in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. It is the most compressed of the three definitions of a class period.

[173] Based on Mr. Torchio's opinion, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that there are likely no damages arising from purchases made during a substantial portion of the class periods in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that given that the average price of Sino's shares was approximately \$4.49 in the ten trading days after the Muddy Waters report, it is likely that any shareholder that acquired Sino-Forest shares for less than \$4.49 suffered no damages, particularly under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[174] In part as a matter of principle, Kim Orr submits that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' approach to defining the class period is unsound because it excludes class members who, despite the mathematical modelling, may have genuine claims and are being denied any opportunity for access to justice. Kim Orr submits it is wrong in principle to abandon these potential class members.

[175] Rochon Genova also submits that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' approach to defining the class period is wrong. It argues that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' reliance on a complex mathematical model to define class membership is arbitrary and unfair to share purchasers with similar claims to those claimants to be included as class members. Rochon Genova criticizes Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' approach as being the condemned merits based approach to class definitions and for being the sin of excluding class members because they may ultimately not succeed after a successful common issues trial.

[176] Relying on what I wrote in *Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd.*, 2010 ONSC 296 at para. 157, Rochon Genova submits that the possible failure of an individual class member to establish an individual element of his or her claim such as causation or damages is not a reason to initially exclude him or her as a class member. Rochon Genova submits that the end date employed in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is wrong.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[177] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the class period is August 17, 2004 to June 2, 2011.

[178] This class period starts from the day Sino-Forest closed its public offering of long-term notes that were still outstanding at the end of the class period and ends on the date of the Muddy Waters Research Report. This period covers three share offerings (June 2007, June 2009, and December 2009) and six note offerings (August 2004, July 2008, July 2009, December 2009, February 2010, and October 2010).

[179] For comparison purposes, the *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* class period begins 3 months later and ends three months sooner than the class period in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. The *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* class period begins approximately two-and-a-half years earlier and ends at the same time as the class period in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[180] Kim Orr submits that its start date of August 17, 2004 is satisfactory, because on that date, Sino-Forest shares were trading at \$2.85, which is below the closing price of Sino-Forest shares on the TSX for the ten days after June 3, 2011 (\$4.49), which indicates that share purchasers before August 2004 would not likely be able to claim loss or damages based on the public disclosures on June 2, 2011.

[181] However, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds point out that Kim Orr's submission actually provides partial support for the theory for a later start date (March 19, 2007) because, there is no logical reason to include in the class persons who purchased Sino-Forest shares between May 17, 2004, the start date of the *Smith Action* and December 1, 2005, because with the exception of one trading day (January 24, 2005), Sino-Forest's shares never traded above \$4.49 during that period.

## 8. Theory of the Case against the Defendants

### *Smith v. Sino-Forest*

[182] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the theory of the case rests on the alleged non-arms' length transfers between Sino-Forest and its subsidiaries and authorized intermediaries, that purported to be suppliers and customers. Rochon Genova's investigations and analysis suggest that there are numerous non-arms length inter-company transfers by which Sino-Forest misappropriated investors' funds, exaggerated Sino-Forest's assets and revenues, and engaged in improper tax and accounting practices.

[183] Mr. Smith alleges that Sino-Forest's quarterly interim financial statements, audited annual financial statements, and management's discussion and analysis reports, which are Core Documents as defined under the *Ontario Securities Act*, misrepresented its revenues, the nature and scope of its business and operations, and the value and composition of its forestry holdings. He alleges that the Core Documents failed to disclose an unlawful scheme of fabricated sales transactions and the avoidance of tax and an unlawful scheme through which hundreds of millions of dollars in investors' funds were misappropriated or vanished.

[184] Mr. Smith submits that these misrepresentations and failures to disclose were also made in press releases and in public oral statements. He submits that Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Wang authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the release of Core Documents and that Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Murray made the misrepresentations in public oral statements.

[185] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, Mr. Smith (and Mr. Collins) brings different claims against different combinations of Defendants; visualize:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act*, against all the Defendants
- subject to leave being granted, misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* as against the defendants: Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, BDO and E&Y
- negligent, reckless, or fraudulent misrepresentation against Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Wang. This claim would appear to cover sales of shares in both the primary and secondary markets.

[186] It is to be noted that *Smith v. Sino-Forest* does not make a claim on behalf of noteholders, and, as described and explained below, it joins the fewest number of defendants.

[187] *Smith* also does not advance a claim on behalf of purchasers of shares through Sino-Forest's prospectus offering of June 5, 2007, because of limitation period concerns associated with the absolute limitation period found in 138.14 of the *Ontario Securities Act*. See: *Coulson v. Citigroup Global Markets Canada Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 1596 at paras. 98-100.

*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*

[188] The theory of *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is that Sino-Forest, along with its officers, directors, and certain of its professional advisors, falsely represented that its financial statements complied with GAAP, materially overstated the size and value of its forestry assets, and made false and incomplete representations regarding its tax liabilities, revenue recognition, and related party transactions.

[189] The claims in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* are largely limited to alleged misrepresentations in Core Documents as defined in the *Ontario Securities Act* and other Canadian securities legislation. Core Documents include prospectuses, annual information forms, information circulars, financial statements, management discussion & analysis, and material change reports.

[190] The representative plaintiffs advance statutory claims and also common law claims that certain defendants breached a duty of care and committed the torts of negligent misrepresentation and negligence. There are unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and oppression remedy claims advanced against certain defendants.

[191] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, different combinations of representative plaintiffs advance different claims against different combinations of defendants; visualize:

- Labourers' Fund and Mr. Wong, purchasers of shares in a primary market distribution, advance a statutory claim under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD and Pöyry
- Labourers' Fund and Mr. Wong, purchasers of shares in a primary market distribution, advance a common law negligent misrepresentation claim against Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD based on the common misrepresentation that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAPP
- Labourers' Fund and Mr. Wong, purchasers of shares in a primary market distribution, advance a common law negligence claim against Sino-Forest, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD and Pöyry
- Grant, who purchased bonds in a primary market distribution, advances a statutory claim under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest

- Grant, who purchased bonds in a primary market distribution, advances a common law negligent misrepresentation claim against Sino-Forest, E&Y and BDO based on the common misrepresentation that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAPP
- Grant, who purchased bonds in a primary market distribution, advances a common law negligence claim against Sino-Forest, E&Y, BDO, Banc of America, Credit Suisse USA, and TD
- All the representative plaintiffs, subject to leave being granted, advance claims of misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation. This claim is against Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, E &Y, BDO, and Pöyry
- All of the representative plaintiffs, who purchased Sino-Forest securities in the secondary market, advance a common law negligent misrepresentation claim against all of the Defendants except the underwriters based on the common misrepresentation contained in the Core Documents that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAAP
- All the representative plaintiffs sue Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, and Poon for conspiracy. It is alleged that Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, and Poon conspired to inflate the price of Sino-Forest's shares and bonds and to profit by their wrongful acts to enrich themselves by, among other things, issuing stock options in which the price was impermissibly low
- While it is not entirely clear from the Statement of Claim, it seems that all the representative plaintiffs sue Chan, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Poon for unjust enrichment in selling shares to class members at artificially inflated prices
- While it is not entirely clear from the Statement of Claim, it seems that all the representative plaintiffs sue Sino-Forest for unjust enrichment for selling shares at artificially inflated prices
- While it is not entirely clear from the Statement of Claim, it seems that all the representative plaintiffs sue Banc of America, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse USA, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD for unjustly enriching themselves from their underwriters fees
- All the representative plaintiffs sue Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, and Wang for an oppression remedy under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*

[192] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is more focused than *Smith* and *Northwest* because: (a) its class definition covers a shorter time period and is limited to securities acquired by Canadian residents or in Canadian markets; (b) the material documents are limited to Core Documents under securities legislation; (c) the named individual defendants are limited to directors and officers with statutory obligations to certify the accuracy of Sino-Forest's public filings; and (d) the



causes of action are tailored to distinguish between the claims of primary market purchasers and secondary market purchasers and so are less susceptible to motions to strike.

[193] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that save for background and context, little is gained in the rival actions by including claims based on non-Core Documents, which confront a higher threshold to establish liability under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[194] The *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* Statement of Claim focuses on an “Integrity Representation,” which is defined as: “the representation in substance that Sino-Forest’s overall reporting of its business operations and financial statements was fair, complete, accurate, and in conformity with international standards and the requirements of the *Ontario Securities Act* and National Instrument 51-102, and that its accounts of its growth and success could be trusted.”

[195] The *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* Statement of Claim alleges that all Defendants made the Integrity Representation and that it was a false, misleading, or deceptive statement or omission. It is alleged that the false Integrity Representation caused the market decline following the June 2, 2011, disclosures, regardless of the truth or falsity of the particular allegations contained in the Muddy Waters Report.

[196] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the representative plaintiffs advance statutory claims under Parts XXIII and XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and a collection of common law tort claims. Kim Orr submits that to the extent, if any, that the statutory claims do not provide complete remedies to class members, whether due to limitation periods, liability caps, or other limitations, the common law claims may provide coverage.

[197] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the plaintiffs advance different claims against different combinations of defendants; visualize:

- With respect to the June 2009 and December 2009 prospectus, a cause of action for violation of Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest, the underwriter Defendants, the director Defendants, the Defendants who consented to disclosure in the prospectus and the Defendants who signed the prospectus
- Negligent misrepresentation against all of the Defendants for disseminating material misrepresentations about Sino-Forest in breach of a duty to exercise appropriate care and diligence to ensure that the documents and statements disseminated to the public about Sino-Forest were complete, truthful, and accurate.
- Fraudulent misrepresentation against all of the Defendants for acting knowingly and deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth making misrepresentations in documents, statements, financial statements, prospectus,

offering memoranda, and filings issued and disseminated to the investing public including Class Members.

- Negligence against all the Defendants for a breach of a duty of care to ensure that Sino-Forest implemented and maintained adequate internal controls, procedures and policies to ensure that the company's assets were protected and its activities conformed to all legal developments.
- Negligence against the underwriter Defendants, the note distributor Defendants, the auditor Defendants, and the Pöyry Defendants for breach of a duty to the purchasers of Sino-Forest securities to perform their professional responsibilities in connection with Sino-Forest with appropriate care and diligence.
- Subject to leave being granted, a cause of action for violation of Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest, the auditor Defendants, the individual Defendants who were directors and officers of Sino-Forest at the time one or more of the pleaded material misrepresentations was made, and the Pöyry Defendants.

[198] Kim Orr submits that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is more comprehensive than its rivals and does not avoid asserting claims on the grounds that they may take time to litigate, may not be assured of success, or may involve a small portion of the total potential class. It submits that its conception of Sino-Forest's wrongdoing better accords with the factual reality and makes for a more viable claim than does Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' focus on GAAP violations and Rochon Genova's focus on the misrepresentations associated with the use of authorized intermediaries. It denies Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' argument that it has pleaded overbroad tort claims.

[199] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that its conspiracy claim against a few defendants is focused and narrow, and it criticizes the broad fraud claim advanced in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* against all the defendants as speculative, provocative, and unproductive.

[200] Relying on *McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 1591 at para. 49; *Corfax Benefits Systems Ltd. v. Fiducie Desjardins Inc.*, [1997] O.J. No. 5005 (Gen. Div.) at paras. 28-36; *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)*, [2000] O.J. No. 4595 (S.C.J.) at paras. 25 and 38; and *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)*, [1998] O.J. No. 2637 (Gen. Div.) at para. 477, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that the speculative fraud action in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is improper and would not advance the interests of class members. Further, the task of proving that each of some twenty defendants had a fraudulent intent, which will be vehemently denied by the defendants, and the costs sanction imposed for pleading and not providing fraud make the fraud claim a negative and not a positive feature of *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

## 9. Joinder of Defendants

### Smith v. Sino-Forest

[201] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the Defendants are: Sino-Forest; seven of its directors and officers; namely: Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Wang; nine underwriters; namely, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD; and Sino-Forest's two auditors during the Class Period, E &Y and BDO.

[202] The *Smith v. Sino-Forest* Statement of Claim does not join Pöyry because Rochon Genova is of the view that the disclaimer clause in Pöyry's reports likely insulates it from liability, and Rochon Genova believes that its joinder would be of marginal utility and an unnecessary complication. It submits that joining Pöyry would add unnecessary expense and delay to the litigation with little corresponding benefit because of its jurisdiction and its potential defences.

### Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[203] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the Defendants are the same as in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* with the additional joinder of Ardell, Bowland, Poon, West, Banc of America, Credit Suisse (USA), and Pöyry.

[204] The *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* action does not join Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Credit Suisse (USA), Haywood, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan and UBS, which are parties to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[205] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' explanation for these non-joinders is that the activities of the underwriters added to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* occurred outside of the class period in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and neither Lawrence nor Wong held a position with Sino-Forest during the proposed class period and the action against Lawrence's Estate is probably statute-barred. (See *Waschkowski v. Hopkinson Estate*, [2000] O.J. No. 470 (C.A.).)

[206] Wong left Sino-Forest before Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* came into force, and Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that proving causation against Wong will be difficult in light of the numerous alleged misrepresentations since his departure. Moreover, the claim against him is likely statute-barred.

[207] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that Chen, Maradin, and Zhao did not have statutory duties and allegations that they owed common law duties will just lead to motions to strike that hinder the progress of an action.

[208] Further, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that it is not advisable to assert claims of fraud against all defendants, which pleading may raise issues for insurers that potentially put available coverage and thus collection for plaintiffs at risk.

[209] Kim Orr submits that it is a mistake in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, which is connected to the late start date for the class period, which Kim Orr also regards as a mistake, that those underwriters that may be liable and who may have insurance to indemnify them for their liability, have been left out of *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[210] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, with one exception, the defendants are the same as in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* with the additional joinder of various officers of Sino-Forest; namely: Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, The Estate of John Lawrence, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, and Zhao; the joinder of Pöyry Forest and JP Management; and the joinder of more underwriters; namely: Haywood, Merrill- Fenner, Morgan, and UBS.

