Court File No.: 12-CL-9539-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TIMMINCO LIMITED AND BÉCANCOUR SILICON INC.

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE MOVING PARTY, ST. CLAIR PENNYFEATHER, REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF IN THE CLASS ACTION

(Motion Returnable March 26, 2012)

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Book of Authorities of the Moving Party

(Motion Returnable March 26, 2012)

TAB 1

Case Name:

Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF Canadian Airlines Corporation and Canadian Airlines International Ltd.
Between
The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company of New York, As Trustee for the Holders of Senior Secured Notes and Montreal Trust Company of Canada, As Collateral Agent for the Holders of Senior Secured Notes, Plaintiffs, and
Canadian Airlines Corporation, Canadian Airlines International Ltd., Canadian Regional Airlines Ltd., Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. and Canadian Airlines Fuel Corporation Inc., defendants

[2000] A.J. No. 1692

19 C.B.R. (4th) 1

Docket: 0001-05071, 0001-05044

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
Judicial District of Calgary

Paperny J.

Oral Judgment: May 4, 2000.

(41 paras.)

Application by holders of senior secured notes in corporation for order lifting stay of proceedings against them in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceeding to allow for appointment of receiver and manager over assets and property charged in their favour and for order appointing court officer with exclusive right to negotiate sale of assets or shares of corporation's subsidiary.

Counsel:

G. Morawetz, A.J. McConnell and R.N. Billington, for Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co. of New York and Montreal Trust Co. of Canada.

A.L. Friend, Q. C., and H.M. Kay, Q. C., for Canadian Airlines.

S. Dunphy, for Air Canada and 853350 Alberta Ltd.

R. Anderson, Q.C., for Loyalty Group.

H. Gorman, for ABN AMRO Bank N.V.

P. McCarthy, for Monitor - Price Waterhouse Cooper.

D. Haigh, Q.C, and D. Nishimura, for Unsecured noteholders - Resurgence Asset Management.

C.J. Shaw, for Airline Pilots Association International.

G. Wells, for NavCanada.

D. Hardy, for Royal Bank of Canada.

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1 **PAPERNY J.** (orally):-- Montreal Trust Company of Canada, Collateral Agent for the holders of the Senior Secured Notes, and the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company of New York, Trustee for the holders of the Senior Secured Notes, apply for the following relief:

1. In the CCAA proceeding (Action No. 0001-05071) an order lifting the stay of proceedings against them contained in the orders of this court dated March 24, 2000 and April 19, 2000 to allow for the court-ordered appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as receiver and manager over the assets and property charged in favour of the Senior Secured Noteholders; and
2. In Action No. 0001-05044, an order appointing Ernst & Young Inc. as a court officer with the exclusive right to negotiate the sale of the assets or shares of Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd.

2 Canadian Airlines Corporation ("CAC") is a Canadian based holding company which, through its majority owned subsidiary Canadian Airlines International Ltd. ("CAC") provides domestic, U.S.-Canada transborder and international jet air transportation services. CAC also provides regional transportation through its subsidiary Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. ("Canadian Regional"). Canadian Regional is not an applicant under the CCAA proceedings.

3 The Senior Secured Notes were issued under an Indenture dated April 24, 1998 between CAC and the Trustee. The principal face amount is $175 million U.S. As well, there is interest outstanding. The Senior Secured Notes are directly and indirectly secured by a diverse package of assets and property of the CCAA applicants, including spare engines, rotables, repairables, hangar leases and ground equipment. The security comprises the key operational assets of CAC and CAIL. The security also includes the outstanding shares of Canadian Regional and the $56 million intercompany indebtedness owed by Canadian Regional to CAIL.

4 Under the terms of the Indenture, CAC is required to make an offer to purchase the Senior Secured Notes where there is a "change of control" of CAC. It is submitted by the Senior Secured Noteholders that Air Canada indirectly acquired control of CAC on January 4, 2000 resulting in a change of control. Under the Indenture, CAC is then required to purchase the notes at 101 percent

of the outstanding principal, interest and costs. CAC did not do so. According to the Trustee, an Event of Default occurred, and on March 6, 2000 the Trustee delivered Notices of Intention to Enforce Security under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

5 On March 24, 2000, the Senior Secured Noteholders commenced Action No. 0001-05044 and brought an application for the appointment of a receiver over their collateral. On the same day, CAC and CAIL were granted CCAA protection and the Senior Secured Noteholders adjourned their application for a receiver. However, the Senior Secured Noteholders made further application that day for orders that Ernst & Young be appointed monitor over their security and for weekly payments from CAC and CAIL of $500,000 U.S. These applications were dismissed.

6 The CCAA Plan filed on April 25, 2000, proposes that the Senior Secured Noteholders constitute a separate class and offers them two alternatives:

1. To accept repayment of less than the outstanding amount; or
2. To be unaffected by the CCAA Plan and realize on their security.

7 On April 26th, 2000, the Senior Secured Noteholders met and unanimously rejected the first option. They passed a resolution to take steps to realize on the security.

8 The Senior Secured Noteholders argue that the time has come to permit them to realize on their security. They have already rejected the Plan and see no utility in waiting to vote in this regard on May 26th, 2000, the date set by this court.

9 The Senior Secured Noteholders submit that since the CCAA proceedings began five weeks ago, the following has occurred:

-interest has continued to accrue at approximately $2 million U.S. per month;

-the security has decreased in value by approximately $6 million Canadian;

-the Collateral Agent and the Trustee have incurred substantial costs;

-no amounts have been paid for the continued use of the collateral, which is key to the operations of CAIL;

-no outstanding accrued interest has been paid; and-they are the only secured creditor not getting paid.

10 The Senior Secured Noteholders emphasize that one of the end results of the Plan is a transfer of CAIL's assets to Air Canada. The Senior Secured Noteholders assert that the Plan is sponsored by this very solvent proponent, who is in a position to pay them in full. They are argue that Air Canada has made an economic decision not to do so and instead is using the CCAA to achieve its own objectives at their expense, an inappropriate use of the Act.

11 The Senior Secured Noteholders suggest that the Plan will not be impacted if they are permitted to realize on their security now instead of after a formal rejection of the Plan at the court scheduled vote on May 26, 2000. The Senior Secured Noteholders argue that for all of the preceding reasons lifting the stay would be in accordance with the spirit and intent of the CCAA.

12 The CCAA is remedial legislation which should be given a large and liberal interpretation: See, for example, Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3d) 165 (Ont. Gen. Div.). It is intended to permit the court to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the struggling company attempts to develop a plan to compromise its debts and ultimately continue operations for the benefit of both the company and its creditors: See for example, Meridian Development Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1984), 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109 (Alta. Q.B.), and Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C.C.A.).

13 This aim is facilitated by the power to stay proceedings provided by Section 11 of the Act. The stay power is the key element of the CCAA process.

14 The granting of a stay under Section 11 is discretionary. On the debtor's initial application, the court may order a stay at its discretion for a period not to exceed 30 days. The burden of proof to obtain a stay extension under Section 11(4) is on the debtor. The debtor must satisfy the court that circumstances exist that make the request for a stay extension appropriate and that the debtor has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence. CAC and CAIL discharged this burden on April 19, 2000. However, unlike under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, there is no statutory test under the CCAA to guide the court in lifting a stay against a certain creditor.

15 In determining whether a stay should be lifted, the court must always have regard to the particular facts. However, in every order in a CCAA proceeding the court is required to balance a number of interests. McFarlane J.A. states in his closing remarks of his reasons in Re Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265 (B.C.C.A. [In Chambers]):

> In supervising a proceeding under the C.C.A.A. orders are made, and orders are varied as changing circumstances require. Orders depend upon a careful and delicate balancing of a variety of interests and problems.

16 Also see Blair J.'s decision in Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.P.C. (3d) 339 (Ont. Gen. Div.), for another example of the balancing approach.

17 As noted above, the stay power is to be used to preserve the status quo among the creditors of the insolvent company. Huddart J., as she then was, commented on the status quo in Re Alberta-Pacific Terminals Ltd (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99 (B.C.S.C.). She stated:

> The status quo is not always easy to find... Nor is it always easy to define. The preservation of the status quo cannot mean merely the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor. Other interests are served by the CCAA. Those of investors, employees, and landlords among them, and in the case of the Fraser Surrey terminal, the public too, not only of British Columbia, but also of the prairie provinces. The status quo is to be preserved in the sense that manoeuvres by creditors that would impair the financial position of the company while it attempts to reorganize are to be prevented, not in the sense that all creditors are to be treated equally or to be maintained at the same relative level. It is the company and all the interests its demise would affect that must be considered.

18 Further commentary on the status quo is contained in Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 98 (B.C.S.C.). Thackray J. comments that the maintenance of the

status quo does not mean that every detail of the status quo must survive. Rather, it means that the debtor will be able to stay in business and will have breathing space to develop a proposal to remain viable.

19 Finally, in making orders under the CCAA, the court must never lose sight of the objectives of the legislation. These were concisely summarized by the chambers judge and adopted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Re Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265 (B.C.C.A. [In Chambers]):

> (1) The purpose of the CCAA is to allow an insolvent company a reasonable period of time to reorganize its affairs and prepare and file a plan for its continued operation subject to the requisite approval of the creditors and court.
> (2) The CCAA is intended to serve not only the company's creditors but also a broad constituency which includes the shareholders and employees.
> (3) During the stay period, the Act is intended to prevent manoeuvres for positioning amongst the creditors of the company.
> (4) The function of the court during the stay period is to play a supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure.
> (5) The status quo does not mean preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor. Since the companies under CCAA orders continue to operate and having regard to the broad constituency of interests the Act is intended to serve, the preservation of the status quo is not intended to create a rigid freeze of relative pre-stay positions.
> (6) The court has a broad discretion to apply these principles to the facts of the particular case.

20 At pages 342 and 343 of this text, Canadian Commercial Reorganization:

> Preventing Bankruptcy (Aurora: Canada Law Book, looseleaf), R.H. McLaren describes situations in which the court will lift a stay:
>
> 1. When the plan is likely to fail;
> 2. The applicant shows hardship (the hardship must be caused by the stay itself and be independent of any pre-existing condition of the applicant creditor);
> 3. The applicant shows necessity for payment (where the creditors' financial problems are created by the order or where the failure to pay the creditor would cause it to close and thus jeopardize the debtor's company's existence);
> 4. The applicant would be severely prejudiced by refusal to lift the stay and there would be no resulting prejudice to the debtor company or the positions of creditors;
> 5. It is necessary to permit the applicant to take steps to protect a right which could be lost by the passage of time;
> 6. After the lapse of a significant time period, the insolvent is no closer to a proposal than at the commencement of the stay period.

21 I now turn to the particular circumstances of the applications before me.

22 I would firstly address the matter of the Senior Secured Noteholders' current rejection of the compromise put forward under the Plan. Although they are in a separate class under CAC's Plan and can control the vote as it affects their interest, they are not in a position to vote down the Plan in its entirety. However, the Senior Secured Noteholders submit that where a plan offers two options to a class of creditors and the class has selected which option it wants, there is no purpose to be served in delaying that class from proceeding with its chosen course of action. They rely on the Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (Oat. CA.) at 115, as just one of several cases supporting this proposition. Re Philip's Manufacturing Ltd. (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.) at pp. 27-28, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 57 (note) (S.C.C.), would suggest that the burden is on the Senior Secured Noteholders to establish that the Plan is "doomed to fail". To the extent that Nova Metal and Philip's Manufacturing articulate different tests to meet in this context, the application of either would not favour the Senior Secured Noteholders.

23 The evidence before me suggests that progress may still be made in the negotiations with the representatives of the Senior Secured Noteholders and that it would be premature to conclude that any further discussions would be unsuccessful. The parties are continuing to explore revisions and alternative proposals which would satisfy the Senior Secured Noteholders.

24 Mr. Carty's affidavit sworn May 1, 2000, in response to these applications states his belief that these efforts are being made in good faith and that, if allowed to continue, there is a real prospect for an acceptable proposal to be made at or before the creditors' meeting on May 26, 2000. Ms. Allen's affidavit does not contain any assertion that negotiations will cease. Despite the emphatic suggestion of the Senior Secured Noteholders' counsel that negotiations would be "one way", realistically I do not believe that there is no hope of the Senior Secured Noteholders coming to an acceptable compromise.

25 Further, there is no evidence before me that would indicate the Plan is "doomed to fail". The evidence does disclose that CAC and CAIL have already achieved significant compromises with creditors and continue to work swiftly and diligently to achieve further progress in this regard. This is reflected in the affidavits of Mr. Carty and the reports from the Monitor.

26 In any case, there is a fundamental problem in the application of the Senior Secured Noteholders to have a receiver appointed in respect of their security which the certainty of a "no" vote at this time does not vitiate: It disregards the interests of the other stakeholders involved in the process. These include other secured creditors, unsecured creditors, employees, shareholders and the flying public. It is not insignificant that the debtor companies serve an important national need in the operation of a national and international airline which employs tens of thousands of employees. As previously noted, these are all constituents the court must consider in making orders under the CCAA proceeding.

27 Paragraph 11 of Mr. Carty's May 1, 2000 affidavit states as follows:

> In my opinion, the continuation of the stay of proceedings to allow the restructuring process to continue will be of benefit to all stakeholders including the holders of the Senior Secured Notes. A termination of the stay proceedings as regards the security of the holders of the Senior Secured Notes would immediately deprive CAIL of assets which are critical to its operational integrity and would result in grave disruption of CAIL's operations and could lead to the cessation of opera-

> tions. This would result in the destruction of value for all stakeholders, including the holders of the Senior Secured Notes. Furthermore, if CAIL ceased to operate, it is doubtful that Canadian Re-gional Airlines (1998) Ltd. ("CRAL98"), whose shares form a significant part of the security package of the holders of the Senior Secured Notes, would be in a position to continue operating and there would be a very real possibility that the equity of CAIL and CRAL, valued at approximately $115 million for the purposes of the issuance of the Senior Secured Notes in 1998, would be largely lost. Further, if such seizure caused CAIL to cease operations, the market for the assets and equipment which are subject to the security of the holders of the Senior Secured Notes could well be adversely affected, in that it could either lengthen the time necessary to realize on these assets or reduce realization values.

28 The alternative to this Plan proceeding is addressed in the Monitor's reports to the court. For example, in Paragraph 8 of the Monitor's third report to the court states:

> The Monitor believes the if the Plan is not approved and implemented, CAIL will not be able to continue as a going concern. In that case, the only foreseeable alternative would be a liquidation of CAIL's assets by a receiver and manager and/or by a trustee. Under the Plan, CAIL's obligations to parties it considers to be essential in order to continue operations, including employees, customers, travel agents, fuel, maintenance, catering and equipment suppliers, and airport authorities, are in most cases to be treated as unaffected and paid in full. In the event of a liquidation, those parties would not, in most cases, be paid in full and, except for specific lien rights, statutory priorities or other legal protection, would rank as ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the additional unsecured claims which would arise if CAIL were to cease operation as a going concern and be forced into liquidation would he in excess of $1.1 billion.

29 This evidence is uncontradicted and flies in the face of the Senior Secured Noteholders' assertion that realizing on their collateral at this point in time will not affect the Plan. Although, as the Senior Secured Noteholders heavily emphasized the Plan does contemplate a "no" vote by the Senior Secured Noteholders, the removal of their security will follow that vote. 9.8(c) of the Plan states that:

> If the Required Majority of Affected Secured Noteholders fails to approve the Plan, arrangements in form and substance satisfactory to the Applicants will have been made with the Affected Secured Noteholders or with a re-ceiver appointed over the assets comprising the Senior Notes Security, which arrangements provide for the transitional use by [CALL], and subsequent sale, of the assets comprising the Senior Notes Security.

30 On the other side of the scale, the evidence of the Senior Secured Noteholders is that the value of their security is well in excess of what they are owed. Paragraph 15(a) of the Monitor's third report to the court values the collateral at $445 million. The evidence suggests that they are not the only secured creditor going unpaid. CAIL is asking that they be permitted to continue the restructuring process and their good faith efforts to attempt to reach an acceptable proposal with the Senior Secured Noteholders until the date of the creditors meeting, which is in three weeks. The Senior Se-

cured Noteholders have not established that they will suffer any material prejudice in the intervening period.

31 The appointment of a receiver at this time would negate the effect of the order staying proceedings and thwart the purposes of the CCAA.

32 Accordingly, I am dismissing the application, with leave to reapply in the event that the Senior Secured Noteholders vote to reject the Plan on May 26, 2000.

33 An alternative to receivership raised by the Senior Secured Noteholders was interim payment for use of the security. The Monitor's third report makes it clear that the debtor's cash flow forecasts would not permit such payments.

34 The Senior Secured Noteholders suggested Air Canada could make the payments and, indeed, that Air Canada should pay out the debt owed to them by CAC. It is my view that, in the absence of abuse of the CCAA process, simply having a solvent entity financially supporting a plan with a view to ultimately obtaining an economic benefit for itself does not dictate that that entity should be required to pay creditors in full as requested. In my view, the evidence before me at this time does not suggest that the CCAA process is being improperly used. Rather, the evidence demonstrates these proceedings to be in furtherance of the objectives of the CCAA.

35 With respect to the application to sell shares or assets of Canadian Regional, this application raises a distinct issue in that Canadian Regional is not one of the debtor companies. In my view, Paragraph 5(a) of Chief Justice Moore's March 24, 2000 order encompasses marketing the shares or assets of Canadian Regional. That paragraph stays, inter alia:

> ...any and all proceedings ... against or in respect of ... any of the Petitioners' property ... whether held by the Petitioners directly or indirectly, as principal or nominee, beneficially or otherwise...

36 As noted above, Canadian Regional is CAC's subsidiary, and its shares and assets are the "property" of CAC and marketing of these would constitute a "proceeding ... in respect of ... the Petitioners' property" within the meaning of Paragraph 5(a) and Section 11 of the CCAA.

37 If I am incorrect in my interpretation of Paragraph 5(a), I rely on the inherent jurisdiction of the court in these proceedings.

38 As noted above, the CCAA is to be afforded a large and liberal interpretation. Two of the landmark decisions in this regard hail from Alberta: Meridian Development Mc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, supra, and Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (NS.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.). At least one court has also recognized an inherent jurisdiction in relation to the CCAA in order to grant stays in relation to proceedings against third parties: Re Woodward's Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C.S.C.). Tysoe J. urged that although this power should be used cautiously, a prerequisite to its use should not be an inability to otherwise complete the reorganization. Rather, what must be shown is that the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction is important to the reorganization process. The test described by Tysoe J. is consistent with the critical balancing that must occur in CCAA proceedings. He states:

> In deciding whether to exercise its inherent jurisdiction, the court should weigh the interests of the insolvent company against the interests of parties who will be

> affected by the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. If, in relative terms, the prejudice to the affected party is greater than the benefit that will be achieved by the insolvent company, the court should decline to its inherent jurisdiction. The threshold of prejudice will be much lower than the threshold required to persuade the court that it should not exercise its discretion under Section 11 of the CCAA to grant or continue a stay that is prejudicial to a creditor of the insolvent company (or other party affected by the stay).

39 The balancing that I have described above in the context of the receivership application equally applies to this application. While the threshold of prejudice is lower, the Senior Secured Noteholders still fail to meet it. I cannot see that it is important to the CCAA proceedings that the Senior Secured Noteholders get started on marketing Canadian Regional. Instead, it would be disruptive and en-danger the CCAA proceedings which, on the evidence before me, have progressed swiftly and in good faith.

40 The application in Action No. 0001-05044 is dismissed, also with leave to reapply after the vote on May 26, 2000.

41 I appreciate that the Senior Secured Noteholders will be disappointed and likely frustrated with the outcome of these applications. I would emphasize that on the evidence before me their rights are being postponed and not eradicated. Any hardship they experience at this time must yield to the greater hardship that the debtor companies and the other constituents would suffer were the stay to be lifted at this time.

PAPERNY J.

cp/s/qw/qlmmm

TAB 2

Indexed as:

Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton

Bennett Jones Verchere, Garnet Schulhauser, Arthur Andersen & Co., Ernst & Young, Alan Lundell, The Royal Trust Company, William R. MacNeill, R. Byron Henderson, C. Michael Ryer, Gary L. Billingsley, Peter K. Gummer, James G. Engdahl, Jon R. MacNeill,
appellants/respondents on cross-appeal;
v.
Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. and Muh-Min Lin and Hoi-Wah Wu, representatives of all holders of Class "A", Class "E" and Class "F" Debentures issued by Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc.,
respondents/appellants on cross-appeal.

[2001] 2 S.C.R. 534

[2000] S.C.J. No. 63

2001 SCC 46

File No.: 27138.