[211] The one exception where *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* does not join a defendant found in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is Banc of America.

[212] Kim Orr's submits that its joinder of all defendants who might arguably bear some responsibility for the loss is a positive feature of its proposed class action because the precarious financial situation of Sino-Forest makes it in the best interests of the class members that they be provided access to all appropriate routes to compensation. It strongly denies Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' allegation that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* takes a "shot-gun" and injudicious approach by joining defendants that will just complicate matters and increase costs and delay.

[213] Kim Orr submits that Rochon Genova has no good reason for not adding Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, and JP Management as defendants to *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds have no good reason in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* for suing Pöyry but not also suing its associated companies, all of whom are exposed to liability and may be sources of compensation for class members.

[214] While not putting it in my blunt terms, Kim Orr submits, in effect, that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' omission of the additional defendants is just laziness under the guise of feigning a concern for avoiding delay and unnecessarily complicating an already complex proceeding.

## 10. Causes of Action

*Smith v. Sino-Forest*

[215] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the causes of action advanced by Mr. Smith on behalf of the class members are:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act*
- negligent, reckless, or fraudulent misrepresentation
- subject to leave being granted, misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation

*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*

[216] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the causes of action advanced by various combinations of plaintiffs against various combinations of defendants are:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act*
- negligent misrepresentation

- negligence
- subject to leave being granted misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation
- conspiracy
- unjust enrichment
- oppression remedy.

[217] Kim Orr submits that the unjust enrichment claims and oppression remedy claims seemed to be based on and add little to the misrepresentation causes of action. It concedes that the conspiracy action may be a tenable claim but submits that its connection to the disclosure issues that comprise the nucleus of the litigation is unclear.

*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*

[218] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the causes of action are:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus in violation of Part XXIII the *Ontario Securities Act*
- misrepresentation in an offering memorandum in violation of Part XXIII the *Ontario Securities Act*
- negligent misrepresentation
- fraudulent misrepresentation
- negligence
- subject to leave being granted misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation

[219] The following chart is helpful in comparing and contrasting the joinder of various causes of action and the joinder of defendants in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

Cause of Action	<i>Smith v. Sino-Forest</i> ,	<i>Labourers v. Sino-Forest</i> ,	<i>Northwest v. Sino-Forest</i> ,
Part XXIII of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> – primary market shares	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Canaccord, CIBC Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management [for June 2009 and Dec. 2009 prospectus]
Part XXIII of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> – primary		Sino-Forest [two bond issues]	Sino-Forest [six bond issues]

market bonds			
Negligent misrepresentation – primary market shares	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management,
Negligent misrepresentation – primary market bonds		Sino-Forest, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Negligence – primary market shares		Sino-Forest, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E &Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, Pöyry,	[see negligence, professional negligence]
Negligence – primary market bonds		Sino-Forest, E&Y, BDO, Banc of America, Credit Suisse USA, TD	[See negligence, professional negligence]
Negligence			Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Professional Negligence			Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management

Part XXIII.1 of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> – secondary market shares	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, E & Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Part XXIII.1 of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> – secondary market bonds		Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, E & Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Negligent misrepresentation – secondary market shares	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Negligent misrepresentation – secondary market bonds		Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Negligence - secondary market shares		Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC,	[see negligence, professional negligence]

		Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	
Conspiracy		Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Poon,	
Fraudulent Misrepresentation - Bonds, shares			Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Unjust Enrichment		Chan, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon,	
Unjust Enrichment		Sino-Forest,	
Unjust Enrichment		Banc of America, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse USA, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD	
Oppression Remedy		Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang	

### 11. The Plaintiff and Defendant Correlation

[220] In class actions in Ontario, for every named defendant there must be a named plaintiff with a cause of action against that defendant: *Ragoonanan v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4597 (S.C.J.) at para. 55 (S.C.J.); *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)* (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (C.A.) at para. 18.

[221] As an application of the *Ragoonanan* rule, a purchaser in the secondary market cannot be the representative plaintiff for a class member who purchased in the primary market: *Menegon v. Philip Services Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 5547 (S.C.J.) at paras. 28-30 aff'd [2003] O.J. No. 8 (C.A.).

[222] Where the class includes non-resident class members, they must be represented by a representative plaintiff that is a non-resident: *McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 1591 at paras. 109, 117 and 184; *Currie v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd.* (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 321 at para. 30 (C.A.).

[223] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* has no *Ragoonanan* problems. However, they submit that the other actions have problems. For example, until Mr. Collins volunteered, there was no representative plaintiff in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* who had purchased shares in the primary market, and at this juncture, it is not clear that Mr. Collins purchased in all of the primary market distributions. Mr. Smith and Mr. Collins may have timing-of-purchase issues. Mr. Smith made purchases



during periods when some of the Defendants were not involved; viz. BDO, Canaccord CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD.

[224] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that none of the representative plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* purchased notes in the primary market for the 2007 prospectus offering and that the plaintiffs in *Northwest* may have timing issues with respect to their claims against Wong, Lawrence, JP Management, UBS, Haywood and Morgan.

[225] Rochon Genova's and Kim Orr's response is that there are no *Ragoonanan* problems or no irremediable *Ragoonanan* problems.

## 12. Prospects of Certification

[226] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds framed part of their argument in favour of their being selected for carriage in terms of the comparative prospects of certification of the rival actions. They submitted that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* was carefully designed to avoid the typical road blocks placed by defendants on the route to certification and to avoid inefficiencies and unproductive claims or claims that on a cost-benefit analysis would not be in the interests of the class to pursue. One of the typical roadblocks that they referred to was challenges to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Court over foreign class members and foreign defendants who have not attorned to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice's territorial jurisdiction.

[227] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submitted that their representative plaintiffs focus their claims on a single misrepresentation to avoid the pitfalls of seeking to certify a negligent misrepresentation claim with multiple misrepresentations over a long period of time. Such a claim apparently falls into a pit because it is often not certified. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds say it is better to craft a claim that has higher prospects of certification and leave some claims behind. They submit that the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that a representative plaintiff is entitled to restrict their causes of action to make their claims more amenable to class proceedings: *Rumley v. British Columbia*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 at para. 30.

[228] Although *Smith v. Sino-Forest* is even more focused than *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds still submit that their approach is better because *Smith v. Sino-Forest* goes too far in cutting out the bondholders' claims and then losses focus by extending its claims beyond the release of the Muddy Waters Report.

[229] In any event, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is better because the named plaintiffs are able to advance statutory and common law claims against all of the named defendants, which arguably is not the case for the plaintiffs in the other actions, who may have *Ragoonanan* problems or no tenable claims against some of the named defendants. Further, *Labourers* arguably is better because of a more focussed approach to maximize class recovery while avoiding the costs and delays inevitably linked with motions to strike.

[230] Kim Orr submits that its more comprehensive approach, where there are more defendant parties and expansive tort claims, is preferable to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Kim Orr submits that it does not shirk asserting claims

because they may be difficult to litigate and it does not abandon class members who may not be assured of success or who comprise a small portion of the class.

[231] Kim Orr submits that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is comprehensive and also cohesive and corresponds to the factual reality. It submits that the theories of the competing actions do not capture the wrongdoing at Sino-Forest for which many are culpable and who should be held responsible. It submits that its approach will meet the challenges of certification and yield an optimum recovery for the class.

[232] Rochon Genova submits that *Smith v. Sino-Forest* is much more cohesive than the other actions. It submits that the more expansive class definitions and causes of action in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* will present serious difficulties relating to manageability, preferability, and potential conflicts of interest amongst class members that are not present in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Rochon Genova submits that it has developed a solid, straightforward theory of the case and made a great deal of progress in unearthing proof of Sino-Forest's wrongdoing.

## **G. CARRIAGE ORDER**

### **1. Introduction**

[233] With the explanation that follows, I stay *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, and I award carriage to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*. In the race for carriage of an action against *Sino-Forest*, I would have ranked Rochon Genova second and Kim Orr third.

[234] This is not an easy decision to make because class members would probably be well served by any of the rival law firms. Success in a carriage motion does not determine which is the best law firm, it determines that having regard to the interests of the plaintiffs and class members, to what is fair to the defendants, and to the policies that underlie the class actions regime, there is a constellation of factors that favours selecting one firm or group of firms as the best choice for a particular class action.

[235] Having regard to the constellation of factors, in the circumstances of this case, several factors are neutral or non-determinative of the choice for carriage. In this group are: (a) attributes of class counsel; (b) retainer, legal, and forensic resources; (c) funding; (d) conflicts of interest; and (e) the plaintiff and defendant correlation.

[236] In the case at bar, the determinative factors are: definition of class membership, definition of class period, theory of the case, causes of action, joinder of defendants, and prospects of certification.

[237] Of the determinative factors, the attributes of the representative plaintiffs is a standalone factor. The other determinative factors are interrelated and concern the rival conceptualizations of what kind of class action would best serve the class members' need for access to justice and the policies of fairness to defendants, behaviour modification, and judicial economy.

[238] Below, I will first discuss the neutral or non-determinative factors. Then, I will discuss the determinative factors. After discussing the attributes of the representative plaintiffs, I will discuss the related factors in two groups. One group of related factors is about class membership, and the second group of factors is about the claims against the defendants.

## **2. Neutral or Non-Determinative Factors**

### **(a) Attributes of Class Counsel**

[239] In the circumstances of the cases at bar, the attributes of the competing law firms along with their associations with prestigious and prominent American class action firms is not determinative of carriage, since there is little difference among the rivals about their suitability for bringing a proposed class action against Sino-Forest.

[240] With respect to the attributes of the law firms, although one might have thought that Mr. Spencer's call to the bar would diminish the risk, Koskie and Minsky and Siskinds, particularly Siskinds, raised a question about whether Milberg might cross the line of what legal services a foreign law firm may provide to the Ontario lawyers who are the lawyers of record, and Siskinds alluded to the spectre of violations of the rules of professional conduct and perhaps the evil of champerty and maintenance. It suggested that it was unfair to class members to have to bear this risk associated with the involvement of Milberg.

[241] However, at this juncture, I have no reason to believe that any of the competing law firms, all of which have associations with notable American class action firms, will shirk their responsibilities to control the litigation and not to condone breaches of the rules of professional conduct or tortious conduct.

### **(b) Retainer, Legal, and Forensic Resources**

[242] The circumstances of the retainers and the initiative shown by the law firms and their efforts and resources expended by them are also not determinative factors in deciding the carriage motions in the case at bar, although it is an enormous shame that it may not be possible to share the fruits of these efforts once carriage is granted to one action and not the others.

[243] As I have already noted above, the aggregate expenditure to develop the tactical and strategic plans for litigation not including the costs of preparing for the carriage motion are approximately \$2 million. It seems that this effort by the respective law firms has been fruitful and productive. All of the law firms claim that their respective efforts have yielded valuable information to advance a claim against Sino-Forest and others.

[244] All of the law firms were quickly out of the starting blocks to initiate investigations about the prospects and merits of a class action against Sino-Forest. For different reasonable reasons, the statements of claim were filed at different times.

[245] In the case at bar, I do not regard the priority of the commencement of the actions as a meaningful factor, given that from the publication of the Muddy Waters Report, all the firms responded immediately to explore the merits of a class action and given that all the firms plan to amend their original pleadings that commenced the actions. In any event, I do not think that a carriage motion should be regarded as some sort of take home exam where the competing law firms have a deadline for delivering a statement of claim, else marks be deducted.

**(c) Funding**

[246] In my opinion, another non-determinative factor is the circumstances that: (a) the representative plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* may apply for court approval for third-party funding; (b) the plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* may apply for court approval for third-party funding or they may apply to the Class Proceedings Fund to be protected from an adverse costs award; (c) Messrs. Smith and Collins in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* may apply to the Class Proceedings Fund to be protected from an adverse costs award; and (d) each of the law firms have respectively undertaken with their respective clients to indemnify them from an adverse costs award.

[247] In the future, the court or the Ontario Law Foundation may have to deal with the funding requests, but for present purposes, I do not see how these prospects should make a difference to deciding carriage, although I will have something more to say below about the significance of the state of affairs that clients with the resources of Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, Sjunde AP-Fonden, BC Investment, Bâtirente, and Northwest would seek an indemnity from their respective class counsel.

[248] In any event, in my opinion, standing alone, the funding situation is not a determinative factor to carriage, although it may be relevant to other factors that are discussed below.

**(d) Conflicts of Interest**

[249] In the circumstances of the case at bar, I also do not regard conflicts of interest as a determinative factor.

[250] I do not see how the fact that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments made their investments on behalf of others and allegedly suffered no losses themselves creates a conflict of interest. It appears to me that they have the same fiduciary responsibilities to their members as do Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, Sjunde AP-Fonden, and Healthcare Manitoba.

[251] Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments were the investors in the securities of Sino-Forest and although there may be equitable or beneficial owners, under the common law, they suffered the losses, just like the other investors in Sino-Forest securities suffered losses. The fact that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments held the investments in trust for their members does not change the reality that they suffered the losses.

[252] It is alleged that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments, who were involved in corporate governance matters associated with Sino-Forest, failed to properly evaluate the risks of investing in Sino-Forest. Based on these allegations, it is submitted that they have a conflict of interest. I disagree

[253] Having regard to the main allegation being that Sino-Forest was engaged in a corporate shell game that deceived everyone, it strikes me that it is almost a spuriously speculative allegation to blame another victim as being at fault. However, even if the allegation is true, the other class members have no claim against Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments. If there were a claim, it would be by the members of Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments, who are not members of the class suing Sino-Forest. The actual class members have no claim against Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments but have a common interest in pursuing Sino-Forest and the other defendants.

[254] Further, it is arguable that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds are incorrect in suggesting that in *Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. c. Société financière Manuvie*, 2011 QCCS 3446, the Superior Court of Québec disqualified Bâtirente as a representative plaintiff because there might be an issue about Bâtirente's investment decisions.