Supreme Court of Canada

Hearing and judgment: December 13, 2000.
Reasons delivered: July 13, 2001.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ALBERTA (62 paras.)

Practice -- Class actions -- Plaintiffs suing defendants for breach of fiduciary duties and mismanagement of funds -- Defendants applying for order to strike plaintiffs' claim to sue in representative capacity -- Whether requirements for class action met -- If so, whether class action should be allowed -- Whether defendants entitled to examination and discovery of each class member -- Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/68, Rule 42.

L and W, together with 229 other investors, became participants in the federal government's Business Immigration Program by purchasing debentures in WCSC, [page535] which was incorporated by D, its sole shareholder, for the purpose of helping investor-class immigrants qualify as permanent residents in Canada. WCSC solicited funds through two offerings to invest in income-producing properties. After the investors' funds were deposited, WCSC purchased from CRI,

for $5,550,000, the rights to a Crown surface lease and also agreed to commit a further $16.5 million for surface improvements. To finance WCSC's obligations to CRI, D directed that the Series A debentures be issued in an aggregate principal amount of $22,050,000 to some of the investors. D advanced more funds to CRI and corresponding debentures were issued, in particular the Series E and F debentures. Eventually, the debentures were pooled. When CRI announced that it could not pay the interest due on the debentures, L and W, the representative plaintiffs, commenced a class action complaining that D and various affiliates and advisors of WCSC breached fiduciary duties to the investors by mismanaging their funds. The defendants applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for a declaration and order striking that portion of the claim in which the individual plaintiffs purport, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Alberta Rules of Court, to represent a class of 231 investors. The chambers judge denied the application. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld that decision but granted the defendants the right to discovery from each of the 231 plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to this Court, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed taking issue with the Court of Appeal's allowance of individualized discovery from each class member.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed.

In Alberta, class-action practice is governed by Rule 42 of the Alberta Rules of Court but, in the absence of comprehensive legislation, the courts must fill the void under their inherent power to settle the rules of practice and procedure as to disputes brought before them. Class actions should be allowed to proceed under Rule 42 where the following conditions are met: (1) the class is capable of clear definition; (2) there are issues of law or fact common to all class members; (3) success for one class member means success for all; and (4) the proposed representative adequately represents the interests of the class. If these conditions are met the court must also be satisfied, in the exercise of its discretion, that there are no countervailing considerations that outweigh [page536] the benefits of allowing the class action to proceed. The court should take into account the benefits the class action offers in the circumstances of the case as well as any unfairness that class proceedings may cause. In the end, the court must strike a balance between efficiency and fairness. The need to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness belies the suggestion that a class action should be struck only where the deficiency is "plain and obvious". On procedural matters, all potential class members should be informed of the existence of the suit, of the common issues that the suit seeks to resolve, and of the right of each class member to opt out. This should be done before any decision is made that purports to prejudice or otherwise affect the interests of class members. The court also retains discretion to determine how the individual issues should be addressed, once common issues have been resolved. In the absence of comprehensive class-action legislation, courts must address procedural complexities on a case-by-case basis in a flexible and liberal manner, seeking a balance between efficiency and fairness.

In this case, the basic conditions for a class action are met and efficiency and fairness favour permitting it to proceed. The defendants' contentions against the suit were unpersuasive. While differences exist among investors, the fact remains that the investors raise essentially the same claims requiring resolution of the same facts. If material differences emerge, the court can deal with them when the time comes. Further, a class action should not be foreclosed on the ground that there is uncertainty as to the resolution of issues common to all class members. If it is determined that the investors must show individual reliance to establish breach of fiduciary duty, the court may then consider whether the class action should continue. The same applies to the contention that different defences will be raised with respect to different class members. Simply asserting this possibility does not negate a class action. If and when different defences are asserted, the court may solve the problem or withdraw leave to proceed as a class.

Finally, to allow individualized discovery at this stage of the proceedings would be premature. The defendants should be allowed to examine the representative plaintiffs as of right but examination of other class members [page537] should be available only by order of the court, upon the defendants showing reasonable necessity.

Cases Cited

Distinguished: General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Naken, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 72; referred to: 353850 Alberta Ltd. v. Horne & Pitfield Foods Ltd., [1989] A.J. No. 652 (QL); Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 774; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959; Korte v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (1993), 8 Alta. L.R. (3d) 337; Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1069; Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377; Chancey v. May (1722), Prec. Ch. 592, 24 E.R. 265; City of London v. Richmond (1701), 2 Vern. 421, 23 E.R. 870; Wallworth v. Holt (1841), 4 My. & Cr. 619, 41 E.R. 238; Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1; Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426; Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021; Bell v. Wood, [1927] 1 W.W.R. 580; Langley v. North West Water Authority, [1991] 3 All E.R. 610, leave denied [1991] 1 W.L.R. 711n; Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v. Newfoundland (1995), 132 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 205;

Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, [1984] 4 W.W.R. 706; International Capital Corp. v. Schafer (1995), 130 Sask. R. 23; Guarantee Co. of North America v. Caisse populaire de Shippagan Ltée (1988), 86 N.B.R. (2d) 342; Lee v. OCCO Developments Ltd. (1994), 148 N.B.R. (2d) 321; Van Audenhove v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1994), 134 N.S.R. (2d) 294; Horne v. Canada (Attorney General) (1995), 129 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 109; Bywater v. Toronto Transit Commission (1998), 27 C.P.C. (4th) 172; Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

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APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal (1998), 73 Alta. L.R. (3d) 227, 228 A.R. 188, 188 W.A.C. 188, 30 C.P.C. (4th) 1, [1998] A.J. No. 1364 (QL), 1998 ABCA 392, dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench (1996), 41 Alta. L.R. (3d) 412, 191 A.R. 265, 3 C.P.C. (4th) 329, [1996] A.J. No. 1165 (QL). Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed.

Barry R. Crump, Brian Beck and David C. Bishop, for the appellants/respondents on cross-appeal.
Hervé H. Durocher and Eugene J. Erler, for the respondents/appellants on cross-appeal.

[Quicklaw note: Please see complete list of solicitors appended at the end of the judgment.]

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

1 **McLACHLIN C.J.**-- This appeal requires us to decide when a class action may be brought. While the class action has existed in one form or another for hundreds of years, its importance has increased of late. Particularly in complicated cases implicating the interests of many people, the class action may provide the best means of fair and efficient resolution. Yet absent legislative direction, there remains considerable uncertainty as to the conditions under which a court should permit a class action to be maintained.

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2 The claimants wanted to immigrate to Canada. To qualify, they invested money in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. ("WCSC"), under the Canadian government's Business Immigration Program. They lost money and brought a class action. The defendants (appellants) claim the class action is inappropriate and ask the Court to strike it out. For the following reasons, I conclude that the claimants may proceed as a class.

I. Facts

3 The representative plaintiffs Muh-Min Lin and Hoi-Wah Wu, together with 229 other investors, became participants in the government's Business Immigration Program of Employment and Immigration Canada by purchasing debentures in WCSC. WCSC was incorporated by Joseph Dutton, its sole shareholder, for the purpose of "facilitat[ing] the qualification of the Investors, their spouses, and their never-married children as Canadian permanent residents."

4 WCSC solicited funds through two offerings "to invest in land located in the Province of Saskatchewan for the purpose of developing commercial, non-residential, income-producing properties". The offering memoranda provided that the subscription proceeds would be deposited with an escrow agent, later designated as The Royal Trust Company ("Royal Trust"), and would be released to WCSC upon conditions, subsequently amended.

5 The dispute arises from events after the investors' funds had been deposited with Royal Trust. In May 1990, WCSC entered into a Purchase and Development Agreement ("PDA") with Claude Resources Inc. ("Claude") under which WCSC purchased from Claude, for $5,550,000, the rights to a Crown surface lease adjacent to Claude's "Seabee" gold deposits in northern Saskatchewan. WCSC also agreed to commit a further $16.5 million for surface improvements and for the construction of a gold mill, which would be owned by WCSC. A lease agreement executed in tandem with the PDA leased the not-yet-constructed gold [page541] mill and related facilities, together with the surface lands, back to Claude. The payments required of Claude under that lease agreement matched the semi-annual interest payments required of WCSC with respect to the investors.

6 To finance WCSC's obligations under the PDA with Claude, Dutton directed Royal Trust to issue debentures in an aggregate principal amount of $22,050,000 to a subset of the investors who had subscribed by that point. Royal Trust did so by issuing "Series A" debentures to 142 investors. After the debentures were issued, WCSC distributed an update letter to its investors, describing the investment in Claude.

7 In a separate series of transactions executed around the same time, Dutton and Claude entered into an agreement by which (1) Dutton effectively conveyed to Claude 49 percent of his shares in WCSC; (2) Claude paid Dutton $1.6 mil-

lion in cash; (3) Claude advanced Dutton a $1.6 million non-recourse loan; (4) Dutton entered into an employment contract with Claude for a salary of $50,000 per year; and (5) Claude and Dutton's management company, J.M.D. Management Ltd., entered into a management contract for $200,000 per year. It appears that WCSC did not distribute an update letter to its investors describing this series of transactions.

8 Over the next months, Dutton advanced more funds to Claude and directed Royal Trust to issue corresponding debentures. Of particular relevance to the instant dispute are the Series E debentures issued in December 1990 (aggregate principal of $2.56 million), and the Series F debentures issued in May 1991 (aggregate principal of $9.45 million). When the Series E debentures were issued, the Series A and E debentures were pooled, so that investors in those series became entitled to a pro rata claim on the total security pledged with respect to the two series. When the Series F debentures were issued, the security for that series was [page542] pooled with the security that had been pledged with respect to the Series A and E debentures. WCSC apparently distributed investor update letters after the issuance of the Series E and F debentures, just as it had done after the issuance of the Series A debentures.

9 In December 1991, Claude announced that it could not pay the interest due on the Series A, E, and F debentures and Muh-Min Lin and Hoi-Wah Wu commenced this action. The gravamen of the complaint is that Dutton and various affiliates and advisors of WCSC breached fiduciary duties to the investors by mismanaging or misdirecting their funds.

II. Statutory Provisions

10 Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/68

> 42 Where numerous persons have a common interest in the subject of an intended action, one or more of those persons may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the Court to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all.
>
> 129(1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading in the action, on the ground that
>
> (a) it discloses no cause of action or defence, as the case may be, or
> (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
> (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action, or
> (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court,
>
> and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly.
>
> (2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under clause (a) of subrule (1).
> (3) This Rule, so far as applicable, applies to an originating notice and a petition.

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> 187 A person for whose benefit an action is prosecuted or defended or the assignor of a chose in action upon which the action is brought, shall be regarded as a party thereto for the purposes of discovery of documents.
>
> 201 A member of a firm which is a party and a person for whose benefit an action is prosecuted or defended shall be regarded as a party for the purposes of examination.

III. Decisions

11 The appellants applied to the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta (1996), 41 Alta. L.R. (3d) 412 for a declaration and order striking that portion of the Amended Statement of Claim in which the individual plaintiffs purport, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Alberta Rules of Court, to represent a class of 231 investors. The chambers judge identified four issues: (1) whether the court had the power under Rule 42 to strike the investors' claim to sue in a representative capacity; (2) whether the court was restricted to considering only the Amended Statement of Claim filed; (3) the standard of proof

required to compel the court to exercise its discretion to strike the representative claim; and (4) whether, in this case, this standard was met.

12 On the first issue, the chambers judge relied on the decision of Master Funduk in 353850 Alberta Ltd. v. Horne & Pitfield Foods Ltd., [1989] A.J. No. 652 (QL), to conclude that the court has the power, under Rule 42, to strike a claim made by plaintiffs to sue in a representative capacity.

13 On the second issue, the chambers judge held that the court need not limit its inquiry to the pleadings, relying on 353850 Alberta, supra, and on the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 774. He concluded, however, that resolution of the case before him did not require resort to the affidavit evidence.

14 On the third issue, the chambers judge concluded that the court should strike a representative claim under Rule 42 only if it is "entirely clear" or [page544] "beyond doubt" or "plain and obvious" that the claim is deficient -- the standard applied to applications to strike pleadings for disclosing no reasonable claim: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959.

15 On the final issue, the chambers judge, applying the "plain and obvious" rule, concluded that the Amended Statement of Claim was not deficient under Rule 42 and met the requirements set out in Korte v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (1993), 8 Alta. L.R. (3d) 337 (C.A.): (1) that the class be capable of clear and definite definition; (2) that the principal issues of law and fact be the same; (3) that one plaintiff's success would necessarily mean success for all members of the plaintiff class; and (4) that the resolution of the dispute not require any individual assessment of the claims of individual class members. However, he left the matter open to review by the trial judge.

16 The Alberta Court of Appeal, per Russell J.A. (for the majority), dismissed the appeal, Picard J.A., dissenting: (1998), 73 Alta. L.R. (3d) 227. The majority rejected the argument that the chambers judge should have conclusively resolved the Rule 42 issue rather than left it open to the trial judge, citing Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1069, in which this Court left to the trial judge the issue of whether the plaintiffs were authorized to sue on behalf of a broader class. The majority also rejected the argument that the investors must show individual reliance to succeed. However, it granted the defendants the right to discovery from each of the 231 plaintiffs on the grounds that Rule 201, read with Rule 187, allows discovery from any person for whose benefit an action is prosecuted or defended and that the defendants should not be barred from developing an argument based on actual reliance merely because it was speculative.

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17 Picard J.A., would have allowed the appeal. In her view, the Chambers judge erred in deferring the matter to the trial judge because, unlike Oregon Jack Creek, the case was narrow and "a great deal of relevant evidence was available to the court to allow it to make a decision" (p. 235). The need to show individual reliance was only one of many problems that the investors would face if allowed to proceed as a class. Citing this Court's decisions in Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, and Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, she concluded that "[t]he extent of fiduciary duties in a particular case requires a meticulous examination of the facts, particularly of any contract between the parties" (p. 237). She concluded that "[t]his responsibility of proof by the [investors] cannot possibly be met by a representative action nor by giving a right of discovery of the 229 other parties to the action" (p. 237).

IV. Issues

18 1. Did the courts below apply the proper standard in determining whether the investors had satisfied the requirements for a class action under Rule 42?

2. Did the courts below err in denying defendants' motion to strike under Rule 42?
3. If the class action is allowed, should the defendants have the right to full oral and documentary discovery of all class members?

V. Analysis

A. The History and Functions of Class Actions

19 The class action originated in the English courts of equity in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The courts of law focussed on individual questions between the plaintiff and the defendant. The courts of equity, by contrast, applied a rule of compulsory joinder, requiring all those interested in the subject matter of the dispute [page546] to be made parties. The aim of the courts of equity was to render "complete justice" -- that is, to "arrang[e] all the rights, which the decision immediately affects": F. Calvert, A Treatise Upon the Law Respecting Parties to Suits in Equity (2nd ed. 1847), at p. 3; see also C. A. Wright, A. R. Miller and M. K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (2nd ed. 1986), at s. 1751; J. Story, Equity Pleadings (10th ed. 1892), at s. 76a. The compulsory-joinder rule "allowed the Court to examine every facet of the dispute and thereby ensure that no one was adversely affected by its decision without first having had an opportunity to be heard": J. A. Kazanjian, "Class Actions in Canada" (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.J. 397, at p. 400. The rule possessed the additional advantage of preventing a multiplicity of duplicative proceedings.

20 The compulsory-joinder rule eventually proved inadequate. Applied to conflicts between tenants and manorial lords or between parsons and parishioners, it closed the door to the courts where interested parties in such cases were too numerous to be joined. The courts of equity responded by relaxing the compulsory-joinder rule where strict adherence would work injustice. The result was the representative action. For example, in Chancey v. May (1722), Prec. Ch. 592, 24 E.R. 265, members of a partnership were permitted to sue on behalf of themselves and some 800 other partners for misapplication and embezzlement of funds by the partnership's former treasurer and manager. The court allowed the action because "it was in behalf of themselves, and all others the proprietors of the same undertaking, except the defendants, and so all the rest were in effect parties," and because "it would be impracticable to make them all parties by name, and there would be continual abatements by death and otherwise, and no coming at justice, if all were to be made parties" (p. 265); see also Kazanjian, supra, at p. 401; G. T. Bispham, The Principles of Equity (9th ed. 1916), at para. 415; S. C. Yeazell, "Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action" (1977), 77 Colum. L. Rev. 866, at pp. 867 and 872; J. K. Bankier, "Class Actions for Monetary [page547] Relief in Canada: Formalism or Function?" (1984), 4 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 229, at p. 236.

21 The representative or class action proved useful in pre-industrial English commercial litigation. The modern limited-liability company had yet to develop, and collectives of business people had no independent legal existence. Satisfying the compulsory-joinder rule would have required a complainant to bring before the court each member of the collective. The representative action provided the solution to this difficulty: see Kazanjian, supra, at p. 401; Yeazell, supra, at p. 867; City of London v. Richmond (1701), 2 Vern. 421, 23 E.R. 870 (allowing the plaintiff to sue trustees for rent owed, though the beneficiaries of the trust were not joined).

22 The class action required a common interest between the class members. Many of the early representative actions were brought in the form of "bills of peace", which could be maintained where the interested individuals were numerous, all members of the group possessed a common interest in the question to be adjudicated, and the representatives could be expected fairly to advocate the interests of all members of the group: see Wright, Miller and Kane, supra, at para. 1751; Z. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity (1950), at p. 201, T. A. Roberts, The Principles of Equity (3rd ed. 1877), at pp. 389-92; Bispham, supra, at para. 417.

23 The courts of equity applied a liberal and flexible approach to whether a class action could proceed. They "continually sought a proper balance between the interests of fairness and efficiency": Kazanjian, supra, at p. 411. As stated in Wallworth v. Holt (1841), 4 My. & Cr. 619, 41 E.R. 238, at p. 244, "it [is] the duty of this Court to adapt its practice and course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not by too strict an adherence to forms and rules, established under different circumstances, [page548] to decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy".

24 This flexible and generous approach to class actions prevailed until the fusion of law and equity under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.), 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, and the adoption of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure:

> 10. Where there are numerous parties having the same interest in one action, one or more of such parties may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by the Court to defend in such action, on behalf or for the benefit of all parties so interested.

While early cases under the new rules maintained a liberal approach to class actions (see, e.g., Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 (H.L.); Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426 (H.L.)),

later cases sometimes took a restrictive approach (see, e.g., Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A.)). This, combined with the widespread use of limited-liability companies, resulted in fewer class actions being brought.

25 The class action did not forever languish, however. Conditions emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century that once again invoked its utility. Mass production and consumption revived the problem that had motivated the development of the class action in the eighteenth century -- the problem of many suitors with the same grievance. As in the eighteenth century, insistence on individual representation would often have precluded effective litigation. And, as in the eighteenth century, the class action provided the solution.

26 The class action plays an important role in today's world. The rise of mass production, the diversification of corporate ownership, the advent of the mega-corporation, and the recognition of environmental wrongs have all contributed to its [page549] growth. A faulty product may be sold to numerous consumers. Corporate mismanagement may bring loss to a large number of shareholders. Discriminatory policies may affect entire categories of employees. Environmental pollution may have consequences for citizens all over the country. Conflicts like these pit a large group of complainants against the alleged wrongdoer. Sometimes, the complainants are identically situated vis-à-vis the defendants. In other cases, an important aspect of their claim is common to all complainants. The class action offers a means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a manner that is fair to all parties.

27 Class actions offer three important advantages over a multiplicity of individual suits. First, by aggregating similar individual actions, class actions serve judicial economy by avoiding unnecessary duplication in fact-finding and legal analysis. The efficiencies thus generated free judicial resources that can be directed at resolving other conflicts, and can also reduce the costs of litigation both for plaintiffs (who can share litigation costs) and for defendants (who need litigate the disputed issue only once, rather than numerous times): see W. K. Branch, Class Actions in Canada (1998), at para. 3.30; M. A. Eizenga, M. J. Peerless and C. M. Wright, Class Actions Law and Practice (1999), at para. 1.6; Bankier, supra, at pp. 230-31; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (1982), at pp. 118-19.

28 Second, by allowing fixed litigation costs to be divided over a large number of plaintiffs, class actions improve access to justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that would otherwise be too costly to prosecute individually. Without class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to some plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims. Sharing costs ensures that injuries are not left unremedied: see Branch, supra, at para. 3.40; Eizenga, Peerless and Wright, supra, at para. 1.7; [page550] Bankier, supra, at pp. 231-32; Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, at pp. 119-22.

29 Third, class actions serve efficiency and justice by ensuring that actual and potential wrongdoers do not ignore their obligations to the public. Without class actions, those who cause widespread but individually minimal harm might not take into account the full costs of their conduct, because for any one plaintiff the expense of bringing suit would far exceed the likely recovery. Cost-sharing decreases the expense of pursuing legal recourse and accordingly deters potential defendants who might otherwise assume that minor wrongs would not result in litigation: see "Developments in the Law -- The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV. Class Action Reform: An Assessment of Recent Judicial Decisions and Legislative Initiatives" (2000), 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1806, at pp. 1809-10; see Branch, supra, at para. 3.50; Eizenga, Peerless and Wright, supra, at para. 1.8; Bankier, supra, at p. 232; Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, at pp. 11 and 140-46.

B. The Test for Class Actions

30 In recognition of the modern importance of representative litigation, many jurisdictions have enacted comprehensive class action legislation. In the United States, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. para. 23 (introduced in 1938 and substantially amended in 1966) addressed aspects of class action practice, including certification of litigant classes, notice, and settlement. The English procedural rules of 1999 include detailed provisions governing "Group Litigation": United Kingdom, Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, rr. 19.10-19.15. And in Canada, the provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec have enacted comprehensive statutory schemes to govern class action practice: see British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50; Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6; Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, Book IX. Yet other Canadian provinces, including Alberta and Manitoba, are considering enacting [page551] such legislation: see Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report #100, Class Proceedings (January 1999); Alberta Law Reform Institute, Final Report No. 85, Class Actions (December 2000); see also R. Rogers, "A Uniform Class Actions Statute", Appendix O to the Proceedings of the 1995 Meeting of The Uniform Law Conference of Canada.

31 Absent comprehensive codes of class action procedure, provincial rules based on Rule 10, Schedule, of the English Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 govern. This is the case in Alberta, where class action practice is governed by Rule 42 of the Alberta Rules of Court:

> 42 Where numerous persons have a common interest in the subject of an intended action, one or more of those persons may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the Court to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all.

The intention of the Alberta legislature is clear. Class actions may be brought. Details of class action practice, however, are largely left to the courts.

32 Alberta's Rule 42 does not specify what is meant by "numerous" or by "common interest". It does not say when discovery may be made of class members other than the representative. Nor does it specify how notice of the suit should be conveyed to potential class members, or how a court should deal with the possibility that some potential class members may desire to "opt out" of the class. And it does not provide for costs, or for the distribution of the fund should an action for money damages be successful.

33 Clearly, it would be advantageous if there existed a legislative framework addressing these issues. The absence of comprehensive legislation means that courts are forced to rely heavily on individual case management to structure class proceedings. This taxes judicial resources and denies [page552] the parties ex ante certainty as to their procedural rights. One of the main weaknesses of the current Alberta regime is the absence of a threshold "certification" provision. In British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, a class action may proceed only after the court certifies that the class and representative meet certain requirements. In Alberta, by contrast, courts effectively certify ex post, only after the opposing party files a motion to strike. It would be preferable if the appropriateness of the class action could be determined at the outset by certification.

34 Absent comprehensive legislation, the courts must fill the void under their inherent power to settle the rules of practice and procedure as to disputes brought before them: Bell v. Wood, [1927] 1 W.W.R. 580 (B.C.S.C.), at pp. 581-82; Langley v. North West Water Authority, [1991] 3 All E.R. 610 (C.A.), leave denied [1991] 1 W.L.R. 711n (H.L.); Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v. Newfoundland (1995), 132 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 205 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.); W. A. Stevenson and J. E. Côté, Civil Procedure Guide, 1996, at p. 4. However desirable comprehensive legislation on class action practice may be, if such legislation has not been enacted, the courts must determine the availability of the class action and the mechanics of class action practice.

35 Alberta courts moved to fill the procedural vacuum in Korte, supra. Korte prescribed four conditions for a class action: (1) the class must be capable of clear and definite definition; (2) the principal issues of fact and law must be the same; (3) success for one of the plaintiffs must mean success for all; and (4) no individual assessment of the claims of individual plaintiffs need be made.

36 The Korte criteria loosely parallel the criteria applied in other Canadian jurisdictions in which comprehensive class-action legislation has yet to be enacted: see, e.g., Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, [1984] 4 W.W.R. 706 [page553] (Man. Q.B.); International Capital Corp. v. Schafer (1995), 130 Sask. R. 23 (Q.B.); Guarantee Co. of North America v. Caisse populaire de Shippagan Ltée (1988), 86 N.B.R. (2d) 342 (Q.B.); Lee v. OCCO Developments Ltd. (1994), 148 N.B.R. (2d) 321 (Q.B.); Van Audenhove v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1994), 134 N.S.R. (2d) 294 (S.C.), at para. 7; Horne v. Canada (Attorney General) (1995), 129 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 109 (P.E.I.S.C.), at para. 24.

37 The Korte criteria also bear resemblance to the class-certification criteria in the British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec class action statutes. Under the British Columbia and Ontario statutes, an action will be certified as a class proceeding if (1) the pleadings or the notice of application disclose a cause of action; (2) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented by the class representative; (3) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues (in British Columbia, "whether or not those common issues predominate over issues affecting only individual members"); (4) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of common issues; and (5) the class representative would fairly represent the interests of the class, has advanced a workable method of advancing the proceeding and notifying class members, and does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with other class members: see Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, s. 5(1); British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, s. 4(1). Under the Quebec statute, an action will be certified as a class proceeding if (1) the recourses of the class members raise identical, similar, or related questions of law or fact; (2) the alleged facts appear to warrant

the conclusions sought; (3) the composition of the group makes joinder impracticable; and (4) the representative is in a position to adequately represent the interests of the class members: see Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1003.

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38 While there are differences between the tests, four conditions emerge as necessary to a class action. First, the class must be capable of clear definition. Class definition is critical because it identifies the individuals entitled to notice, entitled to relief (if relief is awarded), and bound by the judgment. It is essential, therefore, that the class be defined clearly at the outset of the litigation. The definition should state objective criteria by which members of the class can be identified. While the criteria should bear a rational relationship to the common issues asserted by all class members, the criteria should not depend on the outcome of the litigation. It is not necessary that every class member be named or known. It is necessary, however, that any particular person's claim to membership in the class be determinable by stated, objective criteria: see Branch, supra, at paras. 4.190-4.207; Friedenthal, Kane and Miller, Civil Procedure (2nd ed. 1993), at pp. 726-27; Bywater v. Toronto Transit Commission (1998), 27 C.P.C. (4th) 172 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at paras. 10-11.

39 Second, there must be issues of fact or law common to all class members. Commonality tests have been a source of confusion in the courts. The commonality question should be approached purposively. The underlying question is whether allowing the suit to proceed as a representative one will avoid duplication of fact-finding or legal analysis. Thus an issue will be "common" only where its resolution is necessary to the resolution of each class member's claim. It is not essential that the class members be identically situated vis-à-vis the opposing party. Nor is it necessary that common issues predominate over non-common issues or that the resolution of the common issues would be determinative of each class member's claim. However, the class members' claims must share a substantial common ingredient to justify a class action. Determining whether the common issues justify a class action may require the court to examine the significance of the common issues in relation to individual issues. In doing so, the court should remember that it may not always be possible for a representative party to plead the claims of [page555] each class member with the same particularity as would be required in an individual suit.

40 Third, with regard to the common issues, success for one class member must mean success for all. All members of the class must benefit from the successful prosecution of the action, although not necessarily to the same extent. A class action should not be allowed if class members have conflicting interests.

41 Fourth, the class representative must adequately represent the class. In assessing whether the proposed representative is adequate, the court may look to the motivation of the representative, the competence of the representative's counsel, and the capacity of the representative to bear any costs that may be incurred by the representative in particular (as opposed to by counsel or by the class members generally). The proposed representative need not be "typical" of the class, nor the "best" possible representative. The court should be satisfied, however, that the proposed representative will vigorously and capably prosecute the interests of the class: see Branch, supra, at paras. 4.210-4.490; Friedenthal, Kane and Miller, supra, at pp. 729-32.

42 While the four factors outlined must be met for a class action to proceed, their satisfaction does not mean that the court must allow the action to proceed. Other factors may weigh against allowing the action to proceed in representative form. The defendant may wish to raise different defences with respect to different groups of plaintiffs. It may be necessary to examine each class member in discovery. Class members may raise important issues not shared by all members of the class. Or the proposed class may be so small that joinder would be a better solution. Where such countervailing factors exist, the court has discretion to decide whether the class action should be permitted to proceed, notwithstanding that the essential conditions [page556] for the maintenance of a class action have been satisfied.

43 The class action codes that have been adopted by British Columbia and Ontario offer some guidance as to factors that would generally not constitute arguments against allowing an action to proceed as a representative one. Both state that certification should not be denied on the grounds that: (1) the relief claimed includes a demand for money damages that would require individual assessment after determination of the common issues; (2) the relief claimed relates to separate contracts involving different members of the class; (3) different class members seek different remedies; (4) the number of class members or the identity of every class member is unknown; or (5) the class includes subgroups that have claims or defences that raise common issues not shared by all members of the class: see Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, s. 6; British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, s. 7; see also Alberta Law Reform Institute, supra, at pp. 75-

76. Common sense suggests that these factors should no more bar a class action suit in Alberta than in Ontario or British Columbia.

44 Where the conditions for a class action are met, the court should exercise its discretion to disallow it for negative reasons in a liberal and flexible manner, like the courts of equity of old. The court should take into account the benefits the class action offers in the circumstances of the case as well as any unfairness that class proceedings may cause. In the end, the court must strike a balance between efficiency and fairness.

45 The need to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness belies the suggestion that a class action should be struck only where the deficiency is "plain and obvious", as the Chambers judge held. Unlike Rule 129, which is directed at the question of whether the claim should be prosecuted [page557] at all, Rule 42 is directed at the question of how the claim should be prosecuted. The "plain and obvious" standard is appropriate where the result of striking is to forever end the action. It recognizes that a plaintiff "should not be 'driven from the judgment seat' at this very early stage unless it is quite plain that his alleged cause of action has no chance of success": Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094 (C.A.), at p. 1102 (quoted in Hunt, supra, at pp. 974-75). Denial of class status under Rule 42, by contrast, does not defeat the claim. It merely places the plaintiffs in the position of any litigant who comes before the court in his or her individual capacity. Moreover, nothing in Alberta's rules suggests that class actions should be disallowed only where it is plain and obvious that the action should not proceed as a representative one. Rule 42 and the analogous rules in other provinces merely state that a representative may maintain a class action if certain conditions are met.

46 The need to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness also belies the suggestion that class actions should be approached restrictively. The defendants argue that General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Naken, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 72, precludes a generous approach to class actions. I respectfully disagree. First, when Naken was decided, the modern class action was very much an untested procedure in Canada. In the intervening years, the importance of the class action as a procedural tool in modern litigation has become manifest. Indeed, the reform that has been effected since Naken has been motivated in large part by the recognition of the benefits that class actions can offer the parties, the court system, and society: see, e.g., Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, at pp. 3-4.

47 Second, Naken on its facts invited caution. The action was brought on behalf of all persons who purchased new 1971 or 1972 Firenza motor vehicles in Ontario. The complaint was that General [page558] Motors had misrepresented the quality of the vehicles and that the vehicles "were not reasonably fit for use" (p. 76). The statement of claim alleged breach of warranty and breach of representation, and sought $1,000 in damages for each of approximately 4,600 plaintiffs. Estey J., writing for a unanimous Court, disallowed the class action. While each plaintiff raised the same claims against the defendant, the resolution of those claims would have required particularized evidence and fact-finding at both the liability and damages stages of the litigation. Far from avoiding needless duplication, a class action would have unnecessarily complicated the resolution of what amounted to 4,600 individual claims.

48 To summarize, class actions should be allowed to proceed under Alberta's Rule 42 where the following conditions are met: (1) the class is capable of clear definition; (2) there are issues of fact or law common to all class members; (3) success for one class member means success for all; and (4) the proposed representative adequately represents the interests of the class. If these conditions are met the court must also be satisfied, in the exercise of its discretion, that there are no countervailing considerations that outweigh the benefits of allowing the class action to proceed.

49 Other procedural issues may arise. One is notice. A judgment is binding on a class member only if the class member is notified of the suit and is given an opportunity to exclude himself or herself from the proceeding. This case does not raise the issue of what constitutes sufficient notice. However, prudence suggests that all potential class members be informed of the existence of the suit, of the common issues that the suit seeks to resolve, and of the right of each class member to opt out, and that this be done before any decision is made that purports to prejudice or otherwise affect the interests of class members.

[page559]

50 Another procedural issue that may arise is how to deal with non-common issues. The court retains discretion to determine how the individual issues should be addressed, once common issues have been resolved: see Branch, supra, at para. 18.10. Generally, individual issues will be resolved in individual proceedings. However, as under the legislation of

British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, a court may specify special procedures that it considers necessary or useful: see Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, s. 25; British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, s. 27; Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1039.

51 The diversity of class actions makes it difficult to anticipate all of the procedural complexities that may arise. In the absence of comprehensive class-action legislation, courts must address procedural complexities on a case-by-case basis. Courts should approach these issues as they do the question of whether a class action should be allowed: in a flexible and liberal manner, seeking a balance between efficiency and fairness.

C. Whether the Investors Have Satisfied Rule 42

52 The four conditions to the maintenance of a class action are satisfied here. First, the class is clearly defined. The respondents Lin and Wu represent themselves and "[229 other] immigrant investors ... who each invested at least the sum of $150,000.00 into a fund totalling $34,065,000.00, the said sum to be managed, administered and secured by ... Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc.". Who falls within the class can be ascertained on the basis of documentary evidence that the parties have put before the court. Second, common issues of fact and law unite all members of the class. The essence of the investors' complaint is that the defendants owed them fiduciary duties which they breached. While the investors' Amended Statement of Claim alludes to claims in negligence and misrepresentation, counsel for the investors undertook in argument before this Court to abandon all but the fiduciary duty claims. Third, at this stage of the proceedings, it appears that [page560] resolving one class member's breach of fiduciary claim would effectively resolve the claims of every class member. As a result of security-pooling agreements effected by WCSC, each investor now has an interest, proportional to his or her investment, in the same underlying security. Finally, the representative plaintiffs are appropriate.

53 The defendants argue that the proposed suit is not amenable to prosecution as a class action because: (1) there are in fact multiple classes of plaintiffs; (2) the defendants will raise multiple defences to different causes of action advanced against different defendants; and (3) in order to prevail, the investors must show actual reliance on the part of each class member. I find these arguments unpersuasive.

54 The defendants' contention that there are multiple classes of plaintiffs is unconvincing. No doubt, differences exist. Different investors invested at different times, in different jurisdictions, on the basis of different offering memoranda, through different agents, in different series of debentures, and learned about the underlying events through different disclosure documents. Some investors may possess rescissionary rights that others do not. The fact remains, however, that the investors raise essentially the same claims requiring resolution of the same facts. While it may eventually emerge that different subgroups of investors have different rights against the defendants, this possibility does not necessarily defeat the investors' right to proceed as a class. If material differences emerge, the court can deal with them when the time comes.

55 The defendants' contention that the investors should not be permitted to sue as a class because [page561] each must show actual reliance to establish breach of fiduciary duty also fails to convince. In recent decades fiduciary obligations have been applied in new contexts, and the full scope of their application remains to be precisely defined. The fiduciary duty issues raised here are common to all the investors. A class action should not be foreclosed on the ground that there is uncertainty as to the resolution of issues common to all class members. If it is determined that the investors must show individual reliance, the court may then consider whether the class action should continue.

56 The same applies to the contention that different defences will be raised with respect to different class members. Simply asserting this possibility does not negate a class action. If and when different defences are asserted, the court may solve the problem or withdraw leave to proceed as a class.

57 I conclude that the basic conditions for a class action are met and that efficiency and fairness favour permitting it to proceed.

D. Cross-Appeal

58 The investors take issue on cross-appeal with the Court of Appeal's allowance of individualized discovery from each class member. The Court of Appeal held that the defendants are entitled, under Rules 187 and 201, to examination and discovery of each member of the class. The investors argue that the question of whether discovery should be allowed from each class member is a question best left to a case management judge appointed pursuant to the Alberta Rules of Court Binder, Practice Note No. 7.

59 I agree that allowing individualized discovery at this stage of the proceedings would be premature. One of the benefits of a class action is that discovery of the class representatives will usually suffice [page562] and make unnecessary discovery of each individual class member. Cases where individual discovery is required of all class members are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the necessity of individual discovery may be a factor weighing against allowing the action to proceed in representative form.

60 I would allow the defendants to examine the representative plaintiffs as of right. Thereafter, examination of other class members should be available only by order of the court, upon the defendants showing reasonable necessity.

VI. Conclusion

61 For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and allow the investors to proceed as a class. I would allow the cross-appeal.

62 Costs of the appeal and cross-appeal are to the respondents.

Solicitors for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal The Royal Trust Company: Burnet, Duckworth & Palmer, Calgary.
Solicitors for the appellants/respondents on cross-appeal James G. Engdahl, William R. MacNeill, Jon R. MacNeill, Gary L. Billingsley, R. Byron Henderson: McLennan Ross, Edmonton.
Solicitors for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal C. Michael Ryer: Peacock Linder & Halt, Calgary.
Solicitors for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal Peter K. Gummer: Brownlee Fryett, Edmonton.
Solicitors for the appellants/respondents on cross-appeal Ernst & Young and Alan Lundell: Parlee McLaws, Edmonton.

[page563]

Solicitors for the appellants/respondents on cross-appeal Bennett Jones Verchere and Garnet Schulhauser: Gowling Lafleur Henderson, Calgary.
Solicitors for the appellant/respondent on cross-appeal Arthur Andersen & Co.: Lucas Bowker & White, Edmonton.
Solicitors for the respondents/appellants on cross-appeal: Durocher Simpson, Edmonton.

cp/e/qlls

TAB 3

21

Final Report

Responsible Corporate Disclosure

A Search for Balance

ommittee
on Corporate
Disclosure

TSE

Toronto Stock Exchange



Committee on
Corporate Disclosure

TSE

Toronto Stock Exchange

Final Report

Responsible Corporate Disclosure

A Search for Balance

March 1997

Chapter 5

Should Additional Deterrents be Considered?

5.1 Regulation of continuous disclosure in Canada is currently accomplished by a number of institutions:

(i) SRAs regulate and enforce, to whatever extent their resources permit, compliance with legislative and policy requirements;

(ii) second tier regulators, the stock exchanges, enforce, to the extent their resources and their jurisdiction permit, compliance with continuous disclosure policies of the exchanges;

(iii) capital market participants who are injured have available to them common law remedies (albeit of theoretical utility only); and

(iv) markets are themselves self-regulators in the sense that market participants can decline to trade in the securities of companies whose disclosure they find wanting subject to certain practical limitations resulting at times from an excess of capital seeking investment opportunities, a situation that is often exacerbated by the foreign property rules that require institutions to invest in Canadian securities.

Chapter 5 of the Interim Report commented at length on the Committee's views with respect to the effectiveness of each of these regulators of continuous disclosure.

5.2 The SRAs have a variety of remedies available to them, depending upon the legislation under which they operate. By way of example, the Ontario *Securities Act* provides the OSC with the following arsenal:

> Sec. 127(1) The Commission may make one or more of the following orders if in its opinion it is in the public interest to make the order or orders: ...
>
> 4. An order that a market participant [which includes a reporting issuer, a director, officer or promoter of a reporting issuer] submit to a review of his, her or its practices and procedures and institute such changes as may be ordered by the Commission. ...
>
> 5. If the Commission is satisfied that Ontario securities law has not been complied with, an order that a release, report, preliminary prospectus, prospectus, return, financial statement, information circular, take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular, offering memorandum, proxy solicitation or any other document described in the order,
>
> (i) be provided by a market participant to a person or company, ... or
>
> (iii) be amended by a market participant to the extent that amendment is practicable. ...
>
> Sec. 128(1) The Commission may apply to the Ontario Court (General Division) for ... an order ... including ...:
>
> 2. An order requiring the person ... to submit to a review ... of his, her or its practices and procedures and to institute such changes as may be directed by the Commission.
>
> 3. An order directing that a [disclosure document] be provided by the person or company to another person or company... or be amended ... to the extent that amendment is practicable. ...
>
> 7. An order prohibiting the person from acting as officer or director or prohibiting the person or company from acting as promoter of any market participant permanently or for such period as is specified in the order. ...
>
> 10. An order directing the person or company to repay to a securityholder any part of the money paid by the securityholder for securities. ...
>
> 14. An order requiring the person or company to pay general or punitive damages to any other person or company...

5.3 It is hard to imagine what more a primary regulator might ask for. Particularly, one might focus on paragraphs 10 and 14 above and ask why, if the OSC can request a court to order that a person repay to a securityholder any part of the money paid by the securityholder for a security (if the payer has broken securities laws – including, obviously, continuous disclosure requirements), it is necessary to arm private plaintiffs with a private right of action based on statutory civil liability.