[255] It appears to me that Justice Soldevida did not appoint Bâtirente as a representative plaintiff for a different reason. The action in Québec was a class action. There were some similarities to the case at bar, insofar as it was an action against a corporation, Manulife, and its officers and directors for misrepresentations and failure to fulfill disclosure obligations under securities law. In that action, the personal knowledge of the investors was a factor in their claims against Manulife, and Justice Soldevida felt that sophisticated investors, like Bâtirente, could not be treated on the same footing as the average investor. It was in that context that she concluded that there was an appearance of a conflict of interest between Bâtirente and the class members.

[256] In the case at bar, however, particularly for the statutory claims where reliance is presumed, there is no reason to differentiate the average investors from the sophisticated ones. I also do not see how the difference between sophisticated and average investors would matter except perhaps at individual issues trials, where reasonable reliance might be an issue, if the matter ever gets that far.

[257] Another alleged conflict concerns the facts that BDO Canada, which is not a defendant, is the auditor of Labourers' Fund, and Koskie Minsky and BDO Canada have worked together on several matters. These circumstances are not conflicts of interest. There is no reason to think that Labourers' Fund and Koskie Minsky are going to pull their punches against BDO or would have any reason to do so.

[258] Finally, turning to the major alleged conflict between the bondholders and the shareholders, speaking generally, the alleged conflicts of interest between the bondholders that invested in Sino-Forest and the shareholders that invested in Sino-Forest arise because the bondholders have a cause of action in debt in addition to their causes of action based in tort or statutory misrepresentation claims, while, in contrast,

the shareholders have only statutory and common law claims based in misrepresentation.

[259] There is, however, within the context of the class action, no conflict of interest. In the class action, only the misrepresentation claims are being advanced, and there is no conflict between the bondholders and the shareholders in advancing these claims. Both the bondholders and the shareholders seek to prove that they were deceived in purchasing or holding on to their Sino-Forest securities. That the Defendants may have defences associated with the terms of the bonds is a problem for the bondholders but it does not place them in a conflict with shareholders not confronted with those special defences.

[260] Assuming that the bondholders and shareholders succeed or are offered a settlement, there might be a disagreement between them about how the judgment or settlement proceeds should be distributed, but that conflict, which at this juncture is speculative, can be addressed now or later by constituting the bondholders as a subclass and by the court's supervisory role in approving settlements under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*.

[261] If there are bondholders that wish only to pursue their debt claims or who wish not to pursue any claim against Sino-Force or who wish to have the bond trustee pursue only the debt claims, these bondholders may opt out of the class proceeding assuming it is certified.

[262] If there is a bankruptcy of Sino-Forest, then in the bankruptcy, the position of the shareholders as owners of equity is different than the position of the bondholders as secured creditors, but that is a natural course of a bankruptcy. That there are creditors' priorities, outside of the class action, does not mean that, within the class action, where the bondholders and the shareholders both claim damages, i.e., unsecured claims, there is a conflict of interest.

[263] The alleged conflict in the case at bar is different from the genuine conflict of interest that was identified in *Settington v. Merck Frost Canada Ltd.*, [2006] O.J. No. 379 (S.C.J.), where, for several reasons, the Merchant Law Firm was not granted carriage or permitted to be part of the consortium granted carriage in a pharmaceutical products liability class action against Merck.

[264] In *Settington*, one ground for disqualification was that the Merchant Law firm was counsel in a securities class action for different plaintiffs suing Merck for an unsecured claim. If the securities class action claim was successful, then the prospects of an unsecured recovery in the products liability class action might be imperiled. In the case at bar, however, within the class action, the bondholders are not pursuing a different cause of action from the shareholders; both are unsecured creditors for the purposes of their damages' claims arising from misrepresentation. If, in other proceedings, the bondholders or their trustee successfully pursue recovery in debt, then the threat to the prospects of recovery by the shareholders arises in the normal way that debt instruments have priority over equity instruments, which is a normal risk for shareholders.

[265] Put shortly, although the analysis may not be easy, there are no conflicts of interest between the bondholders and the shareholders within the class action that cannot be handled by establishing a subclass for bondholders at the time of certification or at the time a settlement is contemplated.

**(e) The Plaintiff and Defendant Correlation**

[266] In *Ragoonanan v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.J.), in a proposed products liability class action, Mr. Ragoonanan sued Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, and JTI-MacDonald, all cigarette manufacturers. He alleged that the manufacturers had negligently designed their cigarettes by failing to make them “fire safe.” Mr. Ragoonanan’s particular claim was against Imperial Tobacco, which was the manufacturer of the cigarette that allegedly caused harm to him when it was the cause of a fire at Mr. Ragoonanan’s home. Mr. Ragoonanan did not have a claim against Rothmans or JTI-MacDonald.

[267] In *Ragoonanan*, Justice Cumming established the principle in Ontario class action law that there cannot be a cause of action against a defendant without a plaintiff who has that cause of action. Rather, there must be for every named defendant, a named plaintiff with a cause of action against that defendant. The *Ragoonanan* principle was expressly endorsed by the Court of Appeal in *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd.* (2002), 61 O.R. (3de) 433 (C.A.) at paras. 13-18, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) vii.

[268] It should be noted, however, that in *Ragoonanan*, Justice Cumming did not say that there must be for every separate cause of action against a named defendant, a named plaintiff. In other words, he did not say that if some class members had cause of action A against defendant X and other class members had cause of action B against defendant X that it was necessary that there be a named representative plaintiff for both the cause of action A v. X and for the cause of action B v. X. It was arguable that if the representative plaintiff had a claim against X, then he or she could represent others with the same or different claims against X.

[269] Thus, there is room for a debate about the scope of the *Ragoonanan* principle, and, indeed, it has been applied in the narrow way, just suggested. Provided that the representative plaintiff has his or her own cause of action, the representative plaintiff can assert a cause of action against a defendant on behalf of other class members that he or she does not assert personally, provided that the causes of action all share a common issue of law or of fact: *Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp.*, [2002] O.J. No. 1075 (S.C.J.) at para. 22, leave to appeal granted, [2002] O.J. No. 2135 (S.C.J.), varied (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 208 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 41, 48, varied [2003] O.J. No. 2218 (C.A.); *Healey v. Lakeridge Health Corp.*, [2006] O.J. No. 4277 (S.C.J.); *Matoni v. C.B.S. Interactive Multimedia Inc.*, [2008] O.J. No. 197 (S.C.J.) at paras. 71-77; *Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc.*, [2008] O.J. No. 3070 (S.C.J.); *Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier Income Fund*, 2011 ONSC 25 at para. 37. Thus, a representative plaintiff with damages for personal injury can claim in respect of dependents with derivative claims provided that

the statutes that create the derivative causes of action are properly pleaded: *Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc.*, *supra*; *Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp.*, *supra*.

[270] As noted above, in the case at bar, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* has no problem with the *Ragoonanan* principle and that *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and especially the more elaborate *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* confront *Ragoonanan* problems.

[271] For the purposes of this carriage motion, I do not feel it is necessary to do an analysis about the extent to which any of the rival actions are compliant with *Ragoonanan*.

[272] The *Ragoonanan* problem is often easy to fix. The emergence of Mr. Collins in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* to sue for the primary market shareholders is an example, assuming that Mr. Smith's own claims against the defendants do not satisfy the *Ragoonanan* principle. Therefore, I do not regard the plaintiff and defendant correlation as a determinative factor in determining carriage.

[273] It is also convenient here to add that I do not see the spectre of challenges to the Superior Court's jurisdiction over foreign class members or over the foreign defendants are a determinative factor to picking one action over another. It may be that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* has the potential to attract more jurisdictional challenges but standing alone that potential is not a reason for disqualifying *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

### **3. Determinative Factors**

#### **(a) Attributes of the Proposed Representative Plaintiffs**

[274] I turn now to the determinative factors that lead me to the conclusion that carriage should be granted to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[275] The one determinative factor that stands alone is the characteristics of the candidates for representative plaintiff. In the case at bar, this is a troublesome and maybe a profound determinative factor.

[276] Kim Orr extolled the virtues of having its clients, Northwest, Bâtirente and BC Investments, which collectively manage \$92 billion in assets, as candidates to be representative plaintiffs.

[277] Similarly, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds extolled the virtues of having Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, and Sjunde AP-Fonden as candidates for representative plaintiff, along with the support of major class member Healthcare Manitoba. Together, these parties to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* collectively manage \$23.2 billion in assets. As noted above, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submitted that their clients were not tainted by involving themselves in the governance oversight of Sino-Forest, which had been lauded as a positive factor by Kim Orr.

[278] As I have already discussed above in the context of the discussion about conflicts of interest, I do not regard Bâtirente's, and Northwest's interest in corporate governance generally or its particular efforts to oversee Sino-Forest as a negative factor.



[279] However, what may be a negative factor and what is the signature attribute of all of these candidates for representative plaintiff is that it is hard to believe that given their financial heft, they need the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* for access to justice or to level the litigation playing field or that they need an indemnity to protect them from exposure to an adverse costs award.

[280] Although these candidates for representative plaintiff would seem to have adequate resources to litigate, they seem to be seeking to use a class action as a means to secure an indemnity from class counsel or a third-party funder for any exposure to costs. If they are genuinely serious about pursuing the defendants to obtain compensation for their respective members, they would also seem to be prime candidates to opt out of the class proceeding if they are not selected as a representative plaintiff.

[281] Mr. Rochon neatly argued that the class proceedings regime was designed for litigants like Mr. Smith not litigants like Labourers Trust or Northwest. He referred to the *Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995*, legislation in the United States that was designed to encourage large institutions to participate in securities class actions by awarding them leadership of securities actions under what is known as a “leadership order”. He told me that the policy behind this legislation was to discourage what are known as “strike suits;” namely, meritless securities class actions brought by opportunistic entrepreneurial attorneys to obtain very remunerative nuisance value payments from the defendants to settle non-meritorious claims.

[282] I was told that the American legislators thought that appointing a lead plaintiff on the basis of financial interest would ensure that institutional plaintiffs with expertise in the securities market and real financial interests in the integrity of the market would control the litigation, not lawyers. See: *LaSala v. Bordier et CIE*, 519 F.3d 121 (U.S. Ct App (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir)) (2008) at p. 128; *Taft v. Ackermans*, (2003), F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 402789 at 1,2, D.H. Webber, “The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions” (2010) NYU Law and Economics Working Papers, paper 216 at p. 7.

[283] Mr. Rochon pointed out that the litigation environment is different in Canada and Ontario and that the provinces have taken a different approach to controlling strike suits. Control is established generally by requiring that a proposed class action go through a certification process and by requiring a fairness hearing for any settlements, and in the securities field, control is established by requiring leave for claims under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*. See *Ainslie v. CV Technologies Inc.* (2008) 93 O.R. (3d) 200 (S.C.J.) at paras. 7, 10-13.

[284] In his factum, Mr. Rochon eloquently argued that individual investors victimized by securities fraud should have a voice in directing class actions. Mr. Smith lost approximately half of his investment fortune; and according to Mr. Rochon, Mr. Smith is an individual investor who is highly motivated, wants an active role, and wants to have a voice in the proceeding.

[285] While I was impressed by Mr. Rochon’s argument, it did not take me to the conclusions that the attributes of the institutional candidates for representative plaintiff in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* when compared to the

attributes of Mr. Smith should disqualify the institutional candidates from being representative plaintiffs or be a determinative factor to grant carriage to a more typical representative plaintiff like Mr. Smith or Mr. Collins.

[286] I think that it would be a mistake to have a categorical rule that an institutional plaintiff with the resources to bring individual proceedings or the means to opt-out of class proceedings and go it alone should be disqualified or discouraged from being a representative plaintiff. In the case at bar, the expertise and participation of the institutional investors in the securities marketplace could contribute to the successful prosecution of the lawsuit on behalf of the class members.

[287] Although Mr. Smith and Mr. Collins might lose their voice, they might in the circumstances of this case not be best voice for their fellow class members, who at the end of the day want results not empathy from their representative plaintiff and class counsel.

[288] Access to justice is one of the policy goals of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* and although it may be the case that the institutional representative plaintiffs want but do not need the access to justice provided by the Act, they are pursuing access to justice in a way that ultimately benefits Mr. Smith and other class members should their actions be certified as a class proceeding.

[289] On these matters, I agree with what Justice Rady said in *McCann v. CP Ships Ltd.*, [2009] O.J. No. 5182 (S.C.J.) at paras. 104-105:

104. I recognize that access to justice concerns may not be engaged when a class is comprised of large institutions with large claims. Authority for this proposition is found in *Abdool v. Anaheim Management Ltd.* (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 453 (Div. Ct.). Moldaver J. made the following observation at p. 473:

As a rule, certification should have as its root a number of individual claims which would otherwise be economically unfeasible to pursue. While not necessarily fatal to an order for certification, the absence of this important underpinning will certainly weigh in the balance against certification.

105. Nevertheless, I am satisfied on the basis of the record before me that the individual claims and those of small corporations would likely be economically unfeasible to pursue. Further, there is no good principled reason that a large corporation should not be able to avail itself of the class proceeding mechanism where the other objectives are met.

[290] Another goal of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* is judicial economy, and the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions. However, the Act envisions a multiplicity of actions by permitting class members to opt-out and bring their own action against the defendants. However, there is an exception. The only class member that cannot opt out is the representative plaintiff, and in the circumstances of the case at bar, one advantage of granting carriage to one of the institutional plaintiffs is that they cannot opt out, and this, in and of itself, advances judicial economy.