Funding of Securities Regulatory Authorities

5.4 A number of comments suggested that statutory civil liability for misleading continuous disclosure was too draconian a measure to introduce without first trying some other deterrent. These comments suggested that with adequate funding, as was recommended by the Committee, SRAs could enforce disclosure violations. At the current levels of funding of, e.g., the OSC, it is idle to expect that the OSC will be able fully to utilize its expanded remedies under section 128 of the Ontario *Securities Act* except in the most egregious cases. Awareness on the part of issuers that these provisions are not likely to be used against them reduces their deterrent effect.

The best way to achieve deterrence is enforcement.
— Tory Tory DesLauriers & Binnington

5.5 One approach to under-funding would be for governments to provide adequate funding to SRAs. Some of the SRAs are adequately funded or are self-funding. Chronic under-funding of others has not changed since publication of the Interim Report, although there have been some indications that funding for them may improve. The Minister of Finance for Ontario indicated late in 1996 the intention to place the OSC on a self-funding basis. This intention is laudable and should be implemented. If a national securities commission is created, although this appears unlikely at this time, it is paramount that such a commission be adequately-funded.

Fee increases on capital market transactions and participants were justified on the basis that increased fees would fund the OSC to the benefit of Ontario capital markets.
— Tory Tory DesLauriers & Binnington

Private Funding as a Source of Funding for Regulators

5.6 Another approach to under-funding would be to look to other sources of funding for regulators. If governments will not provide adequate funding, and enforcement is believed to be potentially an adequate deterrent, then it is worth exploring other sources of funding. One comment raised the idea: "As an option open for further discussion, some of our members have suggested that perhaps [i]ssuers should pay an additional levy to the OSC for the limited purpose of enforcement of the continuous disclosure obligation."[64] The Committee considered whether a model could be designed and tested for a limited period of time that would use private sector funding to supplement government funding or "self-funding" of SRAs. Such a concept is seductive in its simplicity if adequate funding for SRAs is all that is necessary to enforce continuous disclosure.

5.7 The Committee concluded that timing is an important factor in the issue whether private funding for regulatory enforcement purposes would be preferable to statutory civil liability. A significant delay would be expected before enabling legislation could be passed. This would be followed by a period of implementation during which additional staff would be assembled

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64 The Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries comment letter, at 8.

by SRAs to monitor and prosecute disclosure violations, priorities would be established and violations identified. Once prosecutions were commenced, the process through the court system would begin. In short, several years would elapse before it would be possible to assess the efficacy of additional enforcement as a deterrent. There is no assurance that greater enforcement would result in improved compliance with disclosure requirements. A "moratorium" on statutory civil liability, for the purpose of evaluating whether greater enforcement would have the desired effect, could merely postpone the inevitable for an unacceptable period of time. In view of the march towards integrated disclosure, the Committee finds this delay unsatisfactory and believes that a short-term experiment (which could not realistically be less than five years) is not worthwhile.

There is no assurance that greater enforcement would result in improved compliance with disclosure requirements.

5.8 The Committee also concluded that the provision of private sector funding to SRAs for the purposes of enforcing continuous disclosure violations was not acceptable for a number of reasons. First, private funding would suggest that the regulator was indirectly financed by the entities that it is charged with regulating, raising conflict of interest issues. Second, SRA staff employed under private sector funding directed to continuous disclosure violations could tend to work in a separate camp from the regular staff, with the potential for divisiveness within the SRA. Third, private sector funding would cloud the issue of the necessity and appropriateness of adequate government funding.

The Deterrent Value of Private Enforcement

5.9 The Committee also explored the limits to the role that any regulator can play in seeking redress on behalf of private parties. The role of a regulator is subject to government policy choices, regardless of the harm done in any specific case. It is subject to resource limitations and bureaucratic priorities. It would invite pressure on SRA staff to undertake costly, time consuming investigations into matters that further private interests. The Committee heard evidence that bureaucratic priorities would tend to favour the public interest over private interests, even though the "substitute action" is provided in some securities legislation.[65]

Bureaucratic priorities tend to favour the public interest over private interests.

5.10 The debate over the relative merits of public regulation and private enforcement is not limited to capital markets regulation. There has been a long debate conducted in both Canada and the U.S.[66] and regulatory reform in Canada in the form of amendments to the federal *Competition Act*, introduced in 1996,[67] which would shift the emphasis on enforcement of misleading advertising and deceptive marketing practices from criminal sanctions to new civil procedures.

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[65] E.g., Ontario *Securities Act*, s. 128, discussed above.

[66] See, e.g., Neil Finkelstein and Jack Quinn, "Re-evaluating the Role of Private Enforcement and Private Party Access to the Competition Tribunal," unpublished manuscript, 1995; Bureau of Competition Policy, "Competition Act Amendments: Discussion Paper," Ottawa, Industry Canada, 1995; and Kent Roach and Michael Trebilcock, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law," Fraser Institute Conference.

[67] Bill C-67, An Act to amend the Competition Act, introduced Nov. 7, 1996.

5.11 The nature of the debate is set out in an article by Michael Trebilcock and Kent Roach. The tendency to assume that laws designed to benefit the public should be enforced by public authorities while laws designed to regulate private affairs should be enforced by private actors is an oversimplification given the dominant role played by private prosecutions historically.[68] The rationale for private enforcement is, in part:

> The private enforcement of public laws can act as a check on the monopoly power of enforcement that public authorities would otherwise enjoy. A private individual who has suffered a violation may be in a better position and have better information to enforce public laws than a public official. It is the aggrieved person not the public official who has the greatest incentive to seek corrective justice in the form of damages or other remedies.[69]

5.12 The assumption that public laws should be administered by public officials has persisted in Canada, while in the U.S. private enforcement has been facilitated. However, Canadian attitudes toward private enforcement are changing:

Private remedies cannot serve in any practical sense as an alternative to regulatory enforcement.
— McCarthy Tétrault

> Canadian faith in governments has been sorely tested in recent years and private enforcement can increase the accountability of public officials. ... In addition, a growing lack of consensus about what is in the public interest in Canadian society makes exclusive public enforcement more problematic and suggests that private individuals and groups be allowed an opportunity to advance their claims that they act in the public interest. Finally in times of fiscal restraint, the prospect of attracting private resources to the enterprise of enforcing public laws is appealing.[70]

5.13 Arguments can be made that private enforcement is inefficient and less co-ordinated than public enforcement, that private actors may act against the public interest, e.g., foster over-deterrence or substitute individual objects for the public purpose of the legislation and may disrupt public policy. Arguments can also be made that private enforcement can supplement public enforcement, that public enforcement of private matters is not a rational allocation of resources, that public enforcers may be subject to industry capture and that private enforcement is superior in achieving corrective justice. Trebilcock and Roach conclude that:

You will have much better compliance with a system that rationally deploys private actions into the enforcement scheme.
— Professor James D. Cox, Duke University School of Law

> Private enforcement can supplement public resources with private initiative and information. This is particularly compelling if the public resources devoted to

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[68] Roach and Trebilcock, at 1.
[69] *Ibid.*, at 2.
[70] *Ibid.*, at 3.

> enforcement are modest or diminishing and there is a need for jurisprudence to flesh out the general standards contained in the public law. ... Private enforcement can also be an effective and efficient means of holding public enforcers accountable for decisions not to prosecute. Finally, private as opposed to public enforcement can allow plaintiffs to achieve corrective justice and seek remedies for both past and future harms.[71]

Although the study quoted above focuses on competition laws, the principles articulated in it apply to any area of public policy and regulation where private individuals may seek redress for harms suffered.

5.14 After extensive deliberation, the Committee has concluded that, while adequate funding for SRAs is essential for regulation of Canada's capital markets, it will not, on its own, provide a sufficient deterrent to continuous disclosure violations. The Committee believes that the additional deterrence represented by private plaintiffs armed with a realistic remedy will be important in ensuring compliance with continuous disclosure rules in Canada. All regulators to whom the Committee has spoken, including representatives of the SEC, believe strongly that compliance is best accomplished through a combination of regulatory enforcement and private enforcement. These views, in part, prompted the recommendations for a regime of statutory civil liability.

Compliance is best accomplished through a combination of regulatory enforcement and private enforcement.

5.15 Provision of civil remedies for a misrepresentation in a prospectus, although controversial in 1933, is now accepted as a common sense solution. Extension of similar remedies to secondary markets in the U.S. required heroic judicial ingenuity in development of the concept of "fraud on the market" to replace the necessity of proof of individual reliance. Flaws in the U.S. model led to extortionate litigation and statutory reform. The Committee's model attempts to avoid the flaws but leave prosecutorial discretion, and the risk of losing an ill-founded action, in the hands of private sector market participants who are aggrieved by an issuer's disclosure.

5.16 The Committee sought to construct a model that would achieve a reasonable balance between investors on the one hand and issuers on the other. The choice is between a bureaucratic model and a market enforcement model that can be enforced as of right by market participants. There is an important role for private enforcement in deterring disclosure violations. Our model is found in Chapter 6.

The choice is between a bureaucratic model and a market enforcement model that can be enforced as of right by market participants.

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[71] *Ibid.*, at 24.

TAB 4

Indexed as:

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada and Montreal Trust Co. as trustee of debentures issued by Algoma Steel Corp. under a trust indenture, and Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Hongkong Bank of Canada and the Toronto-Dominion Bank in their capacity as holders of debentures issued pursuant to the trust indenture

[1992] O.J. No. 889

8 O.R. (3d) 449

93 D.L.R. (4th) 98

55 O.A.C. 303

11 C.B.R. (3d) 11

34 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1109

Action No. C11707

Court of Appeal for Ontario,

Krever, McKinlay and Labrosse JJ.A.

April 30, 1992

Counsel:

D.J.T. Mungovan and Debbie A. Campbell, for Kelsey-Hayes Canada Ltd. and Kelsey-Hayes Co.

M.E. Royce and M.E. Barrack, for Algoma Steel Corp.

W.L.N. Somerville, Q.C., and B.H. Bresner, for Royal Insurance Co. of Canada.

R.N. Robertson, Q.C., and W. Alfred Apps, for Dofasco Inc.

1 THE COURT:-- This is a motion for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, an appeal, under the provisions of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (CCAA), from the order of Farley J. dismissing a motion for the valuation of the claim of Kelsey-Hayes Canada Limited (Kelsey-Hayes) and for leave to bring proceedings against the Algoma Steel Corporation Limited (Algoma), the subject of a plan of arrangement under the CCAA.

2 Kelsey-Hayes is involved in product liability litigation in Missouri as a result of serious personal injuries suffered by a child when a wheel broke away from a Dodge truck and struck him. The wheel was manufactured by Kelsey-Hayes against whom a Missouri jury awarded a verdict in excess of four million dollars (U.S.). That verdict was set aside by the trial judge on the basis that Chrysler Corporation, the truck's manufacturer, had been improperly dismissed from the action at an earlier stage. The setting aside of the verdict was appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, but judgment on the appeal has been reserved. Kelsey-Hayes, the defendant in the Missouri litigation, alleges that the steel used for the manufacture of the errant wheel was a defective product of Algoma and seeks to claim contribution or indemnity from Algoma in order to be able to pursue, under s. 132 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, the proceeds of a product liability insurance policy by which Algoma is insured by the Royal Insurance Company of Canada (Royal). It also seeks relief under the plan of arrangement in respect of the amount of any liability Algoma may have to it in excess of the policy limits.

3 In the CCAA proceedings an order was made by Montgomery J. in the terms of s. 11(c) of the CCAA that no action or other proceeding may be proceeded with or commenced against Algoma except with the leave of the court. It is common ground that Kelsey-Hayes, by reason of its claim against Algoma, is a known designated unsecured creditor of Algoma, as defined in the plan of arrangement. The plan of arrangement, which has been voted on by all classes of affected creditors, and sanctioned, subject to the outcome of this appeal, by an order of Farley J. dated April 26, 1992, provides that upon payment by Algoma to a trustee of a certain sum in payment of the claims of the specified unsecured creditors, "all Claims of Specified Unsecured Creditors will be released, discharged and cancelled".

4 After Kelsey-Hayes notified Algoma of the litigation in Missouri, of its allegation of defective steel against Algoma, and of its claim in the amount of the Missouri verdict, Algoma responded by valuing the claim at the sum of one dollar. Kelsey-Hayes thereupon applied to the court, under the provisions of s. 12(2)(iii) of the CCAA , for the determination of the amount of its claim. Before the application was heard, Kelsey-Hayes enlarged the relief sought to include that described above and Royal was brought into the proceedings. Mr. Justice Farley held that he had no authority to permit Kelsey-Hayes to proceed against Algoma and went on to confirm the valuation of the claim at one dollar. The essential issue in this appeal is whether, under the CCAA, the fact that the plan of arrangement now exists prevents the court from permitting Algoma from being proceeded against by Kelsey-Hayes even to the limited extent of the insurance proceeds.

5 We are of the view that, however weak the evidence available on the application may have been with respect to the origin of the steel used in the manufacture of the wheel, and thus the case against Algoma, it cannot be said that the case is without any foundation or is frivolous. The fact that s. 12(2)(iii) provides that the amount of a creditor's claim, if not admitted by the company, "shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor", does not compel the court to determine the valuation summarily. The provision simply authorizes the proceedings to be brought summarily, that is, by way of originating notice of motion or application

rather than by the lengthier, and more complicated, procedure of an action. In an appropriate case, therefore, there is no reason why the determination cannot be made after a trial either of an issue or an action, in the course of which production and discovery would be available. In the absence of such a trial, it cannot be said, in our view, that the valuation of the claim of Kelsey-Hayes against Algoma in the sum of one dollar is correct.

6 The more difficult question is whether the court has jurisdiction to authorize proceedings now that the plan of arrangement is in place. It is submitted that it does not because of the need for commercial certainty and because to do so would be to amend the plan of arrangement (which extinguishes the claims of all designated unsecured creditors of which Kelsey-Hayes is certainly one). The plan of arrangement is a matter of contract, it is argued, and the court's jurisdiction is limited to sanctioning or refusing to sanction the arrangement arrived at contractually. There is much merit in this argument but, in our view, it is not a complete answer.

7 Kelsey-Hayes does not deny that if the language of the plan of arrangement quoted above, extinguishing the claims of designated unsecured creditors, is unambiguous, as we believe it is, to grant the relief which it seeks would require an amendment by the court of the plan of arrangement. We accept the submission that, generally speaking, the plan of arrangement is consensual and the result of agreement and that if it is fair and reasonable (an issue for the court to decide) it is not to be interfered with by the court unless (a) the Act authorizes the court to affect the plan and (b) there are compelling reasons justifying the court's action. Generally speaking again, the court ought not to interfere where to do so would prejudice the interests of the company or the creditors. But where no prejudice would result and the needs of justice are to be met, the court may act if the CCAA, properly interpreted, authorizes intervention. In this connection, it may be relevant that, although it is hardly conclusive, Algoma's management information circular to creditors, shareholders and employees, which accompanied the proposed plan of arrangement, advised those persons, under the heading "Court Approval of the Plan" as follows:

> The authority of the Court is very broad under both the CCAA and the OBCA -- Algoma has been advised by counsel that the Court will consider, among other things, the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The Court may approve the Plan as proposed or as amended in any manner that the Court may direct and subject to compliance with such terms and conditions, if any, as the Court thinks fit.

(Emphasis added)

We agree that the circular's statement that the court may direct an amendment of the plan does not, as a matter of law, make it so. The CCAA must be the authority for the jurisdiction and the critical issue is whether there is any provision in the Act that fairly gives rise to a power in the court to amend. In our view there is such a provision and that provision, s. 11(c), depending on the language of the plan itself, may by necessary inference, in an appropriate case, enable the court to make an order, the technical effect of which is that the plan is amended. The relevant portion of the section reads as follows:

> . . . whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,
>
> . . . . .

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

(Emphasis added)

8 As we have already pointed out, an order in the terms of this provision was made early in the proceedings by Montgomery J. The effect of the enactment and the order is to empower the court to grant leave to take proceedings against Algoma in appropriate circumstances. It was submitted that this power, having regard to the commercial realities reflected by the CCAA, is one that may be exercised only before the creditors have voted to accept the plan of arrangement. No authority could be cited to support such a circumscription of the court's jurisdiction, unqualifiedly conferred by the statute. Nor, as a matter of principle, is there any reason to suggest that the scheme created by the CCAA contemplates a role for the court as a mere rubber stamp or one that is simply administrative rather than judicial. On the other hand, we have no doubt that, given the primacy accorded by the Act to agreement among the affected actors, the jurisdiction of the court is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances only, if the result of the exercise is to amend the plan, even in merely a technical way. In this case, for example, it would be an unacceptable exercise of jurisdiction if the effect of granting leave to Kelsey-Hayes to proceed against Algoma would be to render vulnerable to possible execution any assets other than insurance proceeds, if any, that may be available under the policy by which Royal insured Algoma against product liability. If the leave granted could be so limited, and that is the difficulty that must be addressed, the plan of arrangement which, in its terms, extinguishes the claims of designated unsecured creditors, would undergo amendment in an insignificant and technical way only, as far as the other creditors are concerned.

9 The concern of prejudice must now be considered and the question asked whether any interests would be affected detrimentally if Kelsey-Hayes were permitted to claim against Algoma to the extent only of recourse to the insurance proceeds. If to give leave had the effect of giving potential access to assets over and above the policy limits, there would indeed be prejudice to several interests and, moreover, the plan of arrangement would be significantly amended. On the premise that only the insurance proceeds were to be made potentially available to satisfy any judgment that Kelsey-Hayes may be awarded in its claim over against Algoma, it cannot be said that any interest is affected adversely except possibly that of Royal and that of Dofasco Inc. (Dofasco). It is to that issue that we now turn.

10 The potential liability of Royal to Kelsey-Hayes as insurer of Algoma arises out of the provisions of s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act, which read as follows:

> 132.(1) Where a person incurs a liability for injury or damage to the person or property of another, and is insured against such liability, and fails to satisfy a judgment awarding damages against the person in respect of the person's liability, and an execution against the person in respect thereof is returned unsatisfied, the person entitled to the damages may recover by action against the insurer the amount of the judgment up to the face value of the policy, but subject to the same equities as the insurer would have if the judgment had been satisfied.

Royal is potentially answerable to Kelsey-Hayes, a third party with respect to Algoma's policy of insurance only by virtue of this statutory provision but, in any third-party claim against it, its liability is "subject to the same equities as the insurer would have if the judgment had been satisfied". Prejudice, in a legal sense, as far as Royal is concerned is non-existent.

11 The question of prejudice to Dofasco is more difficult. Its interest arises in this way. As part of the comprehensive restructuring scheme of which the plan of arrangement is the central part, Algoma's assets are to be transferred to a new corporate entity, referred to in argument as New Algoma, in which Algoma's shareholders and creditors (whose claims are being compromised and otherwise discharged) are to receive shares. The funds to make this possible are to be supplied by Dofasco in the sum of 30 million dollars. In return, Dofasco is to obtain Algoma's tax loss in the sum of $150 million. The result of these transactions as contemplated by the comprehensive scheme is that Algoma is to become devoid of assets and creditors, in short, that Algoma is to be made a "clean corporation", or a mere shell with a tax loss carry-forward. Dofasco filed no material and, on the appeal filed no factum, showing any prejudice which it might suffer if leave to proceed is granted. Instead, in oral argument, it submitted that any such order would impair the integrity of the plan of arrangement and reduce the certainty that was necessary for the plan's success. In our view, no impairment will occur if an order is made subject to sufficient safeguards to limit any possible recovery to the insurance proceeds. We think a safeguard can be provided. The difficulty is in the language of s. 132 of the Insurance Act which requires, as a condition precedent to a direct action against the insurer, that an execution against the insured be returned unsatisfied.

12 This very requirement makes the purpose of the section clear. It is to provide direct access to an insurer, by a person incurring the liability referred to in the section, in a situation where the insured is judgment-proof, thus circumventing the normal operation of insurance contracts, which is solely to indemnify the insured against loss. To interpret the section in such a way as to apply only in the narrow situation where the insured is judgment-proof (and therefore almost certainly insolvent), but not in situations where either the insured or its creditors have taken proceedings pursuant to federal insolvency statutes, would be to frustrate its objectives in a large percentage of situations where it would otherwise apply.

13 If the plaintiff in this case were successful in the Missouri action against Kelsey-Hayes and Kelsey-Hayes were successful in a permitted claim over for indemnity or contribution from Algoma, there could be no question that, notionally, the condition precedent of an unsatisfied judgment would be met because, prior to the plan Algoma was insolvent and the commencement of proceedings under the CCAA rendered it judgment-proof. To secure the certainty of the integrity of the plan, which Dofasco argues it needs in order to discharge its role in the scheme, we make clear our intention that only any insurance proceeds that may become available to Algoma are to be the subject of any recovery against Algoma that Kelsey-Hayes may prove that it is entitled to. That is to be accomplished by providing in our order that neither the assets of Algoma (other than the insurance proceeds) nor the assets of any other corporation which may become responsible in any way for any liabilities of Algoma by virtue of the operation of the plan of arrangement or the more comprehensive scheme of restructuring, or any condition precedent thereto, shall be available to satisfy any judgment obtained as a result of any proceedings by Kelsey-Hayes against Algoma.

14 The justice of permitting an amendment to the plan as inconsequential as the one we permit in these exceptional circumstances is illustrated by the hypothetical case put in argument. Suppose a visitor had become quadriplegic as a result of an injury on the premises of Algoma under circum-

stances in which Algoma as occupier might be liable and suppose Algoma's potential liability was insured against by an appropriate insurance policy. To restrict the injured person, a known designated unsecured creditor under the terms of the plan of arrangement, to his or her compromised claim valued, without a trial, in a summary proceeding, would, in our view, be unacceptable. The actual situation before the court is analogous.

15 For these reasons, we grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal, set aside the order of Farley J. dated April 9, 1992, and grant leave to Kelsey-Hayes to proceed as it may be advised in the terms set out above.

Order accordingly.

TAB 5

Case Name:

Carey Canada Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF s. 18.6 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1995, c. C-36, as amended AND IN THE MATTER OF Carey Canada Inc.

[2006] O.J. No. 4905

29 C.B.R. (5th) 81

153 A.C.W.S. (3d) 777

2006 CarswellOnt 7748

Court File No. 04-CL-05660

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

S.N. Lederman J.

Heard: November 28, 2006.
Judgment: December 8, 2006.

(18 paras.)

Civil procedure -- Trials -- Stay of proceedings -- Application by a company subject to a stay under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to stay two actions against it dismissed -- Respondents were entitled to seek judgment against the applicant and to enforce it only against the applicant's liability insurance policies.

Insolvency law -- Legislation -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Application by a company subject to a stay under the Act to stay two actions against it dismissed -- Respondents were entitled to seek judgment against the applicant and to enforce it only against the applicant's liability insurance policies.

Insurance law -- Actions -- By third parties against insurer -- Application by a company subject to a stay under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to stay two actions against it dismissed --

Respondents were entitled to seek judgment against the applicant and to enforce it only against the applicant's liability insurance policies.

Application by Carey Canada Inc. for an order to permanently stay claims asserted by the respondents against it in two actions commenced in Ontario -- Actions were commenced in March and May 2004 and arose out of the alleged environmental contamination of property -- Carey obtained an order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act in 2005 -- Order recognized and enforced in Canada the General Claims Bar Order and Confirmation Order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court in connection with a joint plan of reorganization of Carey and its parent company -- Both orders contained terms that set out comprehensive stays of proceedings and injunctions against any action to be taken against Carey -- Respondents applied to lift the stay and to continue the actions against Carey for the limited purpose of obtaining judgments against Carey which would be enforceable only against its liability insurance policies -- HELD: Carey's application dismissed -- Respondents' application allowed -- It was appropriate to lift the stay because the Act was meant to protect debtors like Carey -- It was not meant to insulate its insurers from providing appropriate indemnification -- There was no prejudice to Carey in lifting the stay to allow the respondents to pursue the insurance proceeds -- Insurers would also not be prejudiced because their rights and options were the same whether or not Carey was subject to proceedings under the Act -- Insurers would be able to assert why the claims against Carey were not covered by the policies -- Respondents could therefore pursue the actions to obtain judgment against Carey and to enforce it only against any relevant insurance policies and not against Carey's current or future assets.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 18.6, s. 18.6(4)

Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I-8, s. 132(1)

Counsel:

Andrea Burke, for Canplas Industries Ltd.

Eric Golden, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario As represented by the Minister of Transportation

Robert Frank, for ITW Canada Management Company

Craig Hill, for Cary Canada Inc.

ENDORSEMENT

S.N. LEDERMAN J.:--

Nature of the Motions

1 Carey Canada Inc. ("Carey") brings a motion for an order permanently staying the claims asserted by the Respondents against Carey in two related actions commenced in Ontario in March 2004 and May 2004 arising out of the alleged environmental contamination of property.

2 In 2005, Carey sought and obtained from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, an order pursuant to section 18.6(4) of the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended (the "CCAA") recognizing and enforcing in Canada the General Claims Bar Order and Confirmation Order, issued by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in connection with the modified Joint Plan of Reorganization of Carey's parent and Carey. Both of the orders contained terms setting out comprehensive stays of proceedings and injunctions against any action to be taken against Carey. Carey relies upon the Recognition Order of Hoy J. dated April 4, 2005 as the basis for permanently staying the Respondents' claims against Carey.

3 The position of the Respondents is that there should not be a stay as:

(1) the U.S. Bankruptcy Court orders on which Carey relies in seeking the stay do not capture the Respondents' claims against Carey within their scope; and
(2) the relevant circumstances do no justify this court exercising its discretion to grant a stay.

4 In the alternative, the Respondents bring a cross-motion for an order lifting any stay and permitting them to continue the actions against Carey for the limited purpose of allowing them to obtain judgments against Carey which shall be enforceable only against the liability insurance policies naming Carey as an insured or that otherwise provide coverage for Carey in respect of the matters in issue in the Ontario actions.

Hoy J's Order

5 In granting the Recognition Order, Hoy J. expressly stated that she was not deciding the issue of whether the claims set out in the Ontario actions come within the provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court orders and are, therefore, stayed. She indicated that that issue would be left to be argued on another occasion, but in the meantime, she ordered that the Ontario actions were exempted from the stay on the terms and conditions that there be production of any relevant insurance policy and the delivery of an Affidavit of Documents by Carey in the actions which might on consideration make any further motion unnecessary. The following paragraphs in Hoy J.'s reasons state as follows:

> [13] Carey withdraws its request for an order specifically staying the claims of the Respondents, without prejudice to its right to subsequently seek such an order. Carey's position, however, is that the effect of the order sought would be to stay the Respondents' claims. Carey also advises that its request for recognition is restricted to the Orders.
>
> ...
>
> [36] In addition, assuming, but not determining, that the Orders apply to the Actions, the order shall specifically exempt the Actions from its application on the following terms and conditions:
>
> 1. If it has not already done so, Carey shall promptly provide to the Respondents a copy of the insurance policy in respect of the Barrie

property, and copies of the correspondence from the insurer denying coverage.

2. Save as hereinafter provided in paragraph 3 below, Carey shall provide its Affidavit of Documents, and copies of all documents referred to therein, to the Respondents within 90 days.

...

[39] Carey takes the position that the Orders capture the claims in the Actions, but the issue was not canvassed before me because Carey abandoned its request for an order specifically staying the Actions. It was content to leave that issue for another day.

[40] I am hopeful that the terms and conditions on which I have specifically exempted the Actions from the application of the order will avoid the need for Respondents to argue that the claims in the Actions are not captured by the Orders. However, given that the matter was not fully addressed before me, the foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the Respondents' right to argue that the Orders do not apply to the claims advanced by them against Carey in the Actions and that the terms and conditions I have imposed with respect to the Actions are therefore not applicable.

Disposition

6 Much argument on the motions before me was devoted to whether, in fact, the environmental claims in issue in the actions fall within or outside the definition of "Claims" as set out in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court orders. It becomes unnecessary for me to decide this issue as I am of the view that even if they do fall within the purview of the stay provisions in the U.S. orders there is justification for lifting any such stay, based on the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada*, et al. (1992), 8 O.R. (3rd) 449.

7 In that case, the court held that the protection afforded by the CCAA was meant for the debtor seeking its protection and not to insulate insurers from providing appropriate indemnification.

8 In *Algoma Steel, supra*, the debtor obtained protection under the CCAA. A creditor sought to amend a court sanctioned Plan of Arrangement and lift the stay of proceedings for the limited purpose of proving its claim and of availing itself of an Algoma insurance policy. However, the Algoma Plan provided *inter alia*, that "all Claims of Specified Unsecured Creditors will be released, discharged, and cancelled" upon payment by Algoma to a trustee of a certain sum in payment of the claims of specified unsecured creditors.

9 The Court of Appeal ordered that the Algoma Plan be amended and the stay of proceedings under the CCAA be lifted, but only for the limited purpose of allowing a creditor to proceed with its action, so that it could attempt to:

(1) establish its claim against the debtor; and
(2) enforce any judgment against the debtor's insurance policy.

10 The Court of Appeal held that there was no prejudice to the debtor as the order lifting the stay of proceedings would explicitly state that any judgment against the debtor was only enforceable

against the insurance proceeds (if any) available to the debtor and not as against the debtor's current or future assets.

11 The Court of Appeal then considered the issue of potential prejudice to the insurer and took into account section 132(1) of the *Insurance Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, and concluded that since the insurer's liability to the applicant in that case was "subject to the same equities as the insurer would have if the judgment had been satisfied", the insurer's prejudice, in a legal sense, was non-existent. The insurer's rights and options would be the same whether the debtor was or was not the subject of a CCAA proceeding.

12 In the instant case, assuming Carey's insurers choose to deny the claims and not defend Carey in the actions, the Respondents would first seek to obtain judgment against Carey and then bring an action against the insurers pursuant to section 132(1) of the *Insurance Act*. At that point, the insurers would have every opportunity to assert their positions as to why the claims against Carey are not covered under the relevant insurance policies.

13 In *Algoma Steel, supra*, the Court of Appeal lifted the stay and made an order with the "technical effect" of amending the Plan so that the applicant could seek recovery against the debtor's insurance policy. In doing so, the court acknowledged that generally it would not do so if it would prejudice the interests of the debtor company or the creditors, but stated at page 453:

> But where no prejudice would result and the needs of justice are to be met, the court may act if the *CCAA*, properly interpreted, authorizes intervention.

14 Counsel for Carey, Mr. Hill, does not take issue with the principles set out in *Algoma Steel, supra*, but points out that the motion to lift the stay was brought before the very court that had created the stay. In the instant case, the Ontario Court is being asked to lift the stay of proceedings created by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the context of the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings. He submits that its not consistent with the principles of comity for the Respondents to ask a Canadian court to pick and choose which provisions should be enforced and which should not. He argues that it is fundamental to the cross-border insolvency process that principles of comity are applied on a two-way street to ensure that the principal matters in the restructuring remain within the control of the court with primary jurisdiction over the debtor's proceedings. He submits that, accordingly, the motion should be brought in the jurisdiction that initiates the stay of proceedings, not the jurisdiction that recognizes and enforces the stay created in the foreign jurisdiction. In that way, the court with primary jurisdiction has the ability to assess a motion to lift the stay of proceedings in the context of the overall restructuring process.

15 However, there are numerous factors in this case that suggest that it is appropriate for the Canadian court to consider the lifting of the stay motion:

(a) it was Carey itself that initiated the motion before the Ontario court expressly seeking a stay of the Ontario actions and accordingly, it is appropriate in the response to that motion for the Respondents to bring this cross-motion;

(b) Ontario is the "natural forum" because Ontario parties and the consideration of environmental claims in respect of property located in Ontario are involved; and

(c) in particular, the application of Ontario law, i.e. section 132(1) of the *Insurance Act*, is best dealt with in this jurisdiction.

16 Accordingly, an Ontario Court may entertain the cross-motion and grant the stay sought on the basis of the *Algoma Steel* principles. The cross-motion is identical to the circumstances in the *Algoma Steel* case in that lifting any stay of proceedings for the limited purposes outlined in the notices of cross-motion and the "technical" amendment of the Carey Plan will have no effect on the debtor company or its creditors. However, it will allow the actions to proceed so that indemnification may be sought by the Respondents from insurers for the remediation of an environmentally contaminated property.

17 Accordingly, I grant the exemption of the actions from any stay of proceedings that may have resulted from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court orders and the Recognition Order as sought in the notices of cross-motion but only for the limited purpose of allowing the Respondents to seek judgment against Carey and to enforce it only against any relevant insurance policy and not against Carey's current or future assets.

18 If the parties cannot agree as to costs, written submissions may be made within 30 days.

S.N. LEDERMAN J.

cp/e/qlbxm/qlcem

TAB 6

Case Name:

ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd.

Between
ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd., Appellant,
and
Bricore Land Group Ltd., Bricore Investment Group Ltd., 624796 Saskatchewan Ltd., 603767 Saskatchewan Ltd., 583261 Saskatchewan Ltd. and Horizon West Management Ltd., Respondents

[2007] S.J. No. 313

2007 SKCA 72

[2007] 9 W.W.R. 79

299 Sask.R. 194

33 C.B.R. (5th) 50

159 A.C.W.S. (3d) 671

2007 CarswellSask 324

Dockets: 1443 and 1452

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal

Klebuc C.J.S., Jackson and Smith JJ.A.

Heard: June 7, 2007.
Judgment: June 25, 2007.

(82 paras.)

Civil procedure -- Costs -- Solicitor and client or substantial indemnity -- As damages or punishment for improper conduct -- Appeal from Supreme Court decision that awarded substantial indem-

nity costs to respondent -- Appeal allowed -- There was no basis upon which to order substantial indemnity costs.

Insolvency law -- Administration of estate -- Actions by or against estate -- Appeal from a Supreme Court decision that denied the appellant leave to commence an action against the bankrupt -- The claim arose on a "post-filing" basis after a restructuring order had been made under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Appeal dismissed -- The order applied to post-filing creditors -- The appellant did not reach the necessary threshold required to allow the action to proceed.

Appeal from a Supreme Court decision that denied ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore. The claim by ICR arose on a "post-filing" basis after a restructuring order had been made under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The restructuring failed. The principal assets of the companies were sold and the net proceeds were being held for distribution. The post-filing claim was asserted against (i) the companies, which were subject to the CCAA order, and (ii) against the companies' Chief Restructuring Officer. ICR claimed a real estate commission with respect to the sale of a building belonging to Bricore. Bricore and four related companies (collectively "Bricore") were all subject to an initial order granted by a Supreme Court judge in January, 2006, pursuant to s. 11(3) of the CCAA. The Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) was appointed by the chambers judge in May, 2006 (the "CRO Order"). The Supreme Court judge remained the supervising CCAA judge from the time of the Initial Order. The Initial Order and the CRO Order imposed a stay of proceedings against Bricore and prohibited the commencement of new actions against Bricore and the CRO without leave of the Court. ICR applied to the supervising judge for directions and, in the alternative, for leave to commence actions against Bricore and the CRO. The supervising judge found that the Initial Order and the CRO Order applied to ICR and that leave of the Court was required. He refused leave and also awarded substantial indemnity costs against ICR. On appeal, ICR raised four issues. First, it alleged that the stay of proceedings imposed did not mean leave to commence an action against Bricore was required. Second, it contended that s. 11.3 of the CCAA did not require that a post-filing claimant was subject to the stay of proceedings imposed by the Initial Order. Third, it claimed that if leave was required, the supervising judge erred when he refused ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore and against the CRO. Finally, ICR contended that the supervising judge erred when he awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

HELD: Appeal allowed in part. The supervising judge erred when he awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis. All other aspects of the appeal were dismissed. The Initial Order applied to post-filing creditors. Leave was required. Ultimately, it was within the discretion of the supervising CCAA judge as to whether the proposed action ought to be allowed to proceed in the face of the stay. ICR did not reach the necessary threshold required to allow the action to proceed. It did not structure its affairs or establish a claim with the specificity that justified the development of a remedy to allow it to participate in the liquidation of the Bricore assets. With respect to costs, there was no basis upon which to order substantial indemnity costs with respect to the application to lift the stay in relation to Bricore, as bad faith was not alleged on its part. With respect to the CRO, the only basis upon which the stay could be lifted was to make an allegation of "bad faith." In the absence of some other factor, ICR could not be faulted for making the very allegation that it was required to make in order to bring its application within the ambit of the stay of proceedings that had been granted.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11(3), s. 11(4), s. 11(6), s. 13

On appeal from Q.B.G. No. 8 of 2006, J.C. Saskatoon

Counsel:

Fred C. Zinkhan for the Appellant.

Jeffrey M. Lee for the Respondents.

Kim Anderson for the Monitor, Ernst & Young.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

JACKSON J.A.:--

I. Introduction

1 This appeal concerns a claim arising on a "post-filing" basis after a restructuring order had been made under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[1] (the "*CCAA*"). The restructuring failed. The principal assets of the companies have been sold and the net proceeds are being held for distribution. The post-filing claim is asserted against: (i) the companies, which are subject to the *CCAA* order; and (ii) against the companies' Chief Restructuring Officer.

2 The post-filing claimant is ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. ("ICR"). ICR claims a real estate commission with respect to the sale of a building belonging to Bricore Land Group Ltd. Bricore Land and four related companies (collectively "Bricore") are all subject to an initial order ("Initial Order") granted by Koch J. on January 4, 2006 pursuant to s. 11(3) of the *CCAA*. The Chief Restructuring Officer, Maurice Duval (the "CRO"), was appointed by Koch J. on May 23, 2006 (the "CRO Order"). Koch J. has been the supervising *CCAA* judge since the Initial Order.

3 The Initial Order and the CRO Order impose the usual stay of proceedings against Bricore and prohibit the commencement of new actions against Bricore and the CRO, without leave of the Court.

4 ICR applied to Koch J. for directions and, in the alternative, for leave to commence actions against Bricore and the CRO. By fiats dated April 9, 2007 and April 25, 2007, Koch J. held that the Initial Order and the CRO Order prohibiting the commencement of actions apply to ICR and that leave of the Court is required. He refused leave and also awarded substantial indemnity costs against ICR.

5 On May 23, 2007, ICR applied in Court of Appeal chambers for leave to appeal, pursuant to s. 13 of the *CCAA,* and received leave to appeal the same day. The appeal was heard on June 7, 2007 and dismissed in relation to the lifting of the stay application and allowed in relation to the costs order on June 13, 2007, with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

II. Issues

6 The issues are:

1. Does the stay of proceedings imposed by the supervising *CCAA* judge J. under the Initial Order apply to an action commenced by ICR, a post-filing claimant, such that leave to commence an action against Bricore is required?
2. Does s. 11.3 of the *CCAA* mean that a post-filing claimant cannot be subject to the stay of proceedings imposed by the Initial Order?
3. If leave is required, did the supervising *CCAA* judge commit a reviewable error in refusing ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore?
4. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge make a reviewable error in refusing leave to commence an action against the CRO?
5. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge err in awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis?

III. Background

7 ICR's claim to a real estate commission arises as a result of these brief facts. Bricore owned four commercial real estate properties in Saskatoon and three such properties in Regina (the "Bricore Properties"). ICR argued that it had marketed one of the Regina properties, known as the Department of Education Building (the "Building"), to the City of Regina.

8 Bricore sold the Building, at a purchase price of $700,000,[2] to a proposed purchaser, which assigned its interest to 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. 101086849 Saskatchewan in its turn sold the Building to the City of Regina for a price of $1,075,000.[3] The certificate of title to the Building issued in early January, 2007 to 101086849 Saskatchewan, and the certificate of title issued to the City of Regina in late January, 2007. The Building came to be sold pursuant to a series of Court Orders made by Koch J., which I will now summarize.

9 As I have indicated, the Initial Order was made on January 4, 2006. On February 13, 2006 Koch J. appointed CMN Calgary Inc. as an Officer of the Court to pursue opportunities and to solicit offers for the sale or refinancing of the Bricore Properties. He also authorized Bricore to enter into an agreement with CMN Calgary dated as of January 30, 2006 entitled "Exclusive Authority To Solicit Offers To Purchase."

10 In May 2006, it was determined that Bricore could not be reorganized and, therefore, all the Bricore Properties should be sold. On May 23, 2006, Koch J. appointed Maurice Duval, C.A., of Saskatoon, Saskatchewan as an officer of the Court to act as CRO, and to assist with the sale of the assets.

11 The CRO Order confers these powers on the CRO pertaining to the proposed sale of the Bricore Properties:

(e) subject to the stay of proceedings in effect in these proceedings, the power to take steps for the preservation and protection of the Bricore Properties, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, (i) the right to make payments to persons, if any, having charges or encumbrances on the Bricore Properties or any part or parts thereof on or after the date of this Order, which payments shall include payments in respect of realty taxes owing in respect of any of the Bricore Properties, (ii) the right to make repairs and improvements to the Bricore Properties or any parts thereof and (iii) the right to make payments for ongoing services in respect of the Bricore Properties;

. . .