[291] Another advantage of keeping the institutional plaintiffs in the case at bar in a class action is that the institutional plaintiffs are already to a large extent representative plaintiffs. They are already, practically speaking, suing on behalf of their own members, who number in the hundreds of thousands. Their members suffered losses by the

investments made on their behalf by BC Investments, Bâtirente, Northwest, Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, Sjunde AP-Fonden, and Healthcare Manitoba. These pseudo-class members are probably better served by the court case managing the class action, assuming it is certified and by the judicial oversight of the approval process for any settlements.

[292] These thoughts lead me to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case at bar, a determinative factor that favours *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is the attributes of their candidates for representative plaintiff. In this regard, *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* has the further advantage that it also has Mr. Grant and Mr. Wong, who are individual investors and who can give voice to the interests of similarly situated class members.

**(b) Definition of Class Membership and Definition of Class Period**

[293] The first group of interrelated determinative factors is: definition of class membership and definition of class period. These factors concern who, among the investors in Sino-Forest shares and bonds, is to be given a ticket to a class action litigation train that is designed to take them to the court of justice.

[294] *Smith v. Sino-Forest* offers no tickets to bondholders because it is submitted that (a) the bondholders will fight with the shareholders about sharing the spoils of the litigation, especially because the bondholders have priority over the shareholders and secured and protected claims in a bankruptcy; (b) the bondholders will fight among themselves about a variety of matters including whether it would be preferable to leave it to their bond trustee to sue on their collective behalf to collect the debt rather than prosecute a class action for an unsecured claim for damages for misrepresentation; and (c) a misrepresentation action by the bondholders against some or all of the defendants may be precluded by the terms of the bonds.

[295] In my opinion, the bondholders should be included as class members, if necessary, with their own subclass, and, thus, *Smith v. Sino-Forest* does not fare well under this group of interrelated factors. As I explained above, I do not regard the membership of both shareholders and bondholders in the class as raising insurmountable conflicts of interest. The bondholders have essentially the same misrepresentation claims as do the shareholders, and it makes sense, particularly as a matter of judicial economy, to have their claims litigated in the same proceeding as the shareholders' claims.

[296] Pragmatically, if the bondholders are denied a ticket to one of the class actions now at the Osgoode Hall station because of a conflict of interest, then they could bring another class action in which they would be the only class members. That class action by the bondholders would raise the same issues of fact and law about the affairs of Sino-Forest. Thus, denying the bondholders a ticket on one of the two class actions that has made room for them would just encourage a multiplicity of litigation. It is preferable to keep the bondholders on board sharing the train with any conflicts being managed by the appointment of separate class counsel for the bondholders, who can form a subclass at certification or later assuming that certification is granted.

[297] As already noted above, for those bondholders who do not want to get on the litigation train, they can opt-out of the class action assuming it is certified. That the defendants may have defences to the misrepresentation claims of the bondholders is just a problem that the bondholders will have to confront, and it is not a reason to deny them a ticket to try to obtain access to justice.

[298] In *Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.*, [2004] O.J. No. 299 (S.C.J.), Justice Winkler, as he then was, noted at para. 39 that there is a difference between restricting the joinder of causes of action in order to make an action more amenable to certification and restricting the number of class members in an action for which certification is being sought. He stated:

Although *Rumley v. British Columbia*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 holds that the plaintiffs can arbitrarily restrict the causes of action asserted in order to make a proceeding more amenable to certification (at 201), the same does not hold true with respect to the proposed class. Here the plaintiffs have not chosen to restrict the causes of action asserted but rather attempt to make the action more amenable to certification by suggesting arbitrary exclusions from the proposed class. This is diametrically opposite to the approach taken by the plaintiffs in *Rumley*, and one which has been expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in *Hollick v. Toronto (City)*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158. There, McLachlin C.J. made it clear that the onus falls on the putative representative to show that the "class is defined sufficiently narrowly" but without resort to arbitrary exclusion to achieve that result.....

[299] For shareholders, *Smith v. Sino-Forest* is more accommodating; indeed, it is the most accommodating, in offering tickets to shareholders to board the class action train. Without prejudice to the arguments of the defendants, who may impugn any of the class period or class membership definitions, and assuming that the bondholders are also included, the best of the class periods for shareholders is that found in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*.

[300] To be blunt, I found the rationales for shorter class periods in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* somewhat paranoid, as if the plaintiffs were afraid that the defendants will attack their definitions for over-inclusiveness or for making the class proceeding unmanageable. Those attacks may come, but I see no reason for the plaintiffs in *Labourers* and *Sino-Forest* to leave at the station without tickets some shareholders who may have arguable claims.

[301] If Mr. Torchio is correct that almost all of the shareholders would be covered by the shortest class period that is found in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, then the defendants may think the fight to shorten the class period may not be worth it. If they are inclined to challenge the class definition on grounds of unmanageability or the class action as not being the preferable procedure, the longer class period definition will likely be peripheral to the main contest.

[302] I do not see the extension of the class period beyond June 2, 2011, when the Muddy Waters Report became public, as a problem. Put shortly, at this juncture, and subject to what the defendants may later have to say, I agree with Rochon Genova's arguments about the appropriate class period end date for the shareholders.

[303] If I am correct in this analysis so far, where it takes me is only to the conclusion that the best class period definition for shareholders is found in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. It,

however, does not take me to the conclusion that carriage should be granted to *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Subject to what the defendants may have to say, the class definitions and class period in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* appear to be adequate, reasonable, certifiable, and likely consistent with the common issues that will be forthcoming.

[304] Since for other reasons, I would grant carriage to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the question I ask myself is whether the class definition in *Labourers*, which favourably includes bondholders, but which is not as good a definition as found in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* or in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* should be a reason not to grant carriage to *Labourers*. My answer to my own question is no, especially since it is still possible to amend the class definition so that it is not under-inclusive.

**(c) Theory of the Case, Causes of Action, Joinder of Defendants, and Prospects of Certification**

[305] The second group of interrelated determinative factors is: theory of the case, causes of action, joinder of defendants, and prospects of certification. Taken together, it is my opinion, that these factors, which are about what is in the best interests of the putative class members, favour staying *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* and granting carriage to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[306] In applying the above factors, I begin here with the obvious point that it would not be in the interests of the putative class members, let alone not in their best interests to grant carriage to an action that is unlikely to be certified or that, if certified, is unlikely to succeed. It also seems obvious that it would be in the best interests of class members to grant carriage to the action that is most likely to be certified and ultimately successful at obtaining access to justice for the injured or, in this case, financially harmed class members. And it also seems obvious that all other things being equal, it would be in the best interests of class members and fair to the defendants and most consistent with the policies of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* to grant carriage to the action that, to borrow from rule 1.04 or the *Rules of Civil Procedure* secures the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the dispute on its merits.

[307] While these points seem obvious, there is, however, a major problem in applying them, because the court should not and cannot go very far in determining the matters that would be most determinative of carriage. A carriage motion is not the time to determine whether an action will satisfy the criteria for certification or whether it will ultimately provide redress to the class members or whether it would be the preferable procedure or the most expeditious and least expensive procedure to resolve the dispute.

[308] Keeping this caution in mind, in my opinion, certain aspects of *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* make the other actions preferable. In this regard, I find the joinder of some defendants to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* mildly troublesome.

[309] More serious, in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, I find the employment and reliance on the tort action of fraudulent misrepresentation less desirable than the causes of action utilized to provide procedural and substantive justice to the class members in *Smith v.*

*Sino-Forest and Labourers v. Sino-Forest*. In my opinion, the fraudulent misrepresentation action adds needless complexity and costs.

[310] While the finger-pointing of the OSC at Ho, Hung, Ip, and Yeung supports their joinder, the joinder of Chen, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, and Zhao is mildly troublesome. The joinder of defendants should be based on something more substantive than their opportunity to be a wrongdoer, and at this juncture it is not clear why Chen, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, and Zhao have been joined to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* and not to the other proposed class actions. Their joinder, however, is only mildly troublesome, because the plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* may have particulars of wrongdoing and have simply failed to plead them.

[311] Turning to the pleading of fraudulent misrepresentation, when it is far easier to prove a claim in negligent misrepresentation or negligence, the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation seems a needless provocation that will just fuel the defendants' fervour to defend and to not settle the class action. Fraud is a very serious allegation because of the moral and not just legal turpitude of it, and the allegation of fraud also imperils insurance coverage that might be the source of a recovery for class members.

[312] Kim Orr has understated the difficulties the plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* will confront in impugning the integrity of Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management.

[313] Fraud must be proved individually. In order to establish that a corporate defendant committed fraud, it must be proven that a natural person for whose conduct the corporation is responsible acted with a fraudulent intent. See: *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)*, [2000] O.J. No. 4595 (S.C.J.) at para. 26; *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)*, [1998] O.J. No. 2637 (Gen. Div.) at paras. 477-479.

[314] A claim for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation typically breaks down into five elements: (1) a false statement; (2) the defendant knowing that the statement is false or being indifferent to its truth or falsity; (3) the defendant having an intent to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the false statement being material and the plaintiff being induced to act; and (5) the defendant suffering damages: *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.); *Graham v. Saville*, [1945] O.R. 301 (C.A.); *Francis v. Dingman* (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 244 (Ont. C.A.). The fraud elements are the second and third in this list.

[315] In the famous case of *Derry v. Peek*, the general issue was what counts as a fraudulent misrepresentation. More particularly, the issue was whether a careless or negligent misrepresentation without more could count as a fraudulent misrepresentation. In the case, the defendants were responsible for a false statement in a prospectus. The prospectus, which was for the sale of shares in a tramway company, stated that the company was permitted to use steam power to work a tram line. The statement was false because the directors had omitted the qualification that the use of steam power required the consent of the Board of Trade. As it happened, the consent was not given, the tram line would have to be driven by horses, and the company was wound-up. The Law

Lords reviewed the evidence of the defendants individually and concluded that although the defendants had all been careless in their use of language, they had honestly believed what they had said in the prospectus.

[316] In the lead judgment, Lord Herschell reviewed the case law, and at p. 374, he stated in the most famous passage from the case:

I think the authorities establish the following propositions. First, in order to sustain an action for deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless, whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think be an honest belief in its truth. And this probably covers the whole ground, for one who knowingly alleges that which is false has obviously no such honest belief. Thirdly, if fraud is proved, the motive of the person guilty is immaterial. It matters not that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made.

[317] Lord Herschell's third situation is the one that was at the heart of *Derry v. Peek*, and the Law Lords struggled to articulate that relationship between belief and carelessness in speaking. Before the above passage, Lord Herschell stated at p. 361:

To make a statement careless whether it be true or false, and therefore without any real belief in its truth, appears to me to be an essentially different thing from making, through want of care, a false statement, which is nevertheless honestly believed to be true. And it is surely conceivable that a man may believe that what he states is the fact, though he has been so wanting in care that the Court may think that there were no sufficient grounds to warrant his belief.

[318] Lord Herschell is saying that carelessness in making a statement does not necessarily entail that a person does not believe what he or she is saying. However, later in his judgment, he emphasizes that carelessness is relevant and could be sufficient to show that a person did not believe what he or she was saying. Thus, carelessness may prove fraud, but it is not itself fraud. Lord Herschell's famous quotation, where he states that fraud is proven when it is shown that a false statement was made recklessly, careless whether it be true or false, states only awkwardly the role of carelessness and must be read in the context of the whole judgment.

[319] In *Angus v. Clifford*, [1891] 2 Ch. 449 (C.A.) at p. 471, Bowen, L.J. discussed the role of carelessness or recklessness in establishing fraud; he stated:

Not caring, in that context [i.e., in the context of an allegation of fraud], did not mean taking care, it meant indifference to the truth, the moral obliquity which consists of wilful disregard of the importance of truth, and unless you keep it clear that that is the true meaning of the term, you are constantly in danger of confusing the evidence from which the inference of dishonesty in the mind may be drawn - evidence which consists in a great many cases of gross want of caution - with the inference of fraud, or of dishonesty itself, which has to be drawn after you have weighed all the evidence.

[320] Bowen, L.J.'s statement alludes to the second element of what makes a statement fraudulent. Deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation requires that the defendant

have “a wicked mind:” *Le Lievre v. Gould*, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 at p. 498. Fraud involves intentional dishonesty, the intent being to deceive. If the plaintiff fails to prove this mental element, then, as was the case in *Derry v. Peek*, the claim is dismissed. To succeed in an action for deceit or for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show not only that the defendant spoke falsely and contrary to belief but that the defendant had the intent to deceive, which is to say he or she had the aim of inducing the plaintiff to act mistakenly: *BG Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority* (1993), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).

[321] The defendant’s reason for deceiving the plaintiff, however, need not be evil. In the passage above from *Derry v. Peek*, Lord Herschell notes that the person’s motive for saying something that he or she does not believe is irrelevant. A person may have a benign reason for defrauding another person, but the fraud remains because of the discordance between words and belief combined with the intent to mislead the plaintiff: *Smith v. Chadwick* (1854), 9 App. Cas. 187 at p. 201; *Bradford Building Society v. Borders*, [1941] 2 All E.R. 205 at p. 211; *Beckman v. Wallace* (1913), 29 O.L.R. 96 (C.A.) at p. 101.

[322] In promoting its fraudulent misrepresentation claim, Kim Orr relied on *Gregory v. Jolley* (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), which was a case where a trial judge erred by not applying the third branch of the test articulated in *Derry v. Peek*. Justice Sharpe discussed the trial judge’s failure to consider whether the appellant had made out a case of fraud based on recklessness and stated at para. 20:

With respect to the law, the trial judge’s reasons show that he failed to consider whether the appellant had made out a case of fraud on the basis of recklessness. While he referred to a case that in turn referred to the test from *Derry v. Peek*, the reasons for judgment demonstrate to my satisfaction that the trial judge simply did not take into account the possibility that fraud could be made out if the respondent made misrepresentations of material fact without regard to their truth. The trial judge’s reasons speak only of an intention to defraud or of statements calculated to mislead or misrepresent. He makes no reference to recklessness or to statements made without an honest belief in their truth. As *Derry v. Peek* holds, that state of mind is sufficient proof of the mental element required for civil fraud, whatever the motive of the party making the representation. In another leading case on civil fraud, *Edgington v. Fitzmaurice*, (1885), 29 Ch. D.459 at 481-82 (C.A.), Bowen L.J. stated: “[I]t is immaterial whether they made the statement knowing it to be untrue, or recklessly, without caring whether it was true or not, because to make a statement recklessly for the purpose of influencing another person is dishonest.” The failure to give adequate consideration to the contention that the respondent had been reckless with the truth in regard to the income figures he gave in order to obtain disability insurance constitutes an error of law justifying the intervention of this court.