(g) subject to paragraphs 7C, 7D and 7E hereof, **the power to work with,** [illegible] Bricore Properties in a manner substantially in accordance with the process and proposed timeline for solicitation of such offers to purchase the Bricore Properties recommended by the Monitor in the Monitor's Third Report. ...[4] [Emphasis added.]

12 On June 19, 2006, Koch J. authorized the CRO to accept an offer to purchase the Bricore Properties, including the Building, made by an undisclosed purchaser (the "Proposed Purchaser"), which offer to purchase was filed with the Court and temporarily sealed. The order directed that any further negotiations between the CRO and the Proposed Purchaser were to be completed by August 1, 2006.

13 Negotiations were protracted resulting in a further series of orders:

(a) August 1, 2006: Koch J. extended the timeframe for due diligence and further negotiations to be completed by August 15, 2006;[5]
(b) August 18, 2006: Koch J. authorized the CRO to accept an Amended Offer to Purchase made the 15th day of August, 2006. The Amended Offer to Purchase contemplated the sale by Bricore to the Proposed Purchaser of six of the seven Bricore Properties including the Building;[6]
(c) September 25, 2006: The closing date for the proposed sale by Bricore to the Proposed Purchaser of the six properties was extended from October 15, 2006 to November 15, 2006;[7]
(d) October 10, 2006: Koch J. approved the sale of the six properties to their respective purchasers; in the case of the Building, it was sold to 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd.[8]

Koch J. ultimately approved the sale of the Building to 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. as of November 30, 2006.

14 ICR said it had introduced the City of Regina to the opportunity to purchase the Building and it was therefore entitled to a real estate commission based on the sale price to the City of Regina. Once its claim was denied by the Monitor, ICR applied to Koch J. on March 22, 2007 contending

that (a) "prior Orders of this Court requiring leave to commence action" against Bricore and the CRO "do not apply in the circumstances"; and (b) in the alternative, "it is entitled to an order granting leave to commence the proposed proceedings." In support of its notice of motion, ICR filed a draft statement of claim and a supporting affidavit with exhibits.

15 This is the substance of ICR's draft statement of claim against Bricore and the CRO:

> 4. At all material times Duval's actions in relation to the matters in issue in the within proceedings were carried out in his capacity as chief restructuring officer for the Bricore Group.
>
> ...
>
> 7. Duval, pursuant to Order of the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, was authorized in accordance in such order to market various assets of the Bricore Group, including the [Building]. [sic]
> 8. In the course of his efforts to market the [Building], Duval enlisted the aid of the plaintiff and its commercial realtors, licensed as brokers under *The Real Estate Act*.
> 9. The plaintiff, in its efforts to market the properties of the Bricore Group under the direction of Duval, including the [Building], introduced a prospective purchaser to Duval, namely the City of Regina.
> 10. By agreement dated September 27, 2006 made between the Plaintiff, the Bricore Group and Duval, it was agreed that the Plaintiff would be protected as the agent of record to a commission for the sale of any of the Bricore Group Properties for which the Plaintiff had located a purchaser.
> 11. The Plaintiff says that at the time of execution of the said Agreement by Duval on September 28, 2006, the City of Regina was in the process of doing its "due diligence" on the [Building] and it was expected that a sale of the [Building] to the City of Regina would be completed in the near future.
> 12. The Plaintiff says that, contrary to the Agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, Duval, **without the Plaintiff's knowledge and in bad faith,** proceeded to arrange to sell the [Building] to a third party, namely 101086849 Saskatchewan ltd., which became the owner of the [Building] on or about January 3, 2007.[9] [Emphasis added.]

16 While the words "bad faith" are not repeated in the affidavit evidence, Paul Mehlsen, the principal of ICR, swore an affidavit in support of the application for leave, stating that he had examined the statement of claim and that to the best of his knowledge the allegations contained therein are true. His affidavit also states:

> 13. Insofar as the attached letter states that "ICR is protected as agent of record", this is commonly understood in the industry as meaning that in the event a sale of the property took place in the protected period to a purchaser introduced by the agent of record, then they would receive the usual commission for such sale, which in this case would be 5%.

14. It would appear from the attached exhibit "A" that Larry Ruf arranged to have the Respondent, Maurice Duval, agree to the arrangement, as well as adding that the protection would extend to the closing of any sale or December 31, 2006, whichever was the earlier.
15. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit "B" to this my Affidavit is a true copy of an email dated October 31, 2006 from Larry Ruf to Evan Hubick, Jim Kambeitz and Jim Thompson of the proposed plaintiff, ICR. Such email states in part:

> I can confirm, on behalf of the CRO, that protection for the potential deals referenced in your letter of September 27, 2006 will be honoured to November 30, 2006.[10]

17 Exhibit "A" is a letter dated September 27, 2006 from Mr. Jim Thompson of ICR to Mr. Larry Ruf of Horizon West Management Inc. It reads, in material part, as follows:

> Please be advised that we have had ongoing discussions with potential buyers and tenants as follows:
>
> 1. 1500 - 4th Avenue [Department of Education Building] - we have been in regular contact with the City of Regina Real Estate Department for over a year regarding the possibility of this site being acquired by the City. In July a large contingent of City employees including a number from the Works and Engineering Department toured the building over several hours. We have had continuous follow up with a Real Estate Department official who confirmed recently that there still is an interest in the property and officials are in the due diligence stage. In addition, we have exposed the property to Alfords Furniture and Flooring who have an ongoing interest.
>
> . . .
>
> The purpose of this memo is to reinforce our ongoing efforts to market and represent the Bricore assets in Regina. We are aware that the properties are under contract to sell and request that ICR be protected in the specific situations as outlined.
>
> In the event we are not able to carry on in a formal fashion we would ask that you sign where indicated to acknowledge that ICR is protected as the agent of record for the Tenants/Buyers noted herein for a period to extend to December 31, 2006.[11]

The words "December 31, 2006" are struck out and these words are added: "Date of closing of a sale or December 31, 2006 whichever is earlier." Mr. Ruf's name is crossed out and the signature of Maurice Duval, Chief Restructuring Officer is added in its place.

18 Mr. Ruf, on behalf of Bricore, refuted ICR's claim in a sworn affidavit stating:

3. At no time did I approach ICR Regina in 2006 to initiate discussions regarding the sale or lease of the Department of Education Building.
4. I received two or three unsolicited telephone calls regarding the Department of Education Building in September of 2006 from representatives of ICR Regina (including Paul Mehlsen, Jim Kambeitz and Evan Hubick). During those calls, representatives of ICR Regina informed me that they knew of certain parties who would be interested in purchasing the Department of Education Building. In response to each of these inquiries, I informed representatives of ICR:

(a) that I had no authority to participate in communications regarding a sale of the Department of Education Building, and that all such inquiries should be directed to Maurice Duval, the court-appointed Chief Restructuring Officer of Bricore Group; and

(b) that further information on the status of the restructuring of Bricore Group could be obtained on the website of MLT.[12]

19 The CRO filed a report in response to ICR:

6. At the time of my review of the September 27, 2006 letter from ICR Regina, I was working very hard to attempt to negotiate and conclude the final closing of the sale of the Bricore Properties to the purchasers identified in the Accepted Offer to Purchase. I fully expected that sale to close (as it ultimately did effective November 30, 2006). However, I determined that, in the event that such sale failed to close, Bricore Group would need to identify other potential purchasers of the Bricore Properties very quickly. I therefore decided that it would be appropriate for Bricore Group, by the CRO, to agree to protect ICR Regina for a commission in the unlikely event that the sale contemplated by the Accepted Offer to Purchase did not close, and it subsequently became necessary for Bricore Group instead to conclude a sale of the Bricore Properties to one or more of the prospective purchasers of the three Bricore Properties located in Regina (as specifically identified in Mr. Thompson's September 27, 2006 letter). For that reason, and that reason only, I agreed to sign the September 27, 2006 letter.
7. In signing the September 27, 2006 letter, my intention, as court-appointed CRO of Bricore Group, was to strike an agreement that, in the unlikely event that:

(a) the sale of the Bricore Properties identified in the Accepted Offer to Purchase fell apart; and

(b) it subsequently became necessary for Bricore Group to sell the Bricore Properties to one or more of the prospective purchasers identified in the September 27, 2006 letter;

then Bricore Group would agree to pay a commission to ICR Regina. In regard to the Department of Education Building located at 1500 - 4th Avenue in Regina (the "Department of Education Building"), the two prospective purchasers in respect of which ICR Regina was protected for a commission were the City of Regina and Alford's Furniture and Flooring. The reference to closing date was to the closing of the Avenue Sale, which occurred effective November 30, 2006.

8. In January of 2007, after much effort and expenditure of resources, the sale of the Bricore Properties contemplated in the Accepted Offer to Purchase was unconditionally closed (effective November 30, 2006). The entity named as purchaser of the Department of Education Building in the final closing documents was a numbered Saskatchewan company controlled by Avenue Commercial Group of Calgary. Such entity was a nominee corporation operating entirely at arm's length from the City of Regina and Bricore Group. At all times after June 2006, the CRO had no authority to sell the property, as it was already sold.
9. It was subsequently brought to my attention that the numbered company which purchased the Department of Education Building had promptly "flipped" such property to the City of Regina. I knew nothing of such a proposed flip prior to learning of it from ICR Regina.[13]

20 To rebut this, Mr. Mehlsen of ICR swore a further affidavit deposing:

3. As indicated in my Affidavit sworn March 22, 2007, ICR had an ongoing relationship with the Bricore Companies prior to 2006. This relationship continued after the Initial Order in January 2006 in that ICR continued to show Bricore Properties for lease or sale, including the [Building].
4. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit E to this my Affidavit is a true copy of an e-mail from my contact at the City of Regina ... dated April 13, 2006 advising that the City was interested in purchasing the [Building].
5. I immediately passed this information along to Larry Ruf, as evidenced in the e-mail dated April 13, 2006 attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "F" to this my affidavit.
6. In reply to paras. 2 and 12 of Mr. Duval's Report, it was not known to ICR that all of the Bricore Properties were sold as claimed; rather, it was known that some of the Bricore Properties had been sold, but not the subject property, [the Building], as it was the "ugly duckling" of the Bricore Properties and therefore had been excluded from the reported sale. ICR's efforts were directed at the sale of [the Building] and leasing the other two Regina properties.
7. In response to para. 13 of Mr. Duval's Report, it is true that there were no direct communications between ICR and Mr. Duval as all communications were with Larry Ruf, who indicated that he acted under the authority and with the knowledge of Mr. Duval.
8. As a result of contact in early summer with Mr. Ruf, ICR actively marketed the [Building] by placing signage on the property, developing an "information" or "fact" sheet detailing aspects of the building, and showed the property to the City of Regina and other prospective purchasers.

. . .

11. Because of delays on the part of the City of Regina in its due diligence and the fact that ICR has been working without any formal agreement, I caused the letter of September 27, 2006 (exhibit "A" to my Affidavit sworn March 22, 2007) to be sent.

12. At no time did either Mr. Ruf or Mr. Duval advise that the [Building] was sold and that ICR's role was merely that of a "backup offer". The signed letter of September 27, 2006 and Mr. Ruf 's e-mail of October 31, 2006 make no mention of these events and this was never disclosed to myself or ICR.

. . .

14. In hindsight, it would appear that the confidential information concerning the intention of the City of Regina to purchase the [Building] that was provided by myself and representatives of ICR to Mr. Ruf and Mr. Duval was communicated to the [Proposed Purchaser], who then incorporated 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. to take advantage of this opportunity. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit "I" to this my Affidavit is a true copy of a Profile Report from the Corporate Registry indicating that 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. was incorporated by solicitors as a "shelf company" on May 31, 2006, with new Directors in the form of Garry Bobke and Steven Butt taking office on August 17, 2006.
15. My understanding is that the [Proposed Purchaser] initially excluded the [Building] from their offer to purchase the Bricore Group properties and made a separate offer through 101086849 Saskatchewan Ltd. when they were made aware of the confidential information about the City of Regina's plans to purchase the property.[14]

21 In refusing ICR leave to commence action, Koch J. wrote:

> [1] On January 4, 2006, I granted an initial order pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, (the "*CCAA*") protecting the respondent corporations Bricore Land Group Ltd. et al. (collectively "Bricore"), from claims of their respective creditors. The order (paragraph 5) explicitly provides in accordance with the authority conferred upon the Court pursuant to s. 11(3) of the *CCAA* that "no Person shall commence or continue any Enforcement or Proceeding of any kind against or in respect of Bricore Group or the Property". The initial period of 30 days has been extended many times. The stay of proceedings continues in effect. Ernst & Young Inc. was appointed monitor. That appointment continues.
>
> ...
>
> [16] Although the interpretation of s. 11.3 of the *CCAA* is not necessarily well settled in all aspects, it appears that the import of s. 11.3, which was introduced as an amendment to the Act in 1997, is this:
>
> (a) An application to lift a stay of proceedings must be addressed in the context of the broad objectives of the *CCAA* which is to promote reorganization and restructuring of companies. If s. 11.3 is interpreted too literally, it can render the stay provisions ineffective, leaving the collective good of the restructuring process subservient to the self-interest of a single creditor. Clearly, s. 11.3 must be construed so as not to defeat the overall

objectives of the Act. See *Smith Brothers Contracting Ltd. (Re)* (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 264 (B.C.S.C.).

(b) The standard for determining whether to lift the stay of proceedings is not, as ICR contends, whether the action is frivolous, analogous to the standard which a defendant applicant under Rule 173 of *The Queen's Bench Rules* must meet to set aside a statement of claim. Rather, to obtain an order lifting the stay ad hoc to permit the suit to proceed, the proposed plaintiff must establish that the cause of action is tenable. I interpret that to mean that the proposed plaintiff has a *prima facie* case. See *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 5029 (Ont. S.C.J.).

(c) In determining whether to lift a stay, the Court must take into consideration the relative prejudice to the parties. See *Ivaco, Inc. (Re), supra*, para. 20; and Richard H. McLaren & Sabrina Gherbaz, *Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy* (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1995) at 3-18.1. Counsel have cited the case of *GMAC Commercial Credit Corporation - Canada v. T.C.T. Logistics Inc.*, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 123, 2006 SCC 35. The circumstances in that case are somewhat analogous but it is of limited assistance because the *CCAA* does not contain a provision equivalent to s. 215 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, which expressly provides that no action lies against the superintendent, an official receiver, an interim receiver or a trustee in certain circumstances without leave of the Court.

[17] For reasons outlined *supra*, I do not find the cause of action ICR asserts against Bricore to be tenable, not even as against Bricore Land Group Ltd. Therefore, the application to lift the stay of proceedings to permit the proposed action against Bricore is dismissed.

[18] Neither is there any basis upon which to lift the stay with respect to the proposed action against Maurice Duval, the Chief Restructuring Officer. Considerations applicable to Bricore under s. 11.3 do not apply to a court- appointed restructuring officer. Maurice Duval, as an officer of the Court, has explained his position in a cogent way. I accept his explanation. He did not sell the Department of Education Building to the City of Regina. He was not aware at the relevant time that the purchaser was going to resell. Indeed, his efforts were directed toward closing a single transaction involving all six Bricore properties. Although the proposed pleading accuses Mr. Duval of acting in "bad faith", it is not suggested on behalf of ICR that Mr. Duval has been guilty of fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct; that is, any of the limitations or exceptions expressly listed in paragraph 20(c) of the order of May 23, 2006.

[19] As stated previously, the overriding purpose of the *CCAA* must also be considered. That applies in the Duval situation too. The statute is intended to facilitate restructuring to serve the public interest. In many cases such as the present it is necessary for the Court to appoint officers whose expertise is required to fulfill its mandate. It is clearly in the public interest that capable people be willing to

> accept such assignments. It is to be expected that such acceptance be contingent on protective provisions such as are included in the order of May 23, 2006, appointing Mr. Duval. It is important that the Court exercise caution in removing such restrictions; otherwise, the ability of the Court to obtain the assistance of needed experts will necessarily be impaired. Qualified professionals will be less willing to accept assignments absent the protection provisions in the appointing order.[15]

IV. Issue #1: Does the stay of proceedings imposed by the supervising *CCAA* judge under the Initial Order apply to an action commenced by ICR, a post-filing claimant, such that leave to commence an action against Bricore is required?

22 ICR argues that, as a post-filing creditor, the Initial Order does not apply to it, either as a matter of law or on the basis of a proper interpretation of the Initial Order.

23 The authority to make an order staying and prohibiting proceedings against a debtor company is contained in s. 11(3) of the *CCAA*:

> 11.(3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,
>
> (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
> (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

24 Pursuant to s. 11(3) of the *CCAA*, Koch J. granted the Initial Order providing for a stay and prohibition of new proceedings in these terms:

> 5. During the 30-day period from and after the date of filing of this application on January 4, 2006 or during the period of any extension of such 30-day period granted by further order of the Court (the "Stay Period"), no Person shall commence or continue any Enforcement or Proceeding of any kind against or in respect of Bricore Group or the Property. Any and all Enforcement or Proceedings already commenced (as at the date of this Order) against or in respect of Bricore Group or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended.
> 6. During the Stay Period, no person shall assert, invoke, rely upon, exercise or attempt to assert, invoke, rely upon or exercise any rights:
>
> a) against Bricore Group or the Property;
> b) as a result of any default or non-performance by Bricore Group, the making or filing of this proceeding or any admission or evidence in this pro-

c) in respect of any action taken by Bricore Group or in respect of any of the Property under, pursuant to or in furtherance of this Order.

. . .

11. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Order:

a) no creditor of Bricore Group shall be under any obligation, by reason only of the issuance of this Order, to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to Bricore Group, except as such creditor may agree; and
b) Bricore Group may, by written consent of its counsel of record, agree to waive any of the protections that this Order provides to them, whether such waiver is given in respect of a single creditor or class of creditors or is given in respect of all creditors generally.

...

13. Any act or action taken or notice given by creditors or other Persons or their agents, from and after 12:01 a.m. (local Saskatoon time) on the date of the filing of the application for this Order to the time of the granting of this Order, to commence or continue Enforcement or to take any Proceeding (including, without limitation, the application of funds in reduction of any debt, set-off or the consolidation of accounts) is, unless the Court orders otherwise, deemed not to have been taken or given.

"Proceeding" is defined in para. 22 of Schedule "A" to the Initial Order as "a lawsuit, legal action, court application, arbitration, hearing, mediation process, enforcement process, grievance, extrajudicial proceeding of any kind or other proceeding of any kind."

25 The authority to extend an initial order is contained in s. 11(4) of the *CCAA:*

> 11(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,
>
> (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
> (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
> (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Koch J., pursuant to this subsection, extended the stay many times and the stay continues in force.

26 As authority for the proposition that the Initial Order does not stay proceedings with respect to claims that arise after the Initial Order, ICR's counsel cites Professor Honsberger's *Debt Restructuring Principles & Practice*:

> The scope of an order staying proceedings extends only to claims that arose prior to the order. A proceeding based on a claim that arose after an order was made staying proceedings is not affected by the stay.[16] [Footnote omitted.]

The only case footnoted is *Ramsay Plate Glass Co. v. Modern Wood Products Ltd.*[17] *In my respectful view, the facts in Ramsay Glass* narrow its application.

27 In *Ramsay Glass*, the initial *CCAA* order, dated April 12, 1951, suspended all proceedings against Modern Wood Products Ltd. Modern Wood Products made an offer of compromise that was accepted by its existing creditors and approved by the Court on May 21, 1951. Ramsay Glass sought to enforce a claim against Modern Wood Products that arose in 1953. Modern Wood Products sought to strike Ramsay Glass's claim on the basis that its proceedings were stayed by the April 1951 order.

28 In dismissing the application to strike, Prevost J. wrote:

> CONSIDERING that said claim is not provable in bankruptcy and that under *The Bankruptcy Act* an order staying proceedings would not apply to such a claim: *Richardson & Co. v. Storey*, 23 C.B.R. 145, [1942] 1 D.L.R. 182, Abr. Con. 301; *In re Bolf*, 26 C.B.R. 149, [1945] Que. S.C. 173, Abr. Con. 303;
>
> CONSIDERING that s. 10 of *The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and the judgments rendered under its authority should receive the same interpretation in this respect as s. 40 of *The Bankruptcy Act*;
>
> CONSIDERING that the present claim is in no way affected by the judgment rendered on April 12, 1951 by Boyer J. under *The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, ordering suspension of all proceedings against defendant company the present claim being posterior to said date and having not been made the subject of any compromise or arrangement homologated by this Court;
>
> CONSIDERING that the present claim arose in 1953, two years after the judgment of Boyer J. homologating the compromise following the non-payment by defendant company of merchandise purchased by it from plaintiff company during said year;[18]

I do not interpret *Ramsay Glass* as permitting a post-filing claimant to commence an action against a debtor company without obtaining leave while the *CCAA* stay is in effect. In my opinion, *Ramsay Glass* can be read as authority for the proposition that a post-filing creditor need not apply for leave after the stay has been lifted. In that respect, it parallels *360networks Inc., Re;*[19] *Stelco Inc., (Re);*[20] *and Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*[21]

29 In 360networks, a creditor (Caterpillar Financial Services Limited) had both pre-filing and post-filing claims. Caterpillar applied, *inter alia*, for an order lifting the stay of proceedings. Tysoe J. wrote:

> 8 On the hearing of the applications, Caterpillar continued to take the position that all of its claims could properly be determined within the *CCAA* proceedings on the first of its two applications. I agree that the Deficiency Claim and the Secured Creditor Claim are properly determinable within the *CCAA* proceedings, but it is my view that it would not be appropriate to make determinations in respect of the Trust Claim or the Post-Filing Claim in the *CCAA* proceedings. The only remaining thing to be done in the *CCAA* proceedings is the determination of the validity of claims for the purposes of the Restructuring Plan (with Caterpillar's claims being the only unresolved ones). **Neither the Trust Claim nor the Post-Filing Claim falls into this category of claim because each of these types of claim is not affected by the Restructuring Plan.** Indeed, the Post-Filing Claim was not asserted in Caterpillar's proof of claim and surely cannot be adjudicated upon within Caterpillar's appeal of the disallowance of its proof of claim. The B.C. Court of Appeal has recently affirmed, in *United Properties Ltd. v. 642433 B.C. Ltd.*, [2003] B.C.J. No. 852, 2003 BCCA 203 (B.C.C.A.), that it is appropriate for the court to decline jurisdiction to resolve a dispute in *CCAA* proceedings which, although it may relate to them, is not part and parcel of the proceedings. [Emphasis added.]
>
> . . .
>
> 11 Counsel for Caterpillar relies for the first ground on the fact that s. 12 of the *CCAA* authorizes the court to deal with secured and unsecured claims. However, s. 12 deals with the determination of claims for the purposes of the CCAA and does not authorize the court to determine claims which fall outside of *CCAA* proceedings, such as the Trust Claim and the Post-Filing Claim.[22]

In the result, Tysoe J. lifted the stay so as to permit an action to be commenced to resolve all of Caterpillar's claims. The significance of the decision for our purposes is that the Court in *360networks* considered the stay as applying to claims that arose after the initial order.

30 In *Stelco,* Farley J., relying on *360networks*, also held that the post-filing creditor's claim in that case "continues to be stayed and is to be dealt with in the ordinary course of litigation after Stelco's *CCAA* protection is terminated."[23]

31 *Campeau* does not deal with a post-filing creditor, but it does address the situation where a creditor, whose claim is not accepted as part of the plan of arrangement, wants to commence action. Blair J. (as he then was) refused an application brought by Robert Campeau and the Campeau Corporations to lift the stay of proceeding imposed by the initial order. In doing so, he wrote:

> 24. In making these orders, I see no prejudice to the Campeau plaintiffs. The processing of their action is not being precluded, but merely postponed. Their claims may, indeed, be addressed more expeditiously than might have otherwise been the case, as they may be dealt with - at least for the purposes of that proceeding - in the C.C.A.A. proceeding itself. On the other hand, there might be great prejudice to Olympia & York if its attention is diverted from the corporate restructuring process and it is required to expend time and energy in defending an action of the complexity and dimension of this one. While there may not be a great deal of

prejudice to National Bank in allowing the action to proceed against it, I am satisfied that there is little likelihood of the action proceeding very far or very effectively unless and until Olympia & York - whose alleged misdeeds are the real focal point of the attack on both sets of defendants - is able to participate.

25. In addition to the foregoing, I have considered the following factors in the exercise of my discretion:

1. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the Campeau claim must be dealt with, either in the action or in the C.C.A.A. proceedings and that it cannot simply be ignored. I agree. However, in my view, it is more appropriate, and in fact is essential, that the claim be addressed within the parameters of the C.C.A.A. proceedings rather than outside, in order to maintain the integrity of those proceedings. Were it otherwise, the numerous creditors in that mammoth proceeding would have no effective way of assessing the weight to be given to the Campeau claim in determining their approach to the acceptance or rejection of the Olympia & York Plan filed under the Act.
2. In this sense, the Campeau claim - like other secured, undersecured, unsecured, and contingent claims - must be dealt with as part of a "controlled stream" of claims that are being negotiated with a view to facilitating a compromise and arrangement between Olympia & York and its creditors. In weighing "the good management" of the two sets of proceedings - i.e. the action and the CCAA proceeding - the scales tip in favour of dealing with the Campeau claim in the context of the latter:

see *Attorney General v. Arthur Andersen & Co.* (United Kingdom) (1988), [1989] E.C.C. 224 (C.A.), cited in *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim, [1992] O.J. No. 1330, supra.* **I am aware, when saying this, that in the initial plan of compromise and arrangement filed by the applicants with the court on August 21, 1992, the applicants have chosen to include the Campeau plaintiffs amongst those described as "Persons not Affected by the Plan".** This treatment does not change the issues, in my view, as it is up to the applicants to decide how they wish to deal with that group of "creditors" in presenting their plan, and up to the other creditors to decide whether they will accept such treatment. In either case, the matter is being dealt with, as it should be, within the context of the C.C.A.A. proceedings.[24] [Emphasis added.]

Campeau is further authority for the proposition that a supervising *CCAA* judge can refuse a prospective creditor, who is not part of the plan of arrangement, leave to commence proceedings and that the creditor may commence action after the stay is lifted.

32 Each of *360networks*[25], *Stelco*[26] *and Campeau*[27] *supports the proposition that while a stay of proceedings is extant, an application to lift the stay must be made to permit an action to be commenced against a debtor that is subject to a CCAA* order, regardless of whether the claim arises before or after the initial order, or whether the prospective creditor is able to take part in the plan of arrangement.

33 Prevost J. in *Ramsay Glass* points out that under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*[28] (*the "BIA"*) the stay of proceedings does not extend to a claim not provable in bankruptcy. This is so, however, because of the definition of "claim provable in bankruptcy" and ss. 69.3(1) and s. 121. (See Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.*[29]) While s. 12 of the *CCAA* defines "claim" by reference to "claim provable in bankruptcy," it has not been interpreted as limiting the extent of the stay.

34 On the face of ss. 11(3) and (4) of the *CCAA*, the authority to safeguard the company is not limited to staying existing actions, but extends to "prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of ... any other action, suit or proceeding against the company." Unlike the *BIA* there are no words limiting this phrase to debts or claims in existence at the time of the initial order.

35 With respect to the wording of the Initial Order, there can be no question that it applies to post-filing creditors. The broad wording of paras. 5 and 6 of the Initial Order and the definition of "proceeding" confirm this. No distinction is made between creditors in existence at the time of the Initial Order and those who become creditors after. Paragraph 11(b) also establishes a mechanism for post-filing creditors to seek relief by obtaining an exemption from the protection afforded Bricore, which would include the prohibition of proceedings. The obvious implication is that the prohibition of proceedings applies to post-filing creditors, subject, of course, to obtaining leave of the Court to commence action.

V. Issue #2. Does s. 11.3 of the *CCAA* mean that a post-filing claimant cannot be subject to the stay of proceedings imposed by the Initial Order?

36 ICR argued that by the addition of s. 11.3 in 1997[30] to the *CCAA*, Parliament intended to grant a post-filing creditor the right to sue without obtaining leave.

37 In my respectful view, s. 11.3 cannot be interpreted in the way in which ICR contends. Indeed, a more logical and internally consistent reading of s. 11.3 and the other sections of the *CCAA* is to permit the supervising judge to determine, as a matter of discretion, whether an action commenced by a post-filing creditor should be permitted to proceed.

38 Section 11.3 forms part of a comprehensive series of sections addressing the question of stays added in 1997 and 2001:[31]

> No stay, etc., in certain cases
>
> 11.1 (2) No order may be made under this Act **staying or restraining** the exercise of any right to terminate, amend or claim any accelerated payment under an eligible financial contract or preventing a member of the Canadian Payments Association established by the *Canadian Payments Act* from ceasing to act as a clearing agent or group clearer for a company in accordance with that Act and the by-laws and rules of that Association. (Added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124)
>
> No stay, etc., in certain cases
>
> 11.11 No order may be made under this Act **staying or restraining**

(a) the exercise by the Minister of Finance or the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of any power, duty or function assigned to them by the *Bank Act*, the *Cooperative Credit Associations Act*, the *Insurance Companies Act* or the *Trust and Loan Companies Act;*
(b) the exercise by the Governor in Council, the Minister of Finance or the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation of any power, duty or function assigned to them by the *Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act*; or
(c) the exercise by the Attorney General of Canada of any power, assigned to him or her by the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act.* (Added by S.C. 2001, c. 9, s. 577.)

No stay, etc. in certain cases

11.2 No order may be made under section 11 **staying or restraining any action, suit or proceeding** against a person, other than a debtor company in respect of which an application has been made under this Act, who is obligated under a letter of credit or guarantee in relation to the company. (Added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124)

11.3 No order made under section 11 shall have the effect of

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or
(b) requiring the further advance of money or credit. (Added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124)

[Emphasis added.]

39 In ss. 11.1(2), 11.11 and 11.2, Parliament uses the words "staying or restraining" to describe those circumstances limiting the scope of the stay power, but these words are not repeated in s. 11.3. This application of the *expressio unius* principle supports the obvious implication that s. 11.3 does not limit the authority of the court to stay all proceedings.

40 While the debates of the House of Commons in Hansard do not comment on s. 11.3, several text book authors assist with the task of interpretation. Professor Honsberger states:

> A distinction is made between the compulsory supply of goods and services and the extension of credit by suppliers to a debtor company in CCAA proceedings.
>
> Suppliers may be enjoined from cutting off services or discontinuing the supply of goods by reason of there being arrears of payment provided the debtor commences regular payments for current deliveries.

> However, no order made under s. 11 of the Act has the effect of prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration after the order is made.
>
> . . .
>
> ... A court could make a similar order after the 1997 amendments provided it stipulated that the debtor company made immediate payment for "goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration after the order is made.[32]

[Footnotes omitted.]

41 Professor McLaren similarly comments in his text "Canadian Commercial Reorganization":[33]

> 3.800 ... Section 11.3 acts as an exemption to the stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA. It appears the section is meant to balance the rights of creditors with debtors. The section addresses the concern that judges had too much discretion in issuing stays. Under s. 11.3(*a*), if a person supplies goods or services or if the debtor continues to occupy or use leased or licensed property, the court will not issue a stay order with respect to the payment for such goods or services or leased or licensed property. In essence, s. 11.3(*a*) will not permit the court to prohibit these individuals from demanding payment from the debtor for goods, services or use of leased property, after a court order is made.

42 Finally, Professor Sarra in *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[34] provides this insight:

> While the court cannot compel a supplier to continue to extend credit to the debtor during a *CCAA* proceeding, the court can protect trade suppliers that choose to supply goods or credit during the stay period by granting them a charge on the assets of the debtor that will rank ahead of other claims. While section 11.3 of the *CCAA* states that no stay of proceedings can have the effect of prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services or the use of leased or licensed property, or requiring the further advance of money or credit, trade suppliers were often continuing credit only to find that they had lost further assets during the workout period because of their priority in the hierarchy of claims. Hence the practice of post-petition trade credit priority charges developed, first recognized in Alberta.[35] [Footnotes omitted.]

43 *Smith Bros. Contracting Ltd. (Re)*[36] also supports a narrow reading of s. 11.3. After citing *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*[37] and *Quintette Coal Limited. v. Nippon Steel Corporation*[38] with respect to the intention of Parliament and the object and scheme of the *CCAA*, Bauman J. in *Smith Bros.* wrote:

45 It is interesting that Gibbs J.A. suggested that it would be unlikely that a court would exercise its s. 11 jurisdiction:

> ... where the result would be to enforce the continued supply of goods and services to the debtor company without payment for current deliveries ...

46 Parliament has now precluded that by adding s. 11.3(a) to the CCAA. It is instructive to note, however, that the subsection has been added against the backdrop of jurisprudence which has underlined the very broad scope of the court's jurisdiction to stay proceedings under s. 11.

47 To repeat the relevant portion of the section:

> 11.3 No order made under s. 11 shall have the effect of
>
> (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for ... use of leased or licenced property ... provided after the order is made;

It is noted that the remedy which is preserved for creditors is a relatively narrow one; it is the right to require immediate payment for the use of the leased property.[39]

Thus, Bauman J. interpreted s. 11.3 in accordance with Parliament's intention and the object and scheme of the C*CAA* as creating a narrow right - the right to withhold services without immediate payment.

44 I agree with Bricore's counsel. When a supplier is requested to provide goods or services on a post-filing basis to a company operating under a stay of proceedings imposed by the *CCAA*, s. 11.3 allows the supplier the right:

(a) to refuse to supply any such goods or services at all;
(b) to supply such goods or services on a "cash on demand" basis only;
(c) to negotiate with the insolvent corporation for the amendment of the *CCAA* Order to create a post-filing supplier's charge on the assets of the insolvent corporation to secure the payment by the insolvent corporation of amounts owing by it to such post-filing suppliers; or
(d) to take the risk of supplying goods or services on credit.

Where the Initial Order imposes a stay of proceedings and prohibits further proceedings, s. 11.3 does not permit the supplier of goods or services to sue without obtaining leave of the court to do so.

VI. Issue #3: If leave is required, did the supervising *CCAA* judge commit a reviewable error in refusing ICR leave to commence an action against Bricore?

45 Having determined that the stay and prohibition of proceedings applies to ICR, notwithstanding its status as a post-filing creditor, the next issue is whether Koch J. erred in refusing to lift the stay on the basis that the claim was not tenable.

46 The claim against Bricore is presumably against Bricore both in its own right and pursuant to its indemnification agreement with the CRO. Paragraph 18 of the CRO Order requires Bricore to indemnify the CRO:

> 18. Bricore Group shall indemnify and hold harmless the CRO from and against all costs (including, without limitation, defence costs), claims, charges, expenses, liabilities and obligations of any nature whatsoever incurred by the CRO that may arise as a result of any matter directly or indirectly relating to or pertaining to any one or more of:
>
> (a) the CRO's position or involvement with Bricore Group;
> (b) the CRO's administration of the management, operations and business and financial affairs of Bricore Group;
> (c) any sale of all or part of the Property pursuant to these proceedings;
> (d) any plan or plans of compromise or arrangement under the CCAA between Bricore Group and one or more classes of its creditors; and/or
> (e) any action or proceeding to which the CRO may be made a party by reason of having taken over the management of the business of Bricore Group.[10]

47 The authority to lift the stay imposed by the Initial Order against Bricore is contained in s. 11(4) of the *CCAA*:

> 11(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,
>
> ...
>
> (c) prohibiting, **until otherwise ordered by the court**, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company. [Emphasis added.]

48 This is a discretionary power, which invokes the standard of appellate review stated as follows:

> [22] ... [T]he function of an appellate court is not to exercise an independent discretion of its own. It must defer to the judge's exercise of his discretion and must not interfere with it merely on the ground that members of the appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently. The function of the appellate court is one of review only. It may set aside the judge's exercise of his discretion on the ground that it was based on a misunderstanding of the law or of the evidence before him or on an inference that particular facts existed or did not exist, which, although it was one that might legitimately have been drawn on the evi-

> dence that was before the judge, can be demonstrated to be wrong by further evidence that has become available by the time of the appeal, or on the ground that there has been a change of circumstances after the judge made his order.[41]

It is often expressed as permitting intervention where the judge acts arbitrarily, on a wrong principle, or on an erroneous view of the facts, or when the appeal court is satisfied that there is likely to be a failure of justice as a result of the refusal. See: *Martin v. Deutch.*[42]

49 With respect to discretionary decisions made under the CCAA, there is a particular reluctance to intervene. The reluctance is justified on the basis of the specialization of the judges who have carriage of complex proceedings that are often replete with compromised solutions.[43] This does not mean that the Court of Appeal can turn a blind eye or permit an injustice, but it does provide the backdrop against which *CCAA* discretionary decisions are reviewed.

50 Unlike the *BIA*,[44] the *CCAA* contains no specific statutory test to provide guidance on the circumstances in which a *CCAA* stay of proceedings is to be lifted. Some guidance, nonetheless, can be found in the statute and in the jurisprudence.

51 Subsection 11(6) of the *CCAA* states:

> 11 (6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless
>
> (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
> (b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

While the reference to "order" in the opening clause "[t]he court shall not make an order under s. (3) or (4)" may very well be to the Initial Order and not to the order lifting the stay, s. 11(6) and, in particular, its legislative history, are also relevant to an application to lift the stay.

52 Subsection 11(6) was brought into effect in 1997 by Bill C-5, which enacted "An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act." When Bill C-5 received third reading on October 23, 1996, s. 11(6) took this form:

> 11 (6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless
>
> (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
> (b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that:
>
> (i) the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence,
> (ii) a viable compromise or arrangement could likely be made in respect of the company, if the order being applied for were made, and
> (iii) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the order being applied for were made.

After Bill C-5 received third reading, it was referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.[45] The Committee reported:

> A number of insolvency experts were of the opinion that the proposed amendment would make it virtually impossible to obtain extensions of the initial 30-day stay under the CCAA and force companies to file plans of arrangement within 30 days after the making of the initial stay order.
>
> Others suggested that some CCAA reorganizations would have turned out differently if the amendment had been in place.
>
> . . .
>
> Of the submissions received about proposed subsection 11(6), all but one condemned the provision.
>
> ...
>
> The CLHIA [Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association] argued that the amendment to the bill would be a significant improvement to the CCAA for four reasons:
>
> (a) it would give direction to the courts as to the tests that must be met before the extension order was granted;
> (b) it would more closely align the CCAA with the BIA;
> (c) the tests are well-established under the BIA and have received extensive scrutiny and study; and
> (d) the tests would direct the courts to consider how the stay would affect creditors. [Footnote omitted.]
>
> . . .
>
> The Committee shares the concerns expressed about the potential impact of proposed subsection 11(6) of the CCAA, particularly the concern that the CCAA may no longer be a sufficiently flexible vehicle for large, complex corporate reorganizations.
>
> While the Committee fully supports initiatives to align the provisions of the CCAA more closely with those of the BIA, these initiatives must be the subject of thorough discussion and analysis before [making] their way into legislation. Unfortunately, such discussion did not take place prior [to] the introduction of proposed subsection 11(6).[46]

Notwithstanding the submissions of the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, the Standing Committee recommended that Bill C-5 be amended by striking subparagraphs 11(6)(b)(ii) and (iii).

53 The House of Commons concurred in the Amendments recommended by the Senate on April 15, 1997.[47] Bill C-5, as thus amended, received Royal Assent on April 25, 1997 and was proclaimed in its present skeletal form on September 30, 1997.[48] Neither the amending legislation[49] nor the proposed Bill presently before the Senate[50] make any change to s. 11 in this regard.

54 The Senate's and Parliament's specific rejection of a limitation on the court's discretion is a strong indication of Parliamentary intention. The fact that Parliament did not see fit to limit the discretion in any significant manner, despite having been given the opportunity to do so, confirms the broad discretion given in ss. 11(3) and (4) to the supervising *CCAA* judge. Discretion is never completely unfettered, but an appellate court should be reluctant to impose rigid tests, standards or criteria where Parliament has declined to do so. Some guidance can be taken from the jurisprudence.

55 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*[51] *Paperny J. (as she then was) indicated that the obligation of the supervising CCAA* judge is to "always have regard to the particular facts" and "to balance" the interests. As Farley J. said in *Ivaco Inc., Re*,[52] the supervising *CCAA* judge must also be concerned not to permit one creditor to mount "an indirect but devastating attack on the CCAA stay" so as to give one creditor an inappropriate advantage over other unsecured creditors as well as over secured creditors with priority.

56 In *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*[53] Ground J. stated this to be the criteria to determine whether a stay should be lifted:

> 20 It appears to me that the criteria which the court must consider in determining whether to lift a stay, being whether the proposed cause of action is tenable, the balancing of interests as between the parties, the relative prejudice to the parties, and whether the proposed action would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the court process, would all be met with respect to a trial of issues to resolve interpretation of the APAs with respect to the calculation of the working capital adjustments.