[323] From this passage, Kim Orr extracts the notion that there is a viable fraudulent misrepresentation against forty defendants all of whom individually can be shown to be reckless as opposed to careless. That seems unlikely, but more to the point, recklessness is only half the battle. The overall motive may not matter, but the defendant still must have had the intent to deceive, which in *Gregory v. Jolley* was the intent to obtain disability insurance to which he was not qualified to receive.



[324] Recklessness alone is not enough to constitute fraudulent misrepresentation, as Justice Cumming notes at para. 25 of his judgment in *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)*, [2000] O.J. No. 4595 (S.C.J.), where he states:

The representation must have been made with knowledge of its falsehood or recklessness without belief in its truth. The representation must have been made by the representor with the intention that it should be acted upon by the representee and the representee must in fact have acted upon it.

[325] I conclude that the fraudulent misrepresentation action is a substantial weakness in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*. In fairness, I should add that I think that the unjust enrichment causes of action and oppression remedy claims in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* add little.

[326] The unjust enrichment claims in *Labourers* seem superfluous. If Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Banc of America, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse USA, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia and TD, are found to be liable for misrepresentation or negligence, then the damages they will have to pay will far exceed the disgorgement of any unjust enrichment. If they are found not to have committed any wrong, then there will be no basis for an unjust enrichment claim for recapture of the gains they made on share transactions or from their remuneration for services rendered. In other words, the claims for unjust enrichment are unnecessary for victory and they will not snatch victory if the other claims are defeated. Much the same can be said about the oppression remedy claim. That said, these claims in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* will not strain the forensic resources of the plaintiffs in the same way as taking on a massive fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action would do in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[327] For the purposes of this carriage motion, I have little to say about the “Integrity Representation” approach to the misrepresentation claims that are at the heart of the claims against the defendants in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* or of the “GAAP” misrepresentation employed in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, or the focus on the authorized intermediaries in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Short of deciding the motion for certification, there is no way of deciding which approach is more likely to lead to certification or which approach the defendants will attack as deficient. For present purposes, I am simply satisfied that the class members are best served by the approach in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[328] The cohesive, yet adequately comprehensive, approach used in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* appears to me close to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, but in my opinion, *Smith v. Sino-Forest* wants for the inclusion of the bondholders, and, as noted above, there are other factors which favour *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* over *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. That said, it was a close call for me to choose *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and not *Smith v. Sino-Forest*.

**H. CONCLUSION**

[329] For the above Reasons, I grant carriage to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds with leave to the plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

[330] In granting leave, I grant leave generally and the plaintiffs are not limited to the amendments sought as a part of this carriage motion. It will be for the plaintiffs to decide whether some amendments are in order to respond to the lessons learned from this carriage motion, and it is not too late to have more representative plaintiffs.

[331] I repeat that a carriage motion is without prejudice to the defendants' rights to challenge the pleadings and whether any particular cause of action is legally tenable.


[332] I make no order as to costs, which is in the usual course in carriage motions.

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Perell, J.

**Released:** January 6, 2012

SCHEDULE "A"



**CITATION:** Smith v Sino-Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC24  
**COURT FILE NO.:** 11-CV-428238CP  
**COURT FILE NO.:** 11-CV-431153CP  
**COURT FILE NO.:** 11-CV-435826CP  
**DATE:** January 6, 2012

**ONTARIO  
 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

**BETWEEN:**

**Douglas Smith and Zhongjun Goa**

Plaintiff

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation et al.**

Defendants

**AND BETWEEN:**

**The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund  
 of Central and Eastern Canada and the  
 Trustees of the International Union of  
 Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan  
 for Operating Engineers in Ontario**

Plaintiff

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation et al.**

Defendants

**AND BETWEEN:**

**Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P., Comité  
 Syndical National de Retraite Bâtirente Inc.**

Plaintiff

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation et al.**

Defendants

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**REASONS FOR DECISION**


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**Perell, J.**

2012 ONSC 24 (CanLI)


# **TAB E**

This is Exhibit "E" mentioned and referred to in the Affidavit of Daniel E. H. Bach, sworn before me at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 11th day of April, 2012.



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A Commissioner, etc.  
Serge Kalloghlian  
(LSUC #55557F)




**The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension  
Fund of Central and Eastern Canada et al  
v Sino-Forest Corporation et al  
Court File No.: CV-11-431153-00CP**

**Motion Records of the Plaintiffs  
Motion to Approve Funding Agreement**

# TAB F



This is Exhibit "F" mentioned and referred to in the Affidavit of Daniel E. H. Bach, sworn before me at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 11th day of April, 2012.



---

A Commissioner, etc.  
Serge Kalloghlian  
(LSUC #55557F)


**The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension  
Fund of Central and Eastern Canada et al  
v Sino-Forest Corporation et al  
Court File No.: CV-11-431153-00CP**

**HIQAG**

**Motion Records of the Plaintiffs  
Certification for Settlement Purposes  
and Notice of Fairness Hearing**

# TAB G

This is Exhibit "G" mentioned and referred to in the Affidavit of Daniel E. H. Bach, sworn before me at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 11th day of April, 2012.



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A Commissioner, etc.  
Serge Kalloghlian  
(LSUC #55557F)

CITATION: Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v.  
Sino-Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC 1924  
COURT FILE NO. 11-CV-431153CP  
DATE: 20120326

ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada, the  
Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for  
Operating Engineers in Ontario, Sjuunde Ap-Fonden, David Grant and Robert Wong

Plaintiffs

- and -

Sino-Forest Corporation, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited (formerly known as BDO  
McCabe Lo Limited), Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon, David J.  
Horsley, William E. Ardell, James P Bowland, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, Simon  
Murray, Peter Wang, Garry J. West, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited,  
Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities  
Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets  
Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada  
Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC and Banc of America Securities LLC

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

COUNSEL:

- Kirk M. Baert and Michael Robb for the Plaintiffs
- Michael Eizenga for Sino-Forest Corporation, Simon Murray, Edmund Mak, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon and Peter Wang
- Emily Cole and Megan Mackey for Allan T.Y. Chan
- Peter Wardle and Simon Bieber for David J. Horsley
- Laura Fric and Geoffrey Grove for William E. Ardell, James P. Bowland, James M.E. Hyde and Garry J. West
- John Fabello and Andrew Gray for Credit Suisse Securities (Canada) Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC and Banc of America Securities LLC
- Peter H. Griffin and Shara Roy for Ernst & Young LLP
- Kenneth Dekker and Michelle Booth for BDO Limited

- John Pirie and David Gadsden for Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited

HEARING DATES: March 22, 2012

PERELL, J.

## REASONS FOR DECISION

### A. INTRODUCTION

[1] A motion for an order requiring a defendant to deliver a statement of defence or for an order setting a timetable for a motion should not be a momentous matter. But scheduling is a very big deal in this very big case under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, S.O. 1992, c. 6.

[2] The Defendants strenuously resist delivering a statement of defence before the certification motion, and they submit that it would both contrary to law and a denial of due process to require them to plead in the normal course of an action.

[3] The Defendants submit that having to plead their statement of defence is contrary to law because the Plaintiffs' statement of claim can be commenced only with leave pursuant to s. 138.8 of the *Securities Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 and in *Sharma v. Timminco*, 2012 ONCA 107, the Court of Appeal ruled that the statement of claim does not exist until leave is granted. The Defendants submit that having to plead their statement of defence is a denial of due process because the Plaintiffs' statement of claim includes causes of action that might not survive a challenge under Rule 21 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. One of the Defendants, BDO Limited, also argues that claims against it are statute-barred, and, therefore, it should not be required to deliver a statement of defence but should be permitted to bring a Rule 21 motion before the certification hearing.

[4] The position of the Defendants is set out in paragraph 2 of the Defendant Sino-Forest Corporation's factum as follows:

2. The Responding Parties oppose the relief relating to the delivery of a statement of defence because, as a result of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in *Sharma v. Timminco*, the secondary market action has yet to be commenced and will not have been commenced unless and until leave has been granted by this Honourable Court. Accordingly, the Defendants cannot be required to deliver a statement of defence to a proceeding that has yet to be commenced. Moreover, the secondary market claims are intertwined with the balance of the allegations in the statement of claim, such that it would not be realistic to provide a partial or bifurcated defence. In addition, the Responding Parties expect to be bringing a motion to strike the Statement of claim, at least in respect of the portion of the claim that purports to be brought on behalf of Noteholders, who are prohibited from commencing such a claim by virtue of the no suits by holder clause.

[5] In response, the Plaintiffs submit that just as defendants are entitled to know the case they must meet, plaintiffs are entitled to know the defence they confront. The Plaintiffs submit that the law and the dictates of due process do not preclude ordering

the delivery of a statement of defence in accordance with the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, and the Plaintiffs' rely on the court's power under s. 12 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* and on what I said in *Pennyfeather v. Tymminco*, 2011 ONSC 4257 about the desirability of the pleadings being closed before the certification motion.

[6] In the immediate case, the Defendants also strenuously resist the Plaintiffs' request that the leave motion under s. 138.8 the *Securities Act* and the certification motion under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* be heard together. Instead of a combined leave and certification motion, the Defendants submit that a series of motions be scheduled, beginning with the leave motion, followed by Rule 21 motions, followed by the certification motion. Some Defendants would begin with the Rule 21 motions before the leave motion, but all wish a sequence of separate motions.

[7] The Defendants submit that a combined leave and certification motion would be both inappropriate and also unfair, and particularly so, if they are also required to plead their defences. The Defendants submit that fairness dictates that leave be determined in advance of certification, and that their right to attack all or part of whatever pleading emerges from the leave motion be preserved. They submit that it would be inefficient to deliver a statement of defence when the statement of claim is likely to be amended in a substantial manner depending on the outcome of the Plaintiffs' leave motion and the Rule 21 motions.

[8] The Plaintiffs regard the Defendants' proposal of a sequence of motions as something akin to having their action being sentenced to a life of imprisonment on Devil's Island.

[9] For the reasons that follow, I adjourn the motion as it concerns BDO Limited, and I order that there shall be a combined leave and certification motion on November 21-30, 2012 (10 days).

[10] I order that the "Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim" be the statement of claim for the purposes of the leave and certification motion and that this pleading shall not be amended without leave of the court. Further, I order that with the exception of the Plaintiffs' funding motion, there shall be no other motions before the leave and certification motion without leave of the court first being obtained.

[11] I do not agree that it would be contrary to law or a denial of due process to order the pre-certification delivery of a statement of defence; nevertheless, I shall not order all the Defendants to deliver their statements of defence before the combined leave and certification.

[12] Rather, I shall order that a statement of defence be delivered by any Defendant that delivers an affidavit pursuant to s. 138.8 (2) of the *Securities Act*. I order that any other Defendant may, if so advised, deliver a statement of defence. Further, I order that if a Defendant delivers a statement of defence, then the delivery of the statement of defence is not a fresh step and the Defendant is not precluded from bringing a Rule 21 motion at the leave and certification motion or from contesting that the Plaintiffs have shown a cause of action under s. 5 (1)(a) of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*.

[13] In my reasons, I will explain why it may be advantageous to a defendant to deliver a statement of defence although it may not be obliged to do so.

[14] Finally, in my reasons, I will establish a timetable for the funding motion and for the leave and certification motion, which timetable may be adjusted, if necessary, by directions made at a case conference.

## B. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[15] Sino-Forest is a Canadian public company whose shares formerly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. At the moment, trading is suspended because on June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters Research released a research report alleging fraud by Sino-Forest. The release of the report had a catastrophic effect on Sino-Forest's share price.

[16] On June 20, 2011, The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada ("Labourers") retained Koskie Minsky LLP to sue Sino-Forest. Koskie Minsky issued a notice of action in a proposed class action with Labourers as the proposed representative plaintiff.

[17] The June action, however, was not pursued, and in July 2011, Labourers and another pension fund, the Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario ("Engineers") retained Koskie Minsky and Siskinds LLP to commence a new action, which followed on July 20, 2011, by notice of action. The statement of claim in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, which is the action now before the court, was served in August, 2011.

[18] On November 4, 2011, Labourers served the Defendants in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* with the notice of motion for an order granting leave to assert the causes of action under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[19] At this time, there were rival class actions. Douglas Smith had retained Rochon Genova, LLP. Rochon Genova issued a notice of action on June 8, 2011. The statement of claim in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* followed on July 8, 2011. Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P. and Comité Syndical National de Retraite Bâtirente Inc. retained Kim Orr Barristers P.C., and on September 26, 2011, Kim Orr commenced *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[20] On December 20 and 21, 2011, there was a carriage motion, and on January 6, 2012, I released my judgment awarding carriage to Class Counsel in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*. I granted leave to the Plaintiffs to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, which may include the joinder of the plaintiffs and the causes of action set out in *Grant v. Sino-Forest*, *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, as the Plaintiffs may be advised.

[21] On January 26, 2012, the plaintiffs delivered an Amended Statement of Claim.

[22] On March 2, 2012, the Plaintiffs initiated a motion seeking leave to assert causes of action pursuant to ss. 138.3 and 138.8 under Part XXIII.1 of the *Securities Act*

[23] Plaintiffs' motion materials included a draft Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim for the eventuality that leave is granted ("Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement



of Claim”). The Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim substantially amends and extends the allegations contained in the pleading delivered in January 2012.