Ground J. went on to confirm that finding a tenable or reasonable cause of action is not the only factor to be considered:

> 30 Even if the Statement of Claim did disclose a tenable or reasonable cause of action, there are a number of other factors which this court must consider which militate against the lifting of the stay in the circumstances of this case. The institution of the Proposed Action, even if a tight timetable is imposed, would inevitably result in considerable delay and complication with respect to the full distribution of the estate to the detriment of many small trade creditors and individual creditors as well as to pension claimants. In addition, it would appear from the evidence before this court that Heico has been aware of most of the matters alleged in the Statement of Claim for approximately 2 years and there does not appear to be any valid reason given for the delay in commencing the application to lift the stay.

57 Turning back to the case before us, Koch J.'s reasons for refusing to lift the stay were:

> [16] . . .
>
> (a) An application to lift a stay of proceedings must be addressed in the context of the broad objectives of the *CCAA* which is to promote reorganization and restructuring of companies. ....
> (b) The standard for determining whether to lift the stay of proceedings is not, as ICR contends, whether the action is frivolous, analogous to the standard which a defendant applicant under Rule 173 of *The Queen's Bench Rules* must meet to set aside a statement of claim. Rather, to obtain an order lifting the stay ad hoc to permit the suit to proceed, the proposed plaintiff must establish that the cause of action is tenable. I interpret that to mean that the proposed plaintiff has a *prima facie* case. See *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 5029 (Ont. S.C.J.).
> (c) In determining whether to lift a stay, the Court must take into consideration the relative prejudice to the parties. See *Ivaco, Inc. (Re), supra*, para. 20; and Richard H. McLaren & Sabrina Gherbaz, *Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy* (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1995) at 3-18.1. ...[54]

He went on to find that the proposed action against Bricore was not "tenable."

58 On an application made by a post-filing creditor, a supervising *CCAA* judge can refuse to lift the stay on the basis that the creditor's claim is outside the *CCAA* process and the action can be commenced after the *CCAA* order is lifted. (See *360networks*[55] and *Stelco*[56]). Koch J. did not exercise this option. He was no doubt motivated in part by the fact that by the time ICR's claim could be tried, after the stay is no longer in effect, there may be no funds for it to claim as Bricore has now liquidated all of its assets and there remains, for all intents and purposes, a pool of funds only. The funds are subject to a plan of distribution, approved by the creditors, and will be distributed over this year.

59 Instead of simply rejecting the claim, Koch J. appears to have weighed the evidence to a certain extent as a means of deciding the next step. He concluded that the claim was not frivolous within the meaning of a Queen's Bench Rule 173 striking motion, but it was nonetheless an untenable claim. The question becomes whether a supervising CCAA judge can weigh a post-filing claim in this manner.

60 Professor Sarra comments on the anomalous position of liquidating *CCAA* proceedings:

> One policy issue that has not to date been fully explored is whether the *CCAA* should be used to effect an organized liquidation that should properly occur under the *BIA* or receivership proceedings. Increasingly, there are liquidating *CCAA* proceedings, whereby the debtor corporation is for all intents and purposes liquidated, but not under the supervision of a trustee in bankruptcy or in compliance with all of the requirements of the *BIA*. While creditors still must vote in support of such plans in the requisite amounts, there may be some public policy concerns

> regarding the use of a restructuring statute, under the broad scope of judicial discretion, to effect liquidation. ...[57]

The issue of whether the *CCAA* should be used for a liquidating, as opposed to a restructuring purpose, is not before us. In the case at bar, when the Initial Order was granted, it was thought possible that Bricore could be restructured. It was only some months after the Initial Order that it became clear that all of the assets would have to be sold. Our task at this point is to address the position of an undetermined claim arising post-filing in such a context.

61 If a claim had some reasonable prospect of success and were otherwise meritorious in the *CCAA* context, it seems inappropriate to refuse simply to lift the stay on the basis that the claim is outside the *CCAA* process knowing that, by the time the matter is heard in the ordinary course, there will be no assets remaining. On the other hand, it also seems inappropriate to delay distribution of the assets under a plan of arrangement, or make some other accommodation, for an action that is likely to fail. I should make it clear that I am not addressing the issue of whether a meritorious claimant can share in a proposed plan of distribution as a result of the liquidation of the assets. The issue before this Court is whether a post-filing creditor should be permitted to commence action, in the context of what is now a liquidating *CCAA*, and avail itself of whatever pre-judgment remedies might be available to it as a result of its claim.

62 In the face of a liquidating plan of arrangement, given the broad jurisdiction conferred by the *CCAA* on the Court, it seems appropriate that the supervising judge establish some mechanism to weigh the post-filing claim to determine the next step. The next step might entail permitting the claimant to commence action and attempt to convince a chambers judge to grant it a pre-judgment remedy in relation to the funds. It is also possible that the supervising judge may delay distribution of the funds, or some portion thereof, with or without full security for costs, or on such other terms as seems fit. Mechanisms to test the claim could include referral to a special claims officer, examination of the pertinent principal parties, or a settlement conference, or, as in this case, a preliminary examination by the supervising *CCAA* judge in chambers based on affidavit evidence.

63 In the case at bar, having determined that it was appropriate to assess ICR's claim in some way, did Koch J. err either in his statement of the appropriate test or in its application?

64 Koch J. used *prima facie* case, which he equated with tenable cause of action. "Tenable cause of action" is taken from Ground J.'s decision in *Ivaco*,[58] but Ground J. used "reasonable cause of action" or "tenable case," as comparable terms and as only one of four criteria to be considered. The use of "*prima facie* case" defined as "tenable cause of action" is not particularly helpful as the words have been used in different contexts with different purposes in mind. Even in the context of bankruptcy where specific guidelines are given, and the courts have had long experience with the application of the tests, the debate continues as to what is meant by *prima facie* case and whether it is too high of a standard to apply in determining whether an action may be commenced.[59]

65 Koch J. was clearly correct to hold that the threshold established by s. 173 of *The Queen's Bench Rules* is too low. On the other hand, it is also important not to decide the case. The purpose for passing on the claim is not to determine whether it will or will not succeed, but to determine whether the plan of arrangement should be delayed or further compromised to accommodate a future claim, or some other step need be taken to maintain the integrity of the *CCAA* proceeding.

66 Given the broad discretion granted to a supervisory judge under the *CCAA*, as well as the knowledge and experience he or she gains from the ongoing dealings with the parties under the pro-

ceedings, it would be contrary to the purpose of the *CCAA* for the law under it to develop in a restrictive way. Having regard for this, there ought not to be rigid requirements imposed on how a supervising *CCAA* judge must exercise his or her discretion with respect to lifting the stay.

67 Nonetheless, a broad test articulated along the lines of that in *Ma, Re*[60] *may be of assistance. The test from Ma, Re* is:

> 3 ... As stated in *Re Francisco*, [1995] O.J. No. 917, the role of the court is to ensure that there are "sound reasons, consistent with the scheme of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*" to relieve against the automatic stay. While the test is not whether there is a *prima facie* case, that does not, in our view, preclude any consideration of the merits of the proposed action where relevant to the issue of whether there are "sound reasons" for lifting the stay. For example, if it were apparent that the proposed action had little prospect of success, it would be difficult to find that there were sound reasons for lifting the stay.

While the *Ma, Re* test was developed for use under the *BIA*, a test based on sound reasons, consistent with the scheme of the *CCAA*, to relieve against the stay imposed by ss. 11(3) and (4) of the *CCAA*, may be a better way to express the task of the chambers judge faced with a liquidating *CCAA* than a test based simply on *prima facie* case. It must be kept firmly in mind that the Court is dealing with a claimant that did not avail itself of the remedy of withholding services under s. 11.3. It is also useful to remind oneself that, in a case such as this, the *CCAA* proceeding began as a restructuring exercise with the attendant possibility of creating s. 11.3 claimants. The threshold must be a significant one, but not insurmountable.

68 In determining what constitutes "sound reasons," much is left to the discretion of the judge. However, previous decisions on this point provide some guidance as to factors that may be considered:

(a) the balance of convenience;
(b) the relative prejudice to the parties;
(c) the merits of the proposed action, where they are relevant to the issue of whether there are "sound reasons" for lifting the stay (i.e., as was said in *Ma, Re*, if the action has little chance of success, it may be harder to establish "sound reasons" for allowing it to proceed).

The supervising *CCAA* judge should also consider the good faith and due diligence of the debtor company as referenced in s. 11(6). Ultimately, it is in the discretion of the supervising *CCAA* judge as to whether the proposed action ought to be allowed to proceed in the face of the stay.

69 While Koch J. did not state the test as broadly as I have, I agree that ICR does not reach the necessary threshold. ICR did not structure its affairs or establish a claim with the specificity that justifies the development of a remedy to allow it to participate in the liquidation of the Bricore assets. There is also no aspect of the liquidation that requires the Court in this case to be concerned. In particular, the stay need not be lifted, and no other step need be taken in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings in light of these facts:

1. as of January 30, 2006, the Building was subject to an exclusive Selling Officer Agreement that provided CMN Calgary with the exclusive right to sell the prop-

erty and to earn a commission of 1.25% of the purchase price,[61] which is significantly less than that being claimed by ICR at a 5% commission;

2. the sale to the Proposed Purchaser was a sale of six of the seven Bricore properties;
3. the trial judge received a report dated September 25, 2006 from the CRO recommending approval of the sale, which is two days before the alleged contract with ICR was proposed;[62]
4. in the September 25 report, the CRO advised the Court that "the total aggregate purchase price for the Bricore Properties obtained by Bricore in the Accepted Offer to Purchase represented the greatest value which it would be possible to obtain for all of the Bricore Properties;"[63]
5. the September 27, 2006 letter from ICR to Bricore, states "we are aware that the properties are under contract to sell ..."; and,
6. there was no sale from Bricore to the City of Regina.

70 While ICR denies knowledge of the sale, it is important to come back to the September 27th letter from ICR to Mr. Ruf. It states:

> **We are aware that the properties are under contract to sell** and request that ICR be protected in the specific situations as outlined.[64] [Emphasis added]

The addition by the CRO of these words, "Date of closing of **a sale** or December 31, 2006 whichever is earlier," to that letter adds further support to the veracity of the CRO's report to the effect that the CRO entered into discussions with ICR to provide for the eventuality of a failed sale to the purchaser with whom Bricore already had a contractual relationship.

71 Finally, in assessing Koch J.'s decision, and in determining the deference that is owed to it, I am not unmindful that he issued some 20 orders in 2006, pertaining to the Bricore restructuring, at least five of which dealt substantively with the Building and its prospective sale to the Proposed Purchaser.

72 Thus, applying the standard of review previously articulated, I cannot say that Koch J. acted arbitrarily, on a wrong principle, or on an erroneous view of the facts, or that a failure of justice is likely to result from the exercise of his discretion in the manner he did.

VII. Issue #4. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge make a reviewable error in refusing leave to commence an action against the CRO?

73 In addition to the indemnification provided by para. 18 of the CRO Order quoted above, the Order goes on to indicate the only circumstances in which the CRO can be sued personally:

> 20. For greater clarity, the CRO [*sic*]:
>
> ...
>
> (c) the CRO shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of his appointment or as a result of the fulfillment of his powers and duties as CRO, except as a result of instances of fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct on his part; and

(d) no Proceeding shall be commenced against the CRO as a result of or relating in any way to his appointment or to the fulfillment of his powers and duties as CRO, without prior leave of the Court on at least seven days' notice to Bricore Group, the CRO and legal counsel to Bricore Group.

21. Subject to paragraph 20 hereof, nothing in this Order shall restrict an action against the CRO for acts of gross negligence, bad faith or wilful misconduct committed by him.

Setting aside the obvious ambiguity in this Order, it can be taken that to assert a claim against the CRO personally, ICR had to claim "fraud, gross negligence, wilful misconduct or bad faith." ICR claimed "bad faith."

74 Based on para. 20(d) of the Initial Order, there is no question that ICR was required to obtain prior leave of the court. The issue thus becomes whether the supervising *CCAA* judge erred in exercising his discretion in refusing to lift the stay.

75 Koch J.'s reasons for refusing to lift the stay are these:

> [18] Neither is there any basis upon which to lift the stay with respect to the proposed action against Maurice Duval, the Chief Restructuring Officer. Considerations applicable to Bricore under s. 11.3 do not apply to a court-appointed restructuring officer. Maurice Duval, as an officer of the Court, has explained his position in a cogent way. I accept his explanation. He did not sell the Department of Education Building to the City of Regina. He was not aware at the relevant time that the purchaser was going to resell. Indeed, his efforts were directed toward closing a single transaction involving all six Bricore properties. Although the proposed pleading accuses Mr. Duval of acting in "bad faith", it is not suggested on behalf of ICR that Mr. Duval has been guilty of fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct; that is, any of the limitations or exceptions expressly listed in paragraph 20(c) of the order of May 23, 2006.
>
> [19] As stated previously, the overriding purpose of the *CCAA* must also be considered. That applies in the Duval situation too. The statute is intended to facilitate restructuring to serve the public interest. In many cases such as the present it is necessary for the Court to appoint officers whose expertise is required to fulfill its mandate. It is clearly in the public interest that capable people be willing to accept such assignments. It is to be expected that such acceptance be contingent on protective provisions such as are included in the order of May 23, 2006, appointing Mr. Duval. It is important that the Court exercise caution in removing such restrictions; otherwise, the ability of the Court to obtain the assistance of needed experts will necessarily be impaired. Qualified professionals will be less willing to accept assignments absent the protection provisions in the appointing order.[65]

76 Again, Koch J. employed the same mechanism that he used to assess the claim against Bricore. He considered the status of the CRO as an officer of the court, noted the ambiguity in the Order and weighed the evidence to a certain extent. The question he was answering was the sufficiency of the claim to permit an action to be commenced against the Court's officer.

77 Again, applying the standard of review with respect to discretionary orders, there is no basis upon which the Court can intervene with Koch J.'s refusal to lift the stay so as to permit an action against the CRO in his personal capacity.

VIII. Issue #5. Did the supervising *CCAA* judge err in awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis?

78 Koch J. awarded substantial indemnity costs for this reason:

> [6] In my view, allegations of misconduct against a court officer are rare and exceptional. Therefore costs on this motion should be imposed on a substantial indemnity scale, although not on the full solicitor and client basis sought. Bricore is entitled to costs on the motion of $2,000.00, and Maurice Duval is entitled to costs of $1,000.00, payable in each instance by the applicant, ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd.[66]

79 I note that Newbury J.A. in *New Skeena Forest Products Inc., Re*[67] dismissed a challenge to a costs award, holding that "these are the kinds of considerations which the [*CCAA*] Chambers judge ... was especially qualified to make." And, of course, all costs orders are discretionary orders.

80 Nonetheless in this case, it would appear that the supervising *CCAA* judge erred. There is no basis upon which to order substantial indemnity costs with respect to the application to lift the stay in relation to Bricore. Bad faith was not alleged on its part. With respect to the CRO, the only basis upon which the stay could be lifted was to make an allegation of "bad faith." In the absence of some other factor, ICR cannot be faulted for making the very allegation that it was required to make in order to bring its application within the ambit of the stay of proceedings that had been granted.

81 In addition, while Koch J. indicated he was not awarding solicitor-and- client costs, there is not a sufficient distinction between substantial indemnity costs and solicitor-and-client costs. An award approaching solicitor-and- client costs is still a punitive order and, as there is no authority for the awarding of substantial indemnity costs, relies upon the same jurisprudential base as solicitor-and-client costs. As such, the award does not seem to meet the test established in *Siemens v. Bawolin*[68] and *Hashemian v. Wilde*[69] wherein it is stated that solicitor-and-client costs are generally awarded where there has been reprehensible, scandalous or egregious conduct on the part of one of the parties in the context of the litigation.

82 If the parties are unable to agree with respect to costs in the Court of Queen's Bench and in this Court, they may speak to the Registrar to fix a time for a conference call hearing regarding costs.

cp/e/qlrds/qlmxt/qltxp/qlcas

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

2 Appeal Book, pp. 17a and 22a [Affidavit of Paul Mehlsen].

3 *Ibid.* at pp. 27a and 32a.

4 Order (Appointment of Chief Restructuring Officer, Extension of Stay of Proceedings; Additional DIP Financing) made May 23, 2006.

5 Order (Extension of Stay of Proceedings) made August 1, 2006.

6 Order (Extension of Stay of Proceedings) made August 18, 2006.

7 Order (Extension of Stay of Proceedings, Extension of Appointment of CRO and Increase in Maximum CRO Remuneration; Increase to Administrative Charge) made September 25, 2006.

8 Order (Approving Sale; Extending Stay of Proceedings; Extending Appointment of CRO) made October 10, 2006.

9 Appeal Book, p. 7a-8a.

10 *Ibid.* at p. 12a.

11 *Ibid.* at pp. 14a-15a.

12 *Ibid.* at p. 46a.

13 *Ibid.* at pp. 38a-39a.

14 *Ibid.* at p. 51a-52a.

15 *ICR v. Bricore*, [2007] S.J. No. 154, 2007 SKQB 121.

16 John D. Honsberger, *Debt Restructuring: Principles and Practice*, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2007) at p. 9.61.

17 (1954) 34 C.B.R. 82 (Que. S.C.). There are no cases referring to Ramsay Glass on the point that Prof. Honsberger raises in his text. (*Ptarmigan Airways Ltd. v. Federated Mining Corp.*, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 723 (N.T.S.C.) mentions *Ramsay Glass* but not in reference to the point made here.)

18 *Ibid.* at p. 83.

19 (2003), 45 C.B.R. (4th) 151 (B.C.S.C.), appeal dismissed (2007), 27 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (B.C.C.A.).

20 (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 283 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

21 (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).

22 *360networks, supra* note 19.

23 *Stelco, supra* note 20 at para. 11.

24 *Campeau, supra* note 21.

25 *360networks, supra* note 19.

26 *Stelco, supra* note 20.

27 *Campeau, supra* note 21.

28 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

29 Lloyd W. Houlden & Geoffrey B. Morawetz, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at pp. 562 and 789.

30 *An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act*, S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 124.

31 *Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act*, S.C. 2001, c. 9, s. 577.

32 *Debt Restructuring Principles and Practice, supra* note 16 at p. 9-88.1.

33 Richard H. McLaren, *Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy,* looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2007) at p. 3-17.

34 Janis Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007).

35 *Ibid.* at pp. 110-11.

36 (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 264 (B.C.S.C.). See also *Air Canada, Re*, (2004), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 182 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), and *Mosaic Group Inc., Re*. (2004), 3 C.B.R. (5th) 40 (Ont. S.C.J.).

37 [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C.C.A.).

38 (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.).

39 *Smith Bros., supra* note 36.

40 Order (Appointment of Chief Restructuring Officer; Extension of Stay of Proceedings; Additional DIP Financing) made May 23, 2006.

41 Bayda C.J.S., for the majority, in *Smart v. South Saskatchewan Hospital Centre* (1989), 75 Sask.R. 34 (C.A.), paraphrasing Lord Diplock in *Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton*, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042 at 1046.

42 [1943] O.R. 683 at 698.

43 *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, supra* note 34 at pp. 88-92.

44 *Supra* note 28.

45 Twelfth Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, February 1997, unnumbered p. 3 of the Chairman's Report, and p. 18.

46 *Ibid.* at pp. 17-18.

47 Canada Legislative Index, 2nd Session, 35th Parliament, Bill C-5, S.C. 1997, c. 12, pp. 1 & 2.

48 *Ibid.*

49 *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts,* S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

50 Bill C-62, *An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada,* 2005, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006-2007.

51 (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 15.

52 (2003), 1 C.B.R. (5th) 204 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial]) at para 3.

53 [2006] O.J. No. 5029 (Ont. S.C.J.).

54 *ICR v. Bricore, supra* note 15.

55 *360networks, supra* note 19.

56 *Stelco, supra* note 20.

57 *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act, supra* note 34 at p. 82.

58 *Ivaco, supra* note 53.

59 *Ma, Re* (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 68 (Ont. C.A.). See Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, supra note 29 at p. 403.

60 Ibid.

61 Order (Extension of Stay, DIP Financing, Sale Process & Shareholder Proceedings) of Koch J. in Chambers dated February 13, 2006.

62 Order made September 25, 2006, *supra* note 7.

63 Appeal Book, p. 37a, para. 3.

64 *Supra* note 11.

65 *ICR v. Bricore, supra* note 15.

66 *ICR v. Bricore,* [2007] S.J. No. 253, 2007 SKQB 144.

67 [2005] 8 W.W.R. 224 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 23.

68 2002 SKCA 84, [2002] 11 W.W.R. 246.

69 2006 SKCA 126, [2007] 2 W.W.R. 52.

Court File No.: 12-CL-9539-00CL

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TIMMINCO LIMITED AND BÉCANCOUR SILICON INC.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE MOVING PARTY, ST. CLAIR PENNYFEATHER, PLAINTIFF IN THE CLASS ACTION

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