[24] In their various pleadings, the Plaintiffs allege that Sino-Forest and the other Defendants made misrepresentations in the primary and secondary markets. The Plaintiffs claims include: \$0.8 billion for primary market claims; \$1.8 billion (U.S.) for noteholders; and \$6.5 billion for secondary market claims. There are also claims against some of the Defendants for a corporate oppression remedy, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The following chart describes the claims against each Defendant:

	S.A. s. 130 (prospectus)	S.A. s. 130.1 (offering memorandum)	S.A. s. 138.3 (secondary market)	Negligent misrepresentation (secondary market)	Negligent misrepresentation (prospectus / o-memo)	Negligence (prospectus, offering memorandum)	Unjust Enrichment	CBCA Oppression	Conspiracy
Sino Forest	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Chan	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Horsley	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Poon	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wang	X		X	X	X	X		X	
Marlin	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Mak	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Murray	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Hyde	X		X	X	X	X		X	
Ardell			X	X				X	
Bowland			X	X				X	
West			X	X				X	
Ernst & Young	X		X	X	X	X			
BDO Ltd.	X		X	X	X	X			
Bövy (Belling)	X		X			X			
Credit Suisse	X				X	X	X		
TD Securities	X				X	X	X		
Dundee Securities	X				X	X	X		
RBC Dominion	X				X	X	X		
Scotia Capital	X				X	X	X		
CIBC World	X				X	X	X		
Merrill Lynch	X				X	X	X		
Canaccord	X				X	X	X		
Malson	X				X	X	X		
Credit Suisse (USA)						X	X		
Banc of America						X	X		

[25] On March 6, 2012, there was a case conference, and I scheduled 10 days of hearings from November 21 to November 30, 2012. Apart from deciding that the leave motion must be heard, I did not decide what would be the subject matter of those hearing dates.

[26] None of the Defendants has served a statement of defence. None has advised which, if any, statutory or common law defences they will advance in response to the Plaintiffs' claims. In this regard, it may be noted that the Plaintiffs advance claims under s. 130 of the *Securities Act* with respect to misrepresentations in the primary market.

These claims raises at least eight possible statutory defences, which are set out in subsections 130(3), (4) and (5) of the *Securities Act*. If leave is granted, the Plaintiffs also advance claims under Part XXIII.1 of the *Securities Act*. As noted in Sino-Forest's factum for this motion, there are at least 11 defences to secondary market claims.

### C. DISCUSSION

#### 1. Introduction

[27] In this introductory section, I will address the one relatively easy issue; i.e., the problem of the "moving target" statement of claim.

[28] In the sections that follow, I will address the more difficult issues of: (a) whether the Defendants can and should be ordered to deliver statements of defence; (b) whether the leave motion should be combined with the certification motion or instead there should be a sequence of motions; (c) what other motions, if any, should be permitted before the certification motion; and (d) what should the timetable be for the motions.

[29] Beginning with the relatively easy problem, at the argument of this motion, the Defendants vociferously complained that the Plaintiffs keep changing their statement of claim. The Defendants pointed to substantial differences among the statement of claim delivered before the carriage motion, the statement of claim delivered after the carriage motion, and the Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim offered up for the purposes of the leave motion.

[30] This complaint about a "moving target" statement of claim was advanced as part of the Defendants' arguments that they cannot legally be ordered to deliver a statement of defence. I, however, do not see how this complaint supports that particular argument.

[31] I rather regard the "moving target" complaint as a proper objection that if the Defendants are to be ordered to deliver a statement of defence, the content of the statement of claim needs first to be finalized.

[32] I agree that for the purposes of a leave or a certification motion, the content of the statement of claim needs to be finalized, and thus the approach should be to order a pleading to be finalized and to order that this pleading not be amended without leave of the court, I so order.

[33] The problem then becomes one of selecting which pleading to finalize for the purposes of the leave and certification motion. It makes common sense to select the pleading for which leave is being sought under the *Securities Act*; i.e. the Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, and that indeed is my selection.

#### 2. The Delivery of the Statement of Defence in Class Actions

[34] I turn now to the difficult issues of whether the Defendants can be ordered to deliver statements of defence, and if they can be ordered to plead, whether they should be ordered to plead.

[35] As will be seen shortly, the Defendants submit that they cannot be ordered to plead to a secondary market claim that does not exist unless and until leave is granted under s. 138.8 of the *Securities Act*. For present purposes, I will accept the correctness of this submission, but it does not follow that the Defendants cannot plead to that portion of the Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim that is not exclusively referable to the secondary market claims. Assuming that the Defendants are correct that there is a portion of the Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim to which they cannot be obliged to plead does not negate that there are portions of the Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim that can and should be answered by a statement of defence.

[36] The Defendants' submission rather means that rule 25.07 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, which provides the rules of pleading applicable to defences, needs to be amended for the purpose of the leave and certification motion so that defendants do not have to plead to a pregnant action under Part XXIII.1 of the *Securities Act* that may never be born.

[37] Rule 25.07 states:

**Admissions**

25.07 (1) In a defence, a party shall admit every allegation of fact in the opposite party's pleading that the party does not dispute.

**Denials**

(2) Subject to subrule (6), all allegations of fact that are not denied in a party's defence shall be deemed to be admitted unless the party pleads having no knowledge in respect of the fact.

**Different Version of Facts**

(3) Where a party intends to prove a version of the facts different from that pleaded by the opposite party, a denial of the version so pleaded is not sufficient, but the party shall plead the party's own version of the facts in the defence.

**Affirmative Defences**

(4) In a defence, a party shall plead any matter on which the party intends to rely to defeat the claim of the opposite party and which, if not specifically pleaded, might take the opposite party by surprise or raise an issue that has not been raised in the opposite party's pleading.

**Effect of Denial of Agreement**

(5) Where an agreement is alleged in a pleading, a denial of the agreement by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial of the making of the agreement or of the facts from which the agreement may be implied by law, and not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of the agreement.

**Damages**

(6) In an action for damages, the amount of damages shall be deemed to be in issue unless specifically admitted.

[38] To repeat, for the purposes of the leave motion where a party cannot be obliged to plead and for the combined certification motion, rule 25.07 needs to be revised to accommodate s. 138.8 of the *Securities Act*.

[39] Pursuant to the authority provided by s. 12 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, which authorizes the court to make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination, I have the jurisdiction to revise the procedure for a class proceeding to accommodate s. 138.8 of the *Securities Act*, and I do so by notionally adding a new subrule 25.07 (7) as follows:

(7) In an action under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* for which leave is also being sought to commence an action under section 138.3 of the *Securities Act* (liability for secondary market disclosure), in a defence, a party who does not file an affidavit pursuant to rule 138.8 (2) and who delivers a statement of defence shall decline to either admit or deny the allegations of fact referable solely to his or her liability for secondary market disclosure and not referable to any other pleaded cause of action.

[40] Practically speaking, notional subrule 25.07 (7) divides the Defendants into three classes.

[41] First, there are those Defendants who deliver a s. 138.8 (2) affidavit under the *Securities Act*. These Defendants must deliver a statement of defence for the reasons expressed below.

[42] Second, there are those Defendants against whom there are no allegations of fact referable to liability for secondary market disclosure, who thus have no right or need to deliver a s. 138.8 (2) affidavit under the *Securities Act* and who choose to deliver a statement of defence. These plaintiffs may, if so advised, simply plead in the normal course.

[43] Third, there are those Defendants against whom there are allegations of fact referable to liability for secondary market disclosure and who do not deliver a s. 138.8 (2) affidavit but who deliver a statement of defence.

[44] Under notional rule 25.07 (7), these Defendants shall decline to either admit or deny the allegations of fact referable solely to his or her liability for secondary market liability and not referable to any other pleaded cause of action. These defendants must state that they neither admit nor deny the allegations contained in those paragraphs (*identify paragraph numbers*) of the statement of claim referable solely to liability for secondary market liability and not referable to any other pleaded cause of action. As will become clearer after the discussion below, by being required to neither admit nor deny allegations referable solely to secondary market liability, these Defendants cannot circumvent the requirements of s.138.8 (2) of the *Securities Act* that they must file an affidavit in order to set forth the material facts upon which they intend to rely for the leave motion.

[45] This brings the discussion and the analysis to whether there might be other reasons not to order the Defendants to deliver a statement of defence. The convention in class actions, which existed from 1996 to 2011, was that a defendant not be required to deliver a statement of defence pre-certification because of the likelihood that the statement of claim would be reformulated as a result of the certification decision and

based on the view that the statement of defence had little utility before certification. See *Mangan v. Inco Ltd.* (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 90 at pp. 94-95 (Gen. Div.); *Glover v. Toronto (City)* [2008] O.J. No. 604 at para. 8 (S.C.J.).

[46] In *Pennyfeather*, I suggested that the convention should be revisited and that it was desirable that the pleadings be closed before the certification motion. See also *Kang v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada*, 2011 ONSC 6335.

[47] In *Pennyfeather* at paras. 37-38, 84-92, I stated:

37. Class actions are subject to the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, and there is nothing in the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* that precludes defendants from pleading before the certification motion. It is informative that the convention of not closing the pleadings is not a statutory rule, and if the Plaintiff insists on the delivery of a pleading, a defendant may need to seek the permission of the court to delay the delivery of the pleading.

38. Moreover, the provisions of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* indicate that it was the Legislature's intention that the general rule is that the statement of defence should be delivered before the certification motion. Section 2 (3) of the Act indicates that the timing of the certification motion is measured by the delivery of the statement of defence. ....

84. ... it would be advantageous for the immediate case and for other cases, if the current convention ended and defendants were required in the normal course to deliver a statement of defence before the certification motion. As I will illustrate, there would be several advantages to this approach, and as I mentioned above, the Legislature intended that the general rule should be that the pleadings should be completed before the certification motion.

85. Before I provide some examples of the advantages of closing the pleadings before certification, it is helpful to recall that under s. 5 (1) of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, a plaintiff must satisfy five interdependent criteria for his or her action or application to be certified as a class proceeding. The Plaintiff must: (1) show a cause of action; (2) identify a class; (3) define common issues; (4) show that a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure; and (5) qualify as a representative plaintiff with a litigation plan and adequate Class Counsel.

86. A major advantage of closing the pleadings is that controversies about the first of the five criteria for certification might be resolved or at least narrowed or confined before the certification motion.

87. The delivery of a statement of defence could be a fresh step that could foreclose any subsequent attack by the defendant for any pleadings irregularities and, more to the point, typically defendants do not deliver a statement of defence if there is a substantive challenge to the statement of claim. Rather, they bundle all their challenges to the statement of claim and bring a motion to have the statement of claim or portions of it struck out on both technical and substantive grounds. ...

88. In other words, the requirement of delivering a statement of defence will call out the defendant to make its challenges to the statement of claim and, thus, the s. 5 (1)(a) criterion might be removed as an issue as would any challenge to the pleading for wanting in particulars or for breaching the technical rules for pleading. The s. 5 (1)(a) criterion for certification might be decided before the certification motion.

89. If the defendant brings a comprehensive pleadings challenge before the certification motion, then, the s. 5 (1)(a) criterion would be resolved before the certification hearing one

way or the other. It would be particularly useful to resolve a s. 5 (1)(a) challenge before the certification motion when the challenge is based on the court not having subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. If that challenge is upheld, then the class action would be dismissed or stayed and the enormous costs of a comprehensive certification motion is avoided.

90. Further, hearing an interlocutory motion about the sufficiency of the pleading might be preferable to having the challenge heard at the certification motion as an aspect of the s. 5 (1)(a) analysis because a common outcome of this analysis is to grant the plaintiff leave to amend his or her statement of claim, which outcome, at a minimum, exacerbates the complexities of determining the certification motion because of the interdependency of the certification criteria.

91. In many cases, the technical or substantive adequacy of a plaintiff's statement of claim is not an issue and, therefore, requiring the completion of the pleadings will involve no interlocutory steps and the analysis of the other four certification criteria would be facilitated by a completed set of pleadings.

92. For instance, having the Statement of defence before the certification motion would provide useful information for analyzing the preferable procedure criterion and the plaintiff's litigation plan. Moreover, it may emerge that there are issues worthy of certification in the defendant's statement of defence.

[48] For present purposes, I do not retreat from what I said in *Pennyfeather*, and I shall emphasize several points and add a few more. In this regard, I emphasize that it was the clear intention of the Legislature that the pleadings be closed before certification. I add that this makes sense because the certification criteria of class definition, common issues, preferable procedure, and litigation plan are best adjudicated in the context of the parameters of the action and it may emerge that the defendant has pleaded issues that may usefully be added to the list of common issues.

[49] Further, I add that the Legislature also indicated by s. 35 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, that the *Rules of Civil Procedure* apply to class proceedings, reserving the courts' authority to make adjustments to that procedure under s. 12 of the *Act*. Generally speaking, it is desirable to normalize class actions with the procedure under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The *Rules* are the norm for a fair procedure, and the norm of civil procedure is that both sides must disclose the case that their opponent must meet. Defendants are not like an accused in a criminal proceeding with a right to remain silent. It is not regarded as unfair or abnormal to compel a defendant to plead a statement of defence in response to a statement of claim.

[50] Further still, I add that having a complete set of pleadings recognizes the maturity of the class action jurisprudence. There already have been many Rule 21 and s.5 (1)(a) challenges, and the viability of many causes of action or types of claim as being suitable for class actions has been informed by twenty years of cases. Recognition of the maturity of the case law in and of itself calls for a rethinking of the convention of not delivering a statement of defence, because assisted by precedents of what has been certified in the past, plaintiffs are better able to exit the certification hearing with their pleadings intact.

[51] In other words, in contemporary times the Defendants' concern that they will have wasted time and effort pleading to a statement of claim that may be different after certification will not be borne out. In any event, the complaint of a wasted effort is overblown. Unless pleadings are to be regarded as a work of fictional literature, claims and defences are based on the material facts that existed, and competent counsel will take instructions about all the possible claims and defences that emerge from those set of facts before the certification motion.

[52] I find it hard to believe that the accomplished lawyers in the case at bar are waiting for the outcome of the leave motion and the certification motion before investigating the material facts and researching the applicable law and advising the Defendants about what defences are available to them. The truth of the matter is that the Defendants and their lawyers are not concerned about wasted time and effort but rather they do not wish to plead because they believe it is tactically better to avoid the disclosure of their case that the *Rules of Civil Procedure* would normally mandate.

[53] I see no unfairness of denying defendants a tactical maneuver that may be inconsistent with general principle of rule 1.04 that the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure, the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits."

[54] I also see no unfairness in denying defendants the tactical maneuver of not delivering a statement of defence before certification when the exchange of pleadings may be tactically and substantively beneficial to defendants. The defendants arguments that class membership is over-inclusive or under-inclusive, that the proposed common issues want for commonality, that the action is not manageable as a class action, that a class proceeding is not the preferable procedure, and that the litigation plan is deficient are best made when the defendants shows the colour of his or her eyes by pleading a defence and these arguments will be stronger than the "is! – is not! – is too!" sandbox arguments of many a certification motion. For whatever it is worth, my own observation from recent certification motions where defendants have pleaded before certification is that both sides and the administration of justice are better for it.

[55] Finally, from a public relations point of view - and class actions are by their nature of considerable interest to the public - I would have thought that many defendants would like to seize the opportunity by pleading the material facts of their defence to take the sting out of the plaintiff's argument that the defendants need behaviour management and to level the playing field about the certification criteria.

[56] Thus, generally speaking, I persist in my view that the pleadings issues should be completed before the certification motion. The Defendants' argue, however, that whatever may be the situation for class actions generally, the Court of Appeal's decision in *Sharma v. Timminco, supra*, has overtaken *Pennyfeather*, and *Sharma* means that in a proposed secondary market class action, a statement of defence cannot be demanded or delivered before leave is granted under s. 138.3 of the *Securities Act*. A defendant cannot be asked to plead to a pregnant statement of claim.

[57] The Defendants take the *Sharma* decision to be authority that a class proceeding is not an action commenced under s. 138.3 until leave is granted and leave is required to

add the s. 138.3 cause of action to the class proceeding. The Defendants submit that without leave, a s. 138.3 action cannot be enforced. As Sino-Forest put it in its factum: "Until leave has been granted, the plaintiff has nothing: no limitation periods are tolled, and no steps in the proceeding – including the filing of a defence – can be taken."

[58] This hyperbolic submission by Sino-Forest and by the rest of the Defendants is not true. Whatever the effect of *Sharma*, it did not take away s. 138.8 of the *Securities Act*, under which subsection (2) requires for the leave motion that the plaintiff and each defendant swear under oath the "material facts upon which each intends to rely."

[59] Section 138.8 of the *Securities Act*, which provides the test for leave and which governs the procedure for the leave motion, states:

Leave to proceed

138.8 (1) No action may be commenced under section 138.3 without leave of the court granted upon motion with notice to each defendant. The court shall grant leave only where it is satisfied that,

- (a) the action is being brought in good faith; and
- (b) there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in favour of the plaintiff.

Same

(2) Upon an application under this section, the plaintiff and each defendant shall serve and file one or more affidavits setting forth the material facts upon which each intends to rely.

Same

(3) The maker of such an affidavit may be examined on it in accordance with the rules of court. ....

[60] Subsection 138.8 (2) may be usefully compared and contrasted with rule 25.06 (1) of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, which is the predominant rule about pleading in an action. Rule 25.06 (1) states:

25.06 (1) Every pleading shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies for the claim or defence, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved.

Both the subsection and the rule require the party to disclose to their opponent the "material facts" on which the party "relies." The pleadings rule, however, does not require that the disclosure of material facts be under oath. Assuming that a defendant does file an affidavit under s. 138.8 (2), then the affidavit is, in effect, an under oath version of 25.06 (1)'s requirement that a defendant disclose the material facts upon which he or she relies.

[61] I concede that filing an affidavit under s. 138 (8) is not mandatory and that it cannot be assumed that a defendant will deliver an affidavit for a leave motion under the *Securities Act*, and that he or she cannot be compelled to do so. In *Ainslie v. CV*



*Technologies Inc.* 93 O.R. (3d) 200 at paras. 14-20, 24-25 (S.C.J.), Justice Lax interpreted s. 138.8 (2), and she stated:

14. Section 138.8(1) sets out a two-part test for obtaining leave to bring an action under Part XXIII.1 of the OSA and places the onus on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that (1) their proposed action is brought in good faith and (2) has a reasonable prospect for success at trial. As s. 138.8(1) requires an examination of the merits, the plaintiffs submit that the section is supplemented with s. 138.8(2) and (3). They rely on the mandatory language in s. 138.8(2) ("and each defendant shall") and submit that without the benefit of this requirement and the ability to cross-examine, a plaintiff would be deprived of the tools necessary to meet the standard the legislature created in s. 138.8(1).

15. This submission ignores the legislative purpose of s. 138.8. The section was not enacted to benefit plaintiffs or to level the playing field for them in prosecuting an action under Part XXIII.1 of the Act. Rather, it was enacted to protect defendants from coercive litigation and to reduce their exposure to costly proceedings. No onus is placed upon proposed defendants by s. 138.8. Nor are they required to assist plaintiffs in securing evidence upon which to base an action under Part XXIII.1. The essence of the leave motion is that putative plaintiffs are required to demonstrate the propriety of their proposed secondary market liability claim before a defendant is required to respond. Section 138.8(2) must be interpreted to reflect this underlying policy rationale and the legislature's intention in imposing a "gatekeeper mechanism".

16. The plaintiffs appear to be interpreting s. 138.8(2) as if it read: "Upon an application under this section, the plaintiff and each defendant shall serve and file one or more affidavits." But, the subsection continues: "setting forth the material facts upon which each intends to rely". If there are no material facts upon which a defendant intends to rely in responding to a leave motion, how can it be that a defendant is required to file an affidavit? Similarly, if a defendant files one or more affidavits, how can a plaintiff require that defendant to file other affidavits? By discounting this language, the plaintiffs are proposing an interpretation which relieves them of their obligation to demonstrate that their proposed action meets the pre-conditions for granting leave under the Act.

17. The plaintiffs' interpretation also fails to address the language used in subsections (3) and (4). Section 138.8(3) reads: "The maker of such an affidavit may be examined on it in accordance with the rules of court." Section 138.8(4) reads: "A copy of the application for leave to proceed and any affidavits filed with the court shall be sent to the Commission when filed" (emphasis added). Had it been the intention of the legislature to require the parties to file affidavits, irrespective of the onus placed upon the moving party, the legislature would have substituted the word "the" for "any" in s. 138.8(4) and the words "the plaintiff and each defendant" for "maker" in s. 138.8(3). I also note that the legislature attached no consequences to the failure of "each defendant" to file an affidavit.

18. In terms of onus, a useful analogy can be found in the summary judgment rule, Rule 20, of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 20.04 provides:

20.04(1) In response to affidavit material or other evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment, a responding party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings but must set out, in affidavit material or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

19. Similar to s. 138.8(2), rule 20.04 utilizes language suggesting that a responding party "must" or "shall" file affidavit material. Notwithstanding the use of such language, under Rule 20, a responding party retains the option to counter the motion by simply cross-examining the moving party, rather than by leading any direct evidence on the motion. In

this regard, rule 20.04 has been interpreted as requiring the respondent to a summary judgment motion to "lead trump or risk losing". Notably, however, the onus to establish that there is no genuine issue for trial remains with the moving party. The onus does not shift to the respondent to show that a genuine issue for trial does in fact exist.<sup>8</sup>

20. Similarly, in a motion under s. 138.8 of the Act, the onus to demonstrate that the proposed claim meets the required threshold remains with the plaintiffs. The onus does not shift to the defendants. A defendant that does not "lead trump" by filing affidavit evidence in response to a motion under s. 138.8 may well take the risk that leave will be granted to the plaintiffs. It does not follow, however, that a defendant is obligated to file evidence or produce an affidavit from each named defendant. It is a well-established principle that, as a general proposition, it is counsel who decides on the witnesses whose evidence will be put forward. ....

24. In my view, the "gatekeeper provision" was intended to set a bar. That bar would be considerably lowered if the plaintiffs' view is correct. As I have already indicated, a defendant who does not file affidavit material accepts the risk that it may be impairing its ability to successfully defeat the motion for leave and is probably foregoing the right to assert the statutory defences under Part XXIII.1 of the Act. However, parties are entitled to present their case as they see fit and this includes the right to oppose the leave motion on the basis of the record put forward by the plaintiffs as GT intends, or on the basis of the affidavits of experts as CV intends. [page209]

25. To accept the plaintiffs' submissions would require each defendant to produce evidence that may not be necessary for the leave motion and would serve no purpose other than to expose those defendants to a time-consuming and costly discovery process. It would sanction "fishing expeditions" prior to the plaintiffs obtaining leave to proceed with their proposed action. This is an unreasonable interpretation of s. 138.8(2). It is inconsistent with the scheme and object of the Act. Properly interpreted, the ordinary meaning of s. 138.8(2) is that a proposed defendant must file an affidavit only where it intends to lead evidence of material facts in response to the motion for leave.

[62] In *Ainslie*, leave to appeal was granted [2009] O.J. No. 730 (Div. Ct.), but it appears that the appeal was never argued. In *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.*, 2010 ONSC 790 at para. 32, I agreed with Justice Lax's interpretation of s. 138.8 (2).

[63] In the case at bar, I do not know whether any of the Defendants will deliver affidavits under s. 138.8 (2), but I do know that if a Defendant does deliver an affidavit, then its protest that it would be unfair to require a statement of defence loses its potency as does the urgency of the Plaintiffs' request that the Defendants be ordered to deliver their statements of defence. Delivering an affidavit under s. 138.8 is essentially the same as delivering a statement of claim or defence. As Justice Lax notes, a defendant who does not file affidavit material accepts the risk that it may be impairing its ability to successfully defeat the motion for leave. Justice Lax also notes that the defendant is probably foregoing the right to assert the statutory defences under Part XXIII.1 of the Act, but I would not necessarily go that far.

[64] Where this analysis takes me is that it while it would be inappropriate to order all the Defendants to deliver a statement of defence to a secondary market claim under the *Securities Act*, it would be proper to order that any Defendant who delivers an affidavit pursuant to s. 138.8 (2) of the *Act* shall also deliver a statement of defence. I so order.

[65] Although I am ordering only Defendants who deliver s. 138.8 (2) affidavits to deliver a statement of defence, I order that any other Defendant may, if so advised, deliver a statement of defence. I leave them to make the tactical decision whether or not to deliver a pleading. As I discussed above, there are advantages for a defendant to plead in a class action.

[66] For reasons that I will come to next, if a Defendant does deliver a statement of defence, the delivery is without prejudice to the Defendant's right to bring a Rule 21 motion or to challenge whether the Plaintiffs have shown a cause of action as required by s. 5 (1)(a) of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*.

[67] Here it should be noted that the "plain and obvious" test for disclosing a cause of action from *Hunt v. Carey Canada*, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, which is used for a Rule 21 motion, is used to determine whether the proposed class proceedings disclose a cause of action; thus, a claim will be satisfactory under s. 5 (1)(a) unless it has a radical defect or it is plain and obvious that it could not succeed: *Anderson v. Wilson* (1999), 44 O.R. (3rd) 673 (C.A.) at p. 679, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref'd, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 476; 1176560 *Ontario Ltd. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd.* (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 535 (S.C.J.) at para. 19, leave to appeal granted, 64 O.R. (3d) 42 (S.C.J.), aff'd (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 182 (Div. Ct.); *Healey v. Lakeridge Health Corp.*, [2006] O.J. No. 4277 (S.C.J.) at para. 25.

[68] In this last regard, the Defendants submitted that a defendant has a right to challenge whether the plaintiff has pleaded a reasonable cause of action by bringing a Rule 21 motion and a defendant would lose this procedural right if he or she delivered a statement of defence. Pleading over is a fresh step that deprives a defendant of the right to subsequently challenge the substantive adequacy of a pleading: *Bell v. Booth Centennial Healthcare Linen Services*, [2006] O.J. No. 4646 at paras. 5-7 (S.C.J.); *Cetinalp v. Casino*, [2009] O.J. No. 5015 (S.C.J.). From this true premise, the Defendants submit that since some or all of them wish to bring a Rule 21 motion or some or all will be challenging the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' statement of claim as an aspect of the s. 5 (1)(a) criterion of the of test for certification, they should not be required to deliver a statement of defence before the certification motion.

[69] The court's typical but not inevitable response to a Defendant's request to bring a Rule 21 motion before certification is to direct the motion to be heard at the certification hearing because the test for granting a Rule 21 motion is the same test that is applied for the s. 5 (1)(a) criterion for certification. Typically, when this direction is made the defendant is not required to deliver a statement of defence.

[70] As already noted, in the case at bar, several defendants have indicated that they wish to bring Rule 21 motions on the basis that several of the Plaintiffs' claims do not disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the bonds contain a "no suits" clause, and BDO Limited wishes to bring a Rule 21 motion based on the argument that it is plain and obvious that claims against it are statute-barred.

[71] I agree that the right of Defendants to challenge the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs' statement of claim should be preserved and protected and I also believe that

this objective can be accomplished while still permitting defendants to deliver a statement of defence.

[72] Once again, using the authority of s. 12 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, I order that if a Defendant delivers a statement of defence, then the delivery of the statement of defence is not a fresh step and the Defendant is not precluded from bringing a Rule 21 motion at the leave and certification motion or the Defendant is not precluded from disputing that the Plaintiffs have shown a cause of action under s. 5 (1)(a) of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*.

### 3. Leave and Certification

[73] The above discussion addresses the matter of the Plaintiffs' request that the Defendants be ordered to deliver statements of defence and the discussion also lays the foundation for the discussion of the Plaintiffs' request that the leave motion under s.138.8 the *Securities Act* and the certification motion under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* be heard together and the Defendants' counter-submission that the motions should be sequenced leave motion, Rule 21 motions, and certification motion.

[74] In the case at bar, there is a general consensus that the leave motion should go first, and, in any event, because of the Court of Appeal's ruling in *Sharma* that s. 28 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* is useless in protecting claims under Part XXIII.1 of the *Securities Act* from limitation periods, the leave motion must go first, and I have scheduled ten days of hearing commencing November 21, 2012.

[75] The question then is whether the certification motion should be combined with the leave motion.

[76] The Plaintiffs submit that hearing the two matters together is consistent with the direction from the Ontario Court of Appeal and that Supreme Court of Canada that litigation by installments should be avoided wherever possible because it does little service to the parties or to the efficient administration of justice." *Garland v. Consumers' Gas Company Limited* (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 127 at para. 76 (C.A.), aff'd [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 at para. 90. The Plaintiffs note that leave and certification were dealt with together in *Silver v. Imax Corp.*, [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused [2011] O.J. No. 656 (Div. Ct.) and in *Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier Income Fund*, 2011 ONSC 25.

[77] An admonition is different from a prohibition, and while the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court may frown on litigation in installments, they did not prohibit it. Whether to permit motions before the certification motion is a matter of discretion. In exercising its discretion whether to permit a motion before the certification motion, relevant factors include : (a) whether the motion will dispose of the entire proceeding or will substantially narrow the issues to be determined; (b) the likelihood of delays and costs associated with the motion; (c) whether the outcome of the motion will promote settlement; (d) whether the motion could give rise to interlocutory appeals and delays that would affect certification; (e) the interests of economy and judicial efficiency; and (f) generally, whether scheduling the motion in advance of certification would promote

the fair and efficient determination of the proceeding: *Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation*, [2010] O.J. No. 314 (S.C.J.) at paras. 14-15

[78] Thus, in my opinion, the question to be decided in the immediate case is whether it is fair (the most important factor) and efficient to hear the certification motion and the leave motion together.

[79] Provided that any Defendants who deliver s. 138.8 (2) affidavits or any Defendants who deliver statements of defence may bring Rule 21 motions or otherwise challenge all of the certification criteria as they may be advised, I see no unfairness in having the certification motion heard along with the leave motion. Because of the orders that I shall make, already discussed above, a Defendant may challenge all of the certification criteria regardless of whether the Defendant has pleaded or not. Pursuant to notional rule 25.07 (7), Defendants who do not file a s. 138.8 (2) affidavit and who deliver a statement of defence "shall decline to admit or deny the allegations referable solely to liability for secondary market disclosure and not referable to any other pleaded cause of action." I see no unfairness to the Defendants who may resist both the certification motion and the leave motion as they may be advised.

[80] In contrast, the sequential approach being advocated by the Defendants is unfair to the Plaintiffs and to the proposed class and will impede fulfilling the purposes of the class proceedings legislation, which are first and foremost, access to justice, secondarily, judicial economy, and thirdly, behaviour modification, all the while providing due process and fairness to all parties. Unfortunately, the suffocating expense of motions in class actions along with the excruciating delays and the additional costs of the inevitable leave to appeal motions and appeals that follow class action orders is a serious barrier to achieving the purposes of the legislation for both plaintiffs and defendants and a substantial disincentive to class counsel employing the legislation for other than the huge cases that would justify the litigation risks.

[81] As night follows day, if I agreed to schedule sequentially, there would be a ten-day leave motion, followed by the unsuccessful party launching the appeal process which will take several years to resolve. Whatever the outcome of the appeal, the action will return to the Superior Court for the certification motion of the claims not referable solely to liability for secondary market disclosure.

[82] In the case at bar, if Rule 21 motions were permitted before the certification hearing although work that could be done at the certification hearing will be accomplished, this will come at the cost of another round of appeals that will take several years to resolve only for the action to return again to the Superior Court for the determination of whether the balance of the certification criteria have been satisfied. That determination will also be appealed.

[83] In contrast, if I combine the leave motion, the Rule 21 motions, and the certification motion into one hearing, as night follows day, the determination will be appealed but the superior court and the appellate courts including the Supreme Court of Canada will be denied the pleasure of three visits from one or two generations of Class and Defence Counsel.

[84] The Defendants argue that there will be no efficiencies in a sequential ordering of the motions because the criteria for leave differs from the certification criteria, as does the burden of proof for these motions. However, courts are obliged to have the perspicacity to be able to deal with different criteria and different onuses of proof, but, more to the point, the evidentiary footprint for the leave and certification motions are the same, and it makes for little efficiency for the parties and little judicial economy to have the evidence and argument for leave and for certification heard more than once.

[85] Putting aside the somewhat unique circumstances of BDO Limited, I conclude that the certification hearing should be combined with the leave motion and that with the exception of the Plaintiffs' funding motion, which has already been scheduled, there shall be no other motions before the leave and certification motion without leave of the court first being obtained.

#### 4. BDO Limited's Request for a Rule 21 Motion

[86] As noted at the outset of these reasons, I am adjourning the motion as it concerns BDO Limited, whose circumstances may be unique.

[87] BDO was a party to the *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and the *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* rival class actions and it was added to the case at bar after the carriage motion. It submits that all of the statutory claims against it are statute-barred as in one of the main common law misrepresentation claims. It submits that it can diminish its involvement in this expensive litigation by a Rule 21 motion based on the pleadings and without evidence.

[88] The Plaintiffs' response was that if BDO wished to assert a limitation period defence it should be a pleaded defence to which the Plaintiffs would file a reply demonstrating that it was not plain and obvious that the claims were statute-barred or demonstrating that there were defences to the running of the limitation period, presumably based on fraudulent concealment or estoppel or waiver. The Plaintiffs also asserted that there were other common claims against BDO that were not statute-barred and thus there was no utility in permitting a Rule 21 motion that would see BDO only partially out of the action.

[89] BDO's response was that there were no defences that could withstand the ultimate limitation periods of the *Securities Act* and fairness dictated that it should be permitted to substantially reduce being embroiled in this litigation.

[90] My own assessment was that the Plaintiffs were correct in submitting that in the circumstances of this case, BDO should plead its limitation defence and the Plaintiffs should have an opportunity to deliver a reply.

[91] Once BDO has pleaded, I will be in a better position in determining whether to permit a Rule 21 motion or perhaps a Rule 20 partial summary judgment motion.

[92] Accordingly, I am adjourning the motion as it concerns BDO Limited to be brought on again, if at all, after BDO has pleaded its statement of defence and the Plaintiffs their Reply.

5. The Timetable

[93] In light of the discussion above, it is ordered that subject to adjustments, if necessary, made at a case conference, the timetable for the Plaintiff's Funding Approval Motion and for the Leave and Certification Motion is as follows:

Funding Approval Motion

March 9, 2012: Plaintiffs to deliver motion record (completed)

March 30, 2012: Defendants to deliver responding records, if any

April 6, 2012: Plaintiffs to deliver factum

April 13, 2012: Defendants to delivery factum

April, 17, 2012: Hearing of the motion

Leave and Certification Motion

April 10, 2012: Plaintiffs to deliver motion record

June 11, 2012: Defendants to deliver responding records

July 3, 2012: Plaintiffs to delivery reply records, if any

September 14, 2012: Cross-examinations to be completed


October 19, 2012: Plaintiffs to deliver factum

November 9, 2012: Defendants to deliver factum

November 21-30, 2012: Hearing of the motion

D. CONCLUSION

[94] An order shall issue in accordance with these Reasons with costs in the cause.



Perell, J.

Released: March 26, 2012

**CITATION: Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v.  
Sino-Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC 1924  
COURT FILE NO. 11-CV-431153CP  
DATE: 20120326**

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

**BETWEEN:**

The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of  
Central and Eastern Canada, et al.

Plaintiffs

- and -

Sino-Forest Corporation et al.

Defendants

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**REASONS FOR DECISION**

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**Perell, J.**

**Released: March 26, 2012.**



# TAB H

This is Exhibit "H" mentioned and referred to in the Affidavit of Daniel E. H. Bach, sworn before me at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 11th day of April, 2012.



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A Commissioner, etc.  
Serge Kalloghlian  
(LSUC #55557F)

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE****SINO-FOREST COMMENTS ON SHARE PRICE DECLINE**

**TORONTO, CANADA, June 3, 2011** – Sino-Forest Corporation (TSX: TRE) (“Sino-Forest” or the “Company”), a leading commercial forest plantation operator in China, today commented on the share price decline on June 2, 2011 as a result of the allegations made in a ‘report’ issued on a website by a short seller operating under the name Muddy Waters, LLC. The Company was not contacted by Muddy Waters for comment ahead of publication of its report.

The Board of Directors and management of Sino-Forest wish to state clearly that there is no material change in its business or inaccuracy contained in its corporate reports and filings that needs to be brought to the attention of the market. Further we recommend shareholders take extreme caution in responding to the Muddy Waters report.

As indicated in the report, Muddy Waters has a short position in the Company’s shares and therefore stands to realize significant gains from a share price decline that it precipitated. Muddy Waters expressly admits that it makes no representation as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any information contained in its report. Further, its website discloses no address or ownership information, nor the credentials of any of the authors of the ‘report’. Neither the Ontario Securities Commission nor the Securities Exchange Commission website lists Muddy Waters or its author as being registered as an advisor. Nevertheless, due to the substantial impact that the report has had on the prices of the Company’s securities and the reputation of the Company, the Board has appointed an independent committee consisting of three of the Company’s independent directors, William Ardell (Chair), James Bowland and James Hyde. All three of these directors are financially qualified professionals and two of the three are recent appointees to the Board. The independent committee’s mandate is to thoroughly examine and review the allegations contained in Muddy Waters’ report, and report back to the Board. The independent committee has appointed Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP as independent legal counsel and will retain the services of an independent accounting firm and such other independent advisors as it deems necessary to assist with its examination. During the course of the independent committee’s examination, the Company will provide any updates as appropriate. Following conclusion of the report, the key findings of the independent committee will be released to shareholders.

Allen Chan, Chairman and CEO of Sino-Forest commented: “We are committed to a high level of corporate governance and stand by the integrity of our company, our 16-year operational track record and our financial statements. Our company has continuously retained the services of internationally recognized law firms, auditors and expert consultants from Canada, the US, Hong Kong and mainland China.”

“It is important that our independent committee thoroughly address Muddy Waters’ allegations, and they will have my full support and those of the management team in doing so. However, let me say clearly that the allegations contained in this report are inaccurate and unfounded. Muddy Waters’ shock-jock approach is transparently self-interested and we look forward to providing our investors and other stakeholders with additional information to rebut these allegations.”

David Horsley, Senior Vice President and CFO of Sino-Forest commented: “I am confident that the independent committee’s examination will find these allegations to be demonstrably wrong, as for example:

(a) Muddy Waters fundamentally misunderstands and misrepresents the most basic items in our published Management’s Discussion & Analysis with respect to revenue generated from Yunnan Province, which we report as being approximately 45.5% of the Company’s standing timber revenue of approximately US\$508 million. Muddy Waters alleges that it is impossible that such revenue existed because achieving such levels would greatly exceed allowable cutting quotas and it would be impossible to truck close to that volume in the period. However, that revenue was very clearly disclosed in our MD&A filed for Q1 and Q2 of 2010 as revenue resulting from the sale of the standing timber - there is no cutting or transport involved, as the trees were sold but not harvested and therefore are not considered part of the quota for the region until the harvesting is conducted by the buyers.

(b) Muddy Waters alleges that the Company overstated the assets in Yunnan Province, based on its erroneous and narrow assumption that our only purchases in Yunnan Province consisted of purchases of 20,574 ha of plantations in Gengma county in Yunnan. However, this allegation ignores the fact that in addition to the purchased plantations in Gengma county, (as disclosed in our 2010 annual MD&A of a total of approximately 193,000 ha purchased in Yunnan Province) we have purchased approximately 173,000 ha of plantations in approximately 25 other counties in Yunnan Province as of December 31, 2010.”

As at December 31, 2010, the Company had approximately US\$1.26 billion in cash, cash equivalents and short term deposits as reported in the audited consolidated balance sheet. As at March 31, 2011, the comparable amount was approximately US\$1.09 billion. The Company continues to hold such cash, with the majority of it in banks in Hong Kong and offshore.

As previously announced, the Company intends to file its Q1 2011 results on June 14, 2011.

### **About Sino-Forest Corporation**

Sino-Forest Corporation is a leading commercial forest plantation operator in China. Its principal businesses include the ownership and management of tree plantations, the sale of standing timber and wood logs, and the complementary manufacturing of downstream engineered-wood products. Sino-Forest also holds a majority interest in Greenheart Group Limited, a Hong Kong-listed investment holding company (HKSE: 00094) with operations based in Suriname, South America and New Zealand, which is involved in responsible and sustainable log harvesting, lumber processing and sales and marketing of logs and lumber products to China and other countries around the world. Sino-Forest's common shares have been listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol TRE since 1995. Learn more at [www.sinoforest.com](http://www.sinoforest.com).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT:

#### **SINO-FOREST CORPORATION**

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Please note: This press release contains projections and forward-looking statements regarding future events. Such forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance of the Company and are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results and company plans and objectives to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to: changes in China's and international economies and in currency exchange rates; changes in market supply and demand for the Company's products, including global production capacity and wood product imports into China; changes in China's political and forestry policies; changes in climatic conditions affecting the growth of the Company's trees; competitive pricing pressures for the Company's products; and changes in wood acquisition and operating costs